RESERVE/COMMISSIONED OFFICER TRAINING

NON-RESIDENT STUDENT STUDY GUIDE

USAF Officer Training School
Maxwell AFB Alabama

Designed for AETC use only

This study Guide was prepared by:

Air Force Officer Accessions and Training Schools Curriculum Division

August 2000

Air Force Officer Accession and Training Schools
Officer Training School
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Cover Design by Penny Shindel

Reserve Commissioned Officer Training (RCOT)

Non-Resident Student Readings

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY (AETC)

MEMORANDUM FOR RESERVE COMMISSIONED OFFICER TRAINING (RCOT) STUDENTS

FROM: COMMANDER, 23RD TRAINING SQUADRON

SUBJECT: RCOT Nonresident Requirements

1. Congratulations on being commissioned an officer in the United States Air Force and your selection to attend RCOT. The mission of the 23d Training Squadron is to train, motivate, and prepare the finest officers in the Air Force for leadership challenges of the 21st Century. Upon the completion of RCOT, you will become one of these fine officers and a member of the world's most powerful and respected Air Force.

2. RCOT is designed to prepare you to accept the responsibilities associated with being an officer in the Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard. With the start of class 01-01, RCOT will consists of two phases: a read-ahead nonresident program and an intensive two-week resident course conducted at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. The nonresident portion is a prerequisite to the resident course, and it is made up of 15 lessons designed to familiarize you with the Air Force and the environment in which you will work. You can find these lessons on the Commissioned Officer Training Squadron homepage (ots.afoats.af.mil/23ts/index.htm). They are to be completed prior to your entry into the resident course. Following the completion of the 15 lessons, you must take, and pass, a short pretest, which is also located on the COT homepage. If you fail to correctly answer 80% of the pretest questions, you are ineligible to attend the resident program. Those who arrive without successfully completing the pretest requirement will be denied entry into the resident course and immediately returned to their host unit.

3. The nonresident portion of RCOT is the initial phase of your officer training, and its successful completion is a prerequisite to the RCOT resident course. We encourage you to approach the RCOT nonresident course seriously and to complete it expeditiously. If you have questions concerning the RCOT nonresident requirements or the RCOT program in general, please feel free to call us at 1-800-854-0188. Congratulations again on becoming a part of the US Air Force team, and "good luck" with your studies.

TIMOTHY R. MALINSKI
Lt Col, USAF
Commander, 23d Training Squadron

About the Cover

The Congressional Medal of Honor

This book is dedicated to the recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor. The Medal of Honor is the highest award for heroism in military action, which this Nation can bestow on a member of its Armed Forces. The first Medal of Honor won by an airman was awarded to Captain Edward V. Rickenbacker for aerial combat in 1918.

On 9 December 1861, Iowa Senator James W. Grimes introduced S. No. 82 in the United States Senate, a bill designed to "promote the efficiency of the Navy" by authorizing the production and distribution of "medals of honor". On 21 December, the bill was passed, authorizing 200 such medals be produced "which shall be bestowed upon such petty officers, seamen, landsmen and marines as shall distinguish themselves by their gallantry in action and other seamanlike qualities during the present war (Civil War)." President Lincoln signed the bill and the (Navy) Medal of Honor was born.

Two months later on 17 February 1862, Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson introduced a similar bill, this one to authorize "the President to distribute medals to privates in the Army of the United States who shall distinguish themselves in battle." Over the following months wording changed slightly as the bill made its way through Congress. When President Lincoln signed S.J.R. No 82 into law as 12 Stat. 523-624 on 14 July 1862, the Army Medal of Honor was born. It read in part:

> *"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to cause two thousand "medals of honor" to be prepared with suitable emblematic devices, and to direct that the same be presented, in the name of the Congress, to such non-commissioned officers and privates as shall most distinguish themselves by their gallantry in action, and other soldier-like qualities, during the present insurrection (Civil War)."*

With this simple and rather obscure act, Congress created a unique award that would achieve prominence in American history like few others.

The Air Force designed Medal of Honor was created on 14 April 1965. Members of the Air Force and its predecessor organizations have earned Medals of Honor in World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and in the Vietnam War. Two additional medals were presented by special Acts of Congress.

The Medal of Honor is awarded for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty.

Problem Solving

Introduction

The task of solving problems will consume a great deal of your time and energy as a commissioned officer and a manager. Although some people seem to have a special talent for assessing problems and devising solutions, the problem-solving process can be learned and a person's existing skills in this area can be improved through a systematic approach.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Comprehend the six-step problem solving process.

Samples of Behavior:
1. Explain the six-step problem-solving process.
2. Given a scenario, identify the steps in the problem-solving process.
3. Identify four ways of classifying data.
4. Identify examples of the four barriers to creativity.
5. Explain the four rules of brainstorming.
6. Explain the six basic measurement tools (flowchart, cause and effect diagram, Pareto chart, scatter diagram, histogram, and run chart.)

Information

Six-Step Problem-Solving Process

A problem can be a question raised for inquiry, consideration, or solution; an unsettled question; or a source of perplexity or vexation. There's nothing inherently difficult about solving problems. Sure, some problems are more difficult to solve than others, but this is because some problems are more complex than others. It isn't because the problems themselves resist being solved.

THE SIX STEPS OF THE PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS

1. Recognize the problem.
2. Gather data relative to the problem.
3. List possible solutions to the problem.
4. Test possible solutions to the problem.
5. Select the best solution to the problem.
6. Implement the problem solution.

Recognize the Problem

This first step in problem solving, **identifying the problem**, is so critical that it's the first step in ALL recognized techniques of problem solving. To identify the problem incorrectly and then "spin your wheels" working on a solution to the WRONG problem is probably the greatest sin of problem solving. It's imperative to analyze the **total problem environment**. The ease with which you can apply the steps of the problem-solving sequence will be determined, to a great extent, by your thoroughness in analyzing the **elements of the problem environment**.

The total problem environment consists of three parts:

1. An individual
2. An obstacle
3. A goal

In order to assemble the data necessary for the correct identification of the problem, you must analyze and interpret the relationship of these three parts. For example:

> From the base semiannual expense account, the support group commander has determined the cost of power mower maintenance for the first 6 months of the current fiscal year is 40 percent higher than the cost of mower maintenance for the first 6 months of the previous fiscal year. The commander has directed the chief of Civil Engineering (CE) to cut the cost of mower maintenance to a level that will ensure this year's total maintenance cost won't exceed last year's total cost.

In the above scenario there isn't enough data available to even tentatively identify the problem. Why? Because one of the elements of the problem environment is missing. There's no **obstacle** -- we don't know the obstacle. What's interfering with goal accomplishment? Suppose an investigation of the mower maintenance costs determine the following: *The equipment is experiencing more MAJOR breakdowns this year than last year.* Although some operators are abusing the equipment, this is only one of the causes of the breakdowns. Parts from suppliers have increased significantly in cost. CE can now identify the obstacle as being more major breakdowns of equipment (caused by a variety of reasons) and the increased costs associated with these breakdowns.

The problem can then be identified as one of reducing major breakdowns. Once CE has identified the problem, make a statement of the problem. This statement must be prepared in one of three ways:

- As a question: "How can we . . .?"
- As a statement of need: "We need to . . ."
- As an infinitive phrase: "To find a way to . . ."

To state a problem in one of these ways is a part of the systematic approach to problem solving. Any of these three statements will serve as a guide for your research in the "GATHER DATA" phase to come.

Gathering Data Relative to the Problem

The data that the problem solution requires may be classified as:

1. **Facts**
2. **Criteria**
3. **Assumptions**
4. **Definitions**

1. **Facts** - are truths upon which your solution to the problem is based. They're observed events, past or present.

2. **Criteria** - are limits within which your solution to the problem must fall.

3. **Assumptions** - are statements that may or may not be true, but have some bearing upon the situation at hand.

4. **Definitions** - are used to explain words or terminology that might be unfamiliar to a third party.

The most available source of factual data will normally be your own experience. Criteria may be provided by a superior, be inherent in the nature of the obstacle causing the problem, or, as is more common, inherent in the problem-solvers own frame of reference and in the goal he/she's trying to attain. This goal and this frame of reference will tolerate only certain solutions, and the limits of this tolerance will establish the criteria for the solution.

During the data-gathering step there'll be times when you accumulate some opinions that are of limited value in reaching a solution to a problem. Solutions must be based on <u>facts</u> -- the only form of data that's demonstrably true. Opinions or assumptions don't meet this test. As you gather data to be used in support of a solution, you'll be required to evaluate each item to determine if it's a fact or opinion.

Remember:

- A fact is an observed event, past or present, you've observed or that's been observed and reported to you.

- An opinion or assumption is a judgment you or some other individual has made.

Tools for Process Analysis

Flowcharts and cause-and-effect diagrams are excellent analysis tools. You can also use thematic content analysis or a Pareto chart in your analysis efforts. Here's a quick look at tools for analyzing problems:

- Flowchart: Want to see what a process looks like from start to finish? A flowchart is a graphical representation of all major steps of a process. To understand the complete process, identify critical stages within a process, and locate problem areas. Flowcharts also show relationships between different steps in the process. Here's what to do:

  1. *Identify the process.* First, define start and finish points for the process being examined.

  2. *Describe the current process.* From the starting point, chart the entire process. Work slowly and include every step along the way, right through to the finish. Use standard flowchart symbols to improve the clarity of the flowchart, but they're not essential.

  3. *Chart the ideal process* (this is an optional step). Try to identify the easiest and most efficient way to go from the "start" to “finish.” This flowchart makes it easier to find improvements.

  4. *Search for improvement opportunities.* Study the flowchart. The process probably has areas that hinder or add little or no value. Look at the flowchart, and examine any steps that differ from the ideal process, and question why they exist.

  5. *Update the chart.* Build a new flowchart that corrects the problems identified.

When working on the flowchart, consider using index cards or sticky-back notes to record each step of the process. Then rearrange the diagram without erasing and redrawing. This can reduce the chances of losing valuable ideas.

Example: A copy machine suffered frequent paper jams, and was a notorious source of frustration. Often, simply opening and closing the access panel clears the problem. Here's a flow chart of the troubleshooting procedure most people used:



Users usually had to check several locations in the copy machine before they found the problem. An office worker posted this flowchart showing a more efficient procedure. This process reduced frustration and "panel slamming" when the machine stopped unexpectedly.

- Cause and Effect Diagram: To examine the relationship between a given outcome and the factors influencing that outcome, use a cause-and-effect diagram. Sometimes called an Ishikawa diagram or even a "fishbone diagram," the cause-and-effect diagram focuses on specific issues, identifies areas short on data and gives you a structured approach to finding root causes. Here's what to do:

  1. *Specify the problem to analyze.* The effect can be stated positively (in terms of the objective to be accomplished) or negatively (in terms of a problem to be overcome). Place the problem's title in a box on the right side of the diagram.

  2. *List the major categories of factors influencing the effect being studied.* Use the "4Ms" (methods/manpower/ materials/ machinery) or "4 Ps" (policies/procedures/people/plant) as the starting point.

  3. *Identify factors and subfactors.* Ask "Why?" or use brainstorming or mental imaging to generate ideas. Start with the major categories and work from there.

  4. *Identify significant factors.* List the factors having a significant effect (data can help identify these).

5. *Prioritize the list of causes.* Don't confuse the location of ideas with importance -- a subfactor may be the root cause to all the problems. After prioritizing new factors may be discovered then more data should be collected.

Example: The frustrated office workers put their heads together and identified specific issues in their search for the root cause. Take a look:



- Pareto Chart: Pareto charts are bar charts based on the Pareto Principle: 20 percent of the problems have 80 percent of the impact. Those 20 percent are the "vital few." Separating the problems or issues in this way helps you focus on the improvement process. Why? A Pareto chart allows you to arrange data according to priority or importance. This takes the guesswork out of the process. Here's what to do:

  1. *Identify the possible problems.* To generate ideas use brainstorming, mental imaging or ask "Why?". List all the possible problems in a particular process.

  2. *Use existing reports or collect new data on the process.* Group existing data by consistent units of measure. That means dollars, percentages, pounds, etc.

  3. *Label the chart.* Put frequency of occurrence on the left vertical axis and categories of problems on the horizontal axis.

  4. *Plot the data.* Order the categories according to their frequency (how many), not their classification (what kind). Use a descending order from left to right. If there are stray categories, include an "other" category.

Here's an optional step: use the right vertical axis to measure the cumulative percentage of total occurrences summed over all the categories.

Example: The office staff experienced a lot of trouble with a new laser printer. This Pareto chart helped them identify the "vital few" problems. The left side shows the frequency of occurrences; the actual problems are listed along the bottom:



Next is a comparison of frequency and cost. The most common defect is "A." The most costly defect, though, is "E." Take a look:



Tools for Analysis of Process Data

The histogram, scatter diagram, and run chart are excellent tools to use to analyze process data. Here is a quick look at these tools:

- Histogram: To show the central tendency and variability of a data set use a graph called a histogram -- sometimes referred to as a frequency distribution. A histogram can help you determine the underlying distribution of a process. Histograms also help understand the total variability of a process. When using histograms, each data point appears in only one interval. The number of intervals can influence the pattern the data will take. Don't expect histograms to be a perfect bell curve; expect variations. Here's what to do:

1. *Determine the type of data to collect.* Make sure the data are measurable. Times, lengths and speeds are examples of measurable data.

2. *Collect the data.* Obtain a random sample of data from the process. Collect as many measurable points as possible. Then count the total number of points collected.

3. *Determine the number of intervals required.* Use this guide to determine how many intervals (or bars) the graph should have.

4. *Determine the range.* Study the data set. Subtract the smallest value from the largest. This value is the range of the data set.

5. *Determine the interval width.* Divide the range by the number of intervals. Round answers up to a convenient value. For example, if the range of the data is 17 and 9 intervals are used, then the interval width is 1.88. Round this interval to 2.0. It's a good idea to carry the intervals to one decimal place more than the data collected.

6. *Determine the starting point of each interval.* Use the smallest data point value as the starting point of the first interval. The starting point for the second interval is the sum of the smallest data point plus the interval width. For example, if the smallest data point is 10 and the interval width is 2, then the starting point for the second interval is 12. Label intervals along the horizontal axis.

7. *Plot the data.* Count the number of data points that fall within each interval; plot this frequency on the histogram. Remember: each data point can appear in just one interval. For example, if the first interval begins with 10.0 and the second with 12.0, then all data points that are equal to or greater than 10.0 and still less than 12.0 are counted in the first interval.

Example: During aerobic testing, evaluators weighed 80 Air Force officers. Here's a histogram and a table showing the distribution of the data. Which format is most useful?



Weights of 80 officers

208	180	139	163	159
155	180	165	149	127
159	171	141	190	159
153	181	180	137	161
115	156	173	165	191
159	109	179	145	144
150	206	166	188	165
127	130	172	180	147
145	150	156	171	189
190	200	208	169	139
130	128	155	185	166
165	187	159	178	169
147	150	201	128	170
189	163	150	158	180
139	149	185	129	169
175	189	150	201	175

- Scatter Diagram: Recognize the relationship between two variables with a scatter diagram. These diagrams are graphs that reveal possible relationships and also help identify possible causes of problems. An important note: while this method shows a relationship exists, it won't show that one variable causes another. Further analysis using other statistical techniques will quantify the strength of a relationship between two variables. Remember, that when a relationship exists between two variables, they're correlated. (Both positive and negative correlation can be useful for continuous process improvement.) Here's what to do:

  1. *Collect the data in pairs.* Find two different variables (X and Y) that appear to have a relationship. Each point on the scatter diagram is an (X, Y) pair of values. There will be many (X, Y) data points on one scatter diagram.

  2. *Construct the graph.* Label the horizontal and vertical axes in ascending order. Make sure the value on the two axes correspond to the data pairs.

  3. *Plot the data.* Look for patterns when plotting each point, circling repeated points. Here's an illustration to help you interpret scatter diagrams.

Example: A typing agency wanted to investigate the relationship of speed of typing and errors made.



Observations about the Scatter Diagram -- One person typed 65 words per minute with 5 mistakes. One person typed 40 words per minute with 3 mistakes. There are differing errors rates for the same words per minute typed. As the words per minute increased the number of errors increased.

- Run Chart: To show changes in a process measurement over time, use a run chart. A run chart may also help recognize abnormal behavior in a process. Here's what to do:

    1. *Construct the chart.* Label the vertical axis with the key measurement of the process you want to measure. Label the horizontal axis with units of time.

    2. *Plot the data.* After collecting the data, plot each data point on the chart.

    3. *Interpret the chart.* One signal that shows the process has significantly changed: six steadily increasing or decreasing points in a row. Another possible signal: nine points in a row that are on the same side of the average.

Example: Here's an example of a run chart tracking the number of people who travel each week. It's important to recognize the variability inherent in any process. In this process, the variability is the number of people traveling (four to nine people). Take a look:



List Possible Solutions to the Problem

By the time you get to this step in the sequence, you'll have most of the data the solution requires. As a part of this data, you'll have defined many of the criteria that will set the limits for the selection of the final solution. You're now ready to give your imagination free rein and list as many possible solutions as your facts and assumptions support. Each of the possible solutions must eventually be weighed against the criteria. As imagination could add a host of possible solutions to the above, let's explore creative thinking briefly.

What is Creative Thinking? According to Cronbach, creativity, or divergent thinking, is one's adeptness in making fresh observations and ideas. Creative thinking can be defined as the imaginative recombination of known elements into something new and different, in other words, the ability to see something in a new way. Since all ideas are syntheses of our experiences, we probably never have a truly original idea. We can, however, be creative by consciously changing and recombining old ideas or by improving or otherwise modifying established procedures.

Barriers to Creativity. Understanding the concept of creative thinking is only half of the battle, the other half centers on the barriers to the creative thought process. These barriers include:

1. Habit. This is lack of recognizing change is needed or reluctance to change from the old and accept new ways of doing things. (EX: "I wasn't aware that our current process was so inefficient," or "There's no need to change; we like doing it this way.")

2. Fear. This is fear of adopting new ways and fear of discarding old ways. This barrier also includes fear of authority and fear of being thought a fool for recommending the new or unusual. (EX: "It may be a good idea, but I'm not going to bring it up at a staff meeting in front of everyone.")

3. Inertia. This is resistance to change. This barrier includes a reverence for the traditional ways of doing things. It's demonstrated by a lack of desire to expend the energy necessary to effect a change. The difference between inertia and habit is this. When something is habitual, you don't recognize or acknowledge the need to change. On the other hand, you confront inertia when you know something needs to change, but you don't want to expend the energy to make that change happen. (EX: "We can't implement this new plan, we'd need to change all our slides and reference material.")

4. Prejudice. Viewed negatively, prejudice is unfounded hatred toward something. An impersonal example is distaste for modes of expression that differ from one's own. Viewed positively, prejudice is an unfounded affection, such as the preference for one's own opinion or pride of authorship. (EX: "The receiving section just wants us to change programs because they're better with Word. I'm going to stick with Word Perfect because I think it's the perfect word processing program.")

How can you overcome these barriers to creativity? The best way to begin is to develop a questioning attitude. Look at the situation and ask "why" until we get to the root cause of the barrier and confront it. To develop this attitude, we may work individually, using some form of interrogation method, or we may work as a group brainstorming a problem.

Brainstorming. Brainstorming is a group idea-generating technique designed to stimulate a chain reaction of ideas or possible solutions that relate to a stated problem. Since the basic purpose of brainstorming is to derive the maximum number of ideas and possible solutions, a brainstorming session should allow members of the

group to advance as many ideas and suggest as many solutions as possible without fear of criticism.

To get the best results from a brainstorming session, certain rules and procedures should be followed:

1. Quantity, Not Quality. Though quality is ultimately important, you should look for that quality in numbers--the more ideas your group generates, the greater your probability of finding viable solutions to the problem. If enough ideas are presented during a session, some will contain the quality needed, but the selection of the quality ideas must wait until the latter stages of the session.

2. Hitchhike Ideas. This is a way in which an idea rides in on another idea. In a brainstorming session, one member suggests an idea. This triggers a thought in the mind of another member. This continues until there is a whole series of ideas all prompted by an original idea.

3. Withhold Judgment**.** This means no evaluation, criticism (positive or negative), or judgment of any kind should be made of an idea advanced by a member of the group until the brainstorming is over. Evaluation and criticism will interfere with the flow of ideas.

4. Encourage Freewheeling. Freewheeling means that once the leader has the flow of ideas started, the leader allows the group to continue under its own steam with little or no guidance. He/she allows people to say whatever comes to mind; all ideas are accepted.

In addition to the rules of brainstorming we've covered, there are some techniques for conducting a brainstorming session that should be decided upon and implemented by the group. Since you may find yourself in the role of the group leader, we've listed some of these techniques: The group and/or group leader . . .

- selects a number of individuals to participate. The ideal size is 12 to 15 members.

- must limit the problem to an area the group knows something about.

- must state the problem and ensure each participant understands the problem.

- must appoint one or two recorders and instruct them to write down all ideas.

- should avoid placing a time limit on the brainstorming session.

The self-interrogation and brainstorming techniques we've discussed don't guarantee creativity. They are, however, excellent tools we can use to overcome the barriers to creativity during our problem solving process.

Test Possible Solutions to the Problem

At this point in the sequence you put the possible solutions to a test. The yardstick you'll use to measure the effectiveness of these solutions will be the criteria the situation, your superiors, and you have established. The total criteria will come from your frame of reference, your goal, the nature of the obstacle, and from outside sources.

It's important to remember that each of the possible solutions must be tested against each of the criteria. If each final solution meets all criteria, what should you do? Decide on a final solution by deriving additional criteria against which to weigh these solutions.

Select the Best Solution to the Problem

If in the previous step the solutions were tested and narrowed down to just one remaining solution, then that would be the best solution to the problem. If, however, there's more than one solution and each of these meets all the criteria, you must select the best solution from those remaining. We've already seen that this can only be done by establishing some additional criteria against which to measure each remaining solution.

Take, for example, the mower problem. We've worked through the process and found two solutions that meet all the criteria.

- Contract to have the mowers maintained by an individual for the amount of money remaining.

- Use off-duty personnel who are qualified in small motor repair to maintain the mowers for a minimum per hour wage rate.

We must now establish additional criteria against which to measure each of the solutions. The following are additional criteria you might consider. The selected solution should/must . . .

1. not interfere with the mission of any other organization.

2. if possible, contribute to the morale and welfare of all base personnel.

3. use military personnel in its execution.

4. be flexible enough to allow for alterations to assure you remain within the limits of the available funds.

With the criteria you chose, could you choose between the two remaining solutions? When you can, you've completed 90 percent of the problem-solving process. Your task isn't complete until you've **implemented the problem solution**.

Implement the Problem Solution

As a junior officer, your superiors will hand you most of the problems you must solve. It'll then be up to you to select the best solution to the problem, prepare the necessary implementation procedures, and secure your superior's approval of both the solution and the procedures. For example, if you decided the best solution for the mower problem was to use off-duty personnel who are qualified in small motor repair to maintain mowers for a minimum per hour wage rate, you would need to submit a detailed report to the commander outlining the steps you went through in reaching the solution. Attach the necessary documents to implement the solution. Include, also, provisions for the commander to approve or disapprove the solution and implement instructions. The documents would include:

1. Notification in the form of letters to commanders or a notice placed in the daily bulletin to the effect that airmen are needed for this maintenance task.

2. Approval in the form of a letter to be signed by the support group commander to the effect that off-duty airmen can participate in this activity.

3. The necessary documentation required authorizing a building to be set aside and equipped for this activity.

4. A notice to the fire marshal of the potentially hazardous activity to take place in the shop to be established.

5. A notice to the accounting and disbursing officer authorizing him/her to pay the wages from appropriated funds as required.

6. A letter of authorization for the use of Air Force resources in this activity.

Conclusion

You've just completed a detailed discussion of each step in the six-step problem solving process. During the resident portion of training, you will be expected to have an comprehensive understanding of the six-step problem solving process. You will also be expected to use this process to solve many of the problems confronting you during training. Learn these problem-solving steps for life application -- you will continue to use them throughout your trianing and your Air Force career.

Bibliography:

1. AFH 33-337, The Tongue and Quill. Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 30 June 1997, pp. 187-195. (LS CAMs' Office)
2. Programmed Text, Communication Techniques, Vol. III, Creative Problem Solving and Solution Reporting, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1967.
3. Hughes, Richard L., Ginnett, Robert C., and Curphy, Gordon J., Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience, Irwin McGraw-Hill, Boston, MA, 1999.

Ethics, Values, and Leadership

Introduction

Military leaders, at all levels of command, face ethical dilemmas, the best leaders recognize and face these dilemmas with a commitment to **doing what's right**, not just what is most convenient and expedient. This phrase, *doing what's right*, sounds deceptively simple, but sometimes it will take great moral courage to do what's **right**, even when the right course of actions seems clear. At other times, leaders face ethically complex issues that lack a simple black-and-white answer. Whichever the case, military leaders are charged with setting the moral example for their subordinates, an example which becomes the model for the entire group or organization, good or bad. Leaders who themselves do not honor integrity do not inspire it in others. Leaders who are mostly concerned with their own advancement do not inspire selflessness in others. The effective leader is the one who internalizes a strong set of ethical or moral values and principles.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Comprehend how society's ethical standards and values are interwoven into the concept of military ethics.

Sample of Behavior: In your own words, summarize the phrase "Doing what's right" as it pertains to the concept of military ethics.

Information

This following article is reprinted from the *U.S. Air Force Academy Journal of Professional Military Ethics*, April 1980, pp. 23-28.

Professional Military Ethics: An Attempt at Definition

Lt Col Kenneth H. Wenker

What is "professional military ethics?" A journal of professional military ethics ought to be able to address such a question. Yet for every ten people you poll you get ten different responses. For cynical persons military ethics is merely a public front put up to prop up civilian confidence so as to obtain funding. For another person military ethics is the rules of the game which we must follow, most of the time, if we are to "make it" in a military career. Still another will see military ethics as a matter of conforming oneself to the immutable laws of the universe, at least insofar as those laws might apply to the military setting.

Most of the time we don't need to worry about such issues. We get along fine with conventional rules. Don't lie! Keep your promises! Follow orders! These and similar precepts serve us well in most situations no matter what our more fundamental concept of professional ethics might be. Whether one views ethics as doing what's necessary to get ahead or as complying with the immutable laws of the universe, lying turns out to be a bad practice. We say we ought to avoid lying and we agree with that practice even if we disagree on what it means or why it's true. The generally accepted rules of conduct such as not cheating or stealing serve us in most situations. And so we preach them as the basic foundation of social, not just military, conduct. We drill them into our recruits; we emphasize them in our professional military education programs.

It would be great if we could get along all the time with a code of ethics based only on simple rules of conduct. Unfortunately, such an ethics, while sufficient most of the time, is too shallow for many of the more complex issues military professionals often fact. Sometimes ethics does demand that we lie, break a promise, disobey a legal order, or even kill a human being. The principal reason justifying this conduct is that more fundamental ethical values are at stake, values such as freedom, or individual rights, or human dignity, or national self-preservation. Sometimes, in order to preserve our fundamental ethical values, we must act contrary to the immediate rules, which are normally acceptable as guides for social behavior. Thus, for example, we would probably break some promises in order to save a life, or we would injure or otherwise use force against someone about to steal valuable property from another person or from ourselves, and we would go to war to protect wholesale violations of the rights of the American or free world citizenry, as the American military has done several times in this century.

The complications which such actions involve in terms of our basic ethical codes and values are hard for some people to understand and accept. Like all of us, they learned ethical behavior by having rigidly defined rules of behavior drilled into them by parents, teachers, and clergymen whom they highly respect. Having learned such rules well, they consider absolute obedience to such rules the total extent of their ethical obligations. In such cases one of two understandable attitudes often results. Either the rules are tenaciously held to, as though they could solve all ethical problems while ignoring or burying conflicting ethical demands, or once the individual sees that sometimes one must act contrary to such rules, the rules themselves are seen as invalid and are often jettisoned. This latter situation really amounts to the abandonment of any ethical commitment whatsoever. The effect of an excessive identification of ethics with rigidly defined rules is either a lack of ethical sensitivity or the abandonment of the ethical in favor of the prudential.

The real problems which one must deal with then, when attempting to define what professional military ethics involves or consists of, is to find a way to explain what professional ethics might be without reducing it to a set of rigid, simplistic rules. At the same time we need to do so in a way that can serve as a foundation for a set of *immediate rules*, which provide ethical guidance for most situations. In other words, ethics is not merely a set of rules, but it does provide a foundation for those rules.

This paper contains three basic contentions. First, I suggest that the fundamental commitment of the mature American soldier should be to the most basic

values we are supposed to be protecting, such values as individual freedom, personal rights, equality of opportunity, and human dignity. Second, I argue that such a commitment will generate two kinds of ethical obligations, those which are important in themselves and those which are important as means. Third, I discuss how these two kinds of obligations are related, and I draw certain implications concerning the personal character required of men and women functioning in a modern American armed forces.

A.

On the surface the armed forces would not appear to be a very noble institution. By definition it must be prepared, as an institution, to wage war with all the killing, wounding, and destruction associated with that human calamity. This would seem, at first, to be not much different in behavior from the actions of an overgrown but legalized gang of criminals.

One's initial response to such a suggestion or analogy might be to point out that criminals work against society and for the good of themselves, whereas the armed forces work for society frequently at the expense of the well-being of its members. The armed forces, according to this suggestion, gains nobility from the self-sacrificing nature of its enterprise.

While this suggestion points us in the right direction, it doesn't go far enough. The ideal of self-sacrifice falls short as a justification for military conduct because self-sacrifice, of itself, has very little if anything to recommend it. Self-sacrifice is a praiseworthy thing only if that for which one is sacrificing oneself is of value. Societies, as such, aren't work sacrifice, because some of them are good and some are not. A society is worth sacrifice only if the values of that society have a strong moral foundation. Where an army has no real function except to keep the current group of political thugs in power, the self-sacrifice of the soldiers has no value. In fact, it is probably wrong. The activity of the soldier gets its worth not because it supports a society but because it supports a *good* society, one committed to basic human values.

What these basic values are or ought to be, of course, is the subject of apparently never-ending debate. In our own case, our nation's fundamental values, such as belief in the dignity and equality of individual persons, the freedom from unnecessary political restraints or pressures, or basic human rights are considered the source of our society's worth. While American society is surely not perfect, we believe that our basic values are important and worth defending. They alone give meaning and justification to the activity of an American armed forces.

Such fundamental values must not be looked at primarily as a more basic set of rules. Then we only end up with possible conflicts between these more basic rules and thus must search even deeper for still more fundamental rules. We get nowhere. Rather, our fundamental values reflect more of an attitude or outlook than a set of rules. They determine the perspective with which we view the world. We "see" the world in such a way that we are aware of the essential equality of all human beings; we see all individual human beings as possessing dignity; we recognize the essential

moral autonomy of individuals; we are conscious of and affirm the rights that flow from such human characteristics.

There is something deficient about someone who enters the armed forces exclusively for his or her own benefit. Such persons are usually not blameworthy or guilty; they are usually not aware of the moral implications of their actions and overlook such implications because of the generally accepted and unquestioning social approval of service in the armed forces. To enter into an organization whose primary purpose is to be prepared for and to fight wars – with the attendant killing, wounding, and destroying inherent in that occupation – and to do so *exclusively* for self gain amounts to participating in activity which is normally considered immoral behavior without realizing that higher moral commitments alone justify one's behavior. We need to be aware that membership in the armed forces is not a morally neutral situation. It must be justified. And in our case we consider it to be justified by the moral need to protect human rights. In effect, we do not enter the armed forces to kill or destroy; we enter to preserve and protect human rights. Our moral concern for human rights is what makes moral sense out of our participation in the armed forces.

Of course this commitment to basic values is rarely what prompts one to join the armed services. Most join out of economic motivation, the pressure of the draft, the opportunity for education and the like. And yet most such persons, at least subconsciously, realize that they wouldn't consider it right to "enlist" in a criminal syndicate for similar reasons. They somehow recognize that the one is wrong and the other is right. And, I believe, if they are encouraged and helped in figuring out why they accept the one and not the other, they will come to recognize their basic value commitments, which permit involvement in activity, which would be normally wrong. Indeed, they will come to realize that these commitments are quite strong, strong enough to override the normal prohibition against activity involving homicide and destruction. To repeat, most persons are not aware of their basic value commitments when they enter the armed service; however, up reflection, they will usually find very strong commitments. These commitments can serve as the ground, the starting point, of a viable "professional military ethics."

B.

Professional military ethics from this perspective can be seen as the obligations that a member of the armed forces has, which arise from or are generated by the fundamental value commitments, which justify his or her participation in the armed forces in the first place. These obligations arise in two totally separate ways.

The first way is be direct derivation from the fundamental values. If we are to claim that the role of the armed forces is to protect such values as human liberties, human autonomy, human dignity, the essential equality of humans, and the equal rights that humans possess, then there are obligations of personal behavior which demand that we act according to these values. It makes no sense for a person to belong to the armed forces, which are committed to protecting the dignity of humans, if he or she isn't concerned about treating other human beings with dignity in the first place. A consistent military ethics demands that we treat humans, including ourselves and our subordinates, with respect, that we recognize their essential equality, and that we respect their basic human rights. To break our promises to others, to steal their property, to cheat in order to take unfair advantage of others, to treat humans as mere objects in our pursuit of economic, sexual, or psychological goals, to mistreat our own selves with drugs, including excessive alcohol, to lie; all of these kinds of actions and many others are inconsistent with the most fundamental values we are committed to protect. As such, these prohibitions of certain types of behavior become part of the military ethic.

There is a second kind of ethical obligation that grows out of our fundamental values. These obligations arise because they are necessary as means to the end of protecting these more fundamental values. An obvious example is military obedience. This is an ethical obligation because it is necessary for an effective military force, which in turn is necessary to protect fundamental human values. Other actions that are important as a means of securing basic values include those which promote discipline, orderliness, subordination of individual desires to group necessities, personal integrity and reliability, and commitment to excellence.

C.

Finally, I wish to consider the relationship between obligations that are derived from our fundamental values and those that are needed as means to preserve those fundamental values. First, it should be fairly obvious that the two kinds of obligations, ethical obligations derived from fundamental values and obligations incurred in pursuing the defense of ideals, can conflict. For example, the need to obey orders and subordinate one's own needs to group needs conflicts with the value we place on personal freedom. For another example, the need to train new service members in the values of discipline and order (as in basic training) can conflict with the ethical demand to respect the dignity and equality of each individual. Still another example is the conflict between the ethical need for military efficiency and the need to respect the rights of civilians who happen to be in an area of operations.

Unfortunately, there are no rules telling us how to go about resolving such conflicts in every circumstance. In some of the more common or more crucial

situations we have various policy statements, regulations, conventions, or laws to help guide our decisions. But often these are only guides, and even more often the most difficult cases don't seem to be covered by any policies, rules, conventions, or laws. In such cases we have to consider the extent to which the rights, dignity, and freedom of human beings are being violated, the importance of the objective, the necessity of the means in attaining that objective, and many other factors. Because there are no rules to help make such decisions, military ethics demands that we cultivate more than a commitment to mere ethical rules. We need to cultivate our sense of commitment to the fundamental values on which those rules depend. The ethical conflicts generated by membership in the armed forces are so complex that they cannot be resolved except by relying on the ethical sensitivity of mature individuals. We need to cultivate that sensitivity by reflecting on, and diligently committing ourselves to, our fundamental values.

It should be equally obvious that the two kinds of obligations do not always conflict. Most of the time they demand the same kind of action. For example, honesty, integrity, and reliability are demanded both because they are the necessary means to military efficiency and because they are demanded more directly by our fundamental value commitments. Sometimes someone will ask, "What difference does it make if I tell this relatively insignificant lie this one time? It doesn't turn me into an ethical monster. It doesn't destroy or even harm military effectiveness." The answer is to point out that honesty is not only valuable as a means to further military effectiveness, it is also demanded by the basic values which justify the existence of the armed forces in the first place.

I want to make one final point: given a mature perspective on military ethics, it is impossible to accept the idea of professional military ethics as a standard governing duty hours and military activities only. This is because military ethics does not arise merely from involvement in the armed forces. Military ethics also arises directly from the values which justify the armed forces in the first place. Ultimately even those character traits of special importance to the armed forces such as discipline and obedience derive their ethical force from our concern for basic human values.

If a fundamental element of an American serviceman's duty is a responsibility to act in accordance with basic values, then perhaps at no other institution in the Air Force is it as important to help define those values as at the United States Air Force Academy. For the mission of this institution is to prepare future leaders of the Air Force and to prepare them for the moral conflicts they inevitably will confront. The success of any institution rests on the character and leadership of its personnel. If we cannot teach rules that will guide behavior in all possible circumstances, we can at least teach the ideal that the function of a professional American military officer is to provide a leadership that chooses, when confronted with ethical conflict, on the side of basic American values rather than on the side of expedience or mere reflex response to orders.

Conclusion

Values are constructs representing the general set of behaviors individuals consider important, and they play a central part in a leader's psychological makeup. Values are a key component of the moral-reasoning process, which is the process

people use to resolve moral or ethical dilemmas. This is important since leaders undoubtedly will face a variety of ethical dilemmas during their careers. In his book, On Leadership, John Gardner stresses the centrality and importance of the moral dimension of leadership. He states leaders ultimately must be judged on the basis of a framework of values, not just in terms of effectiveness, and argues that leaders should always treat others as ends in themselves, not as objects or mere means to the leader's ends.

Bibliography:

1. Wenker, Kenneth H. Lt Col (USAF), "Professional Military Ethics: An Attempt at Definition", *U.S. Air Force Academy Journal of Professional Military Ethics*, April 1980, pp. 23-28.
2. Hughes, Richard L., Ginnett, Robert , Curphy, Gordon, Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience, Irwin McGraw-Hill., Boston, MA, 1999. Chapter 7.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ADDISON EARL BAKER led his B-24 bomber group on an extremely hazardous low-level attack against enemy oil refineries at Ploesti, Rumania, 1 August 1943. Approaching the target, his B-24 was seriously damaged and set afire. Although flying over terrain suitable for landing, he refused to jeopardize the mission of the group and battled his way to the target, bombing it with devastating effect. Only then did he leave formation, avoiding other aircraft with superb airmanship; but his valiant attempts to gain sufficient altitude for the crew to bail out were unavailing. Colonel Baker and his crew were killed when the flaming aircraft crashed.

Leadership Principles and Traits

Introduction

Leaders are people who do the right thing.
Managers are people who do things right.

-- Warren G. Bennis

Any discussion of leadership in today's Air Force must include the controversial and emotional issue of whether an officer should be a leader or a manager. Some observers insist that military success depends on management, while others would insist that charismatic leadership is the key. In this lesson we'll examine these two concepts as well as discuss the principles and traits of the effective Air Force leader.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Comprehend the leadership principles and traits.

Samples of Behavior:
1. In your own words, paraphrase the leadership principles.
2. Given a scenario, identify the traits of the effective leader.

Information

The Air Force Leadership Concept

Leadership is the art of influencing and directing people to accomplish the mission. The concept of effective leadership must include two fundamental elements:

- The Mission
- The People

All facets of Air Force leadership should support these two basic elements. They are embedded in the definition of leadership.

The Mission. The military organization's primary task is to perform its mission. This is paramount, and everything must be subordinate to this objective. Thus, the leader's primary responsibility is to lead people to carry out the unit's mission successfully. Former Air Force Chief of Staff, Curtis E. LeMay, stated "No matter how well you apply the art of leadership, no matter how strong your unit, or how high the morale of your men, if your leadership is not directed completely toward

the mission, your leadership has failed." Yet, a leader must never forget the importance of the unit's personnel.

The People. People perform the mission. They are the heart of the organization and without their support a unit will fail. On of a leader's responsibilities is the care and support of the unit's personnel. Successful leaders continually ensure the needs of their subordinates are met promptly and properly.

Leadership Traits

Effective leaders have certain distinguishing characteristics, which are the foundation for their approach to the leadership situation. The list of a leader's desirable qualities is virtually endless. While many characteristics (such as truthfulness) are expected of all members of the military profession, there are six traits that are vital to Air Force leaders.

1. **Integrity.** The total commitment to the highest personal and professional standards. A leader must be honest and fair. Integrity means establishing a set of values and adhering to those values. Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Gabriel said, "Integrity is the fundamental premise of military service in a free society. Without integrity, the moral pillars of our military strength -- public trust and self-respect -- are lost."

2. **Loyalty.** A three dimensional trait which includes faithfulness to superiors, peers, and subordinates. Leaders must first display an unquestionable sense of loyalty before they can expect members of their unit to be loyal. General George S. Patton Jr. highlighted the importance of loyalty saying, "There is a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top. Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and much less prevalent."

3. **Commitment.** The complete devotion to duty. A leader must demonstrate total dedication to the United States, the Air Force, and the unit. Plato said, "Man was not born for himself alone, but for his country." Dedicated service is the hallmark of the military leader.

4. **Energy.** An enthusiasm and drive to take the initiative. Throughout history successful leaders have demonstrated the importance of mental and physical energy. They approached assigned tasks aggressively. Their preparation included physical and mental conditioning which enabled them to look and act the part. Once a course of action was determined, they had the perseverance and stamina to stay on course until the job was completed.

5. **Decisiveness.** A willingness to act. A leader must have the self-confidence to make timely decisions. The leader must then effectively communicate the decision to the unit. British Admiral Sir Roger Keyes emphasized that, "In all operations a moment arrives when brave decisions have to be made if an enterprise is to be carried through." Of course, decisiveness includes the willingness to accept responsibility. Leaders are always accountable -- when things go right and when things go wrong.

6. **Selflessness.** Sacrificing personal requirements for a greater cause. Leaders must think of performing the mission and caring for the welfare of the men and women in the organization. Air Force leaders cannot place their own comfort or convenience before the mission or the people. Willingness to sacrifice is intrinsic to military service. Selflessness also includes the courage to face and overcome difficulties. While courage is often thought of as an unselfish willingness to confront physical dangers, equally important -- and more likely to be tested on a daily basis -- is the moral courage a leader needs to make difficult decisions. General Douglas MacArthur said, "No action can safely trust its martial honor to leaders who do not maintain the universal code which distinguishes those things that are right and those things that are wrong." It requires courage and strength of character to confront a tough situation head-on rather than avoiding it by passing the buck to someone else.

These traits are essential to effective leadership. Developing these characteristics will improve your ability to employ the leadership principles.

Leadership Principles

An Air Force leader is flexible enough to meet changing circumstances, competent enough to perform under adverse conditions, courageous enough to lead at the risk of life or career, and courageous enough to stand on principle and to do what is right. The leadership principles are guides that have been tested and proven over time by successful leaders. Many of these principles are related to the Air Force Core Values. As you comprehend and apply these principles, you and your subordinates will begin to experience success in all your efforts.

1. **Take Care of Your People.** People are our most valuable resource who should be cared for to the best of a leader's ability. The time and effort a leader spends taking care of subordinates and co-workers will be amply rewarded in increased unit morale, effectiveness, and cohesion. Leaders should exhort each unit member to reach their maximum potential and thus their value to the Air Force. An effective and thorough effort to resolve threats to the individual's and family's well being will free airmen to achieve their potential. Find out what their requirements are and be sensitive to human needs. Are the people housed adequately; are they well fed; are they paid promptly; are there personal problems with which they need help? When people are worried about these conditions, they cannot focus their full attention on their job, and the mission will suffer. If people believe they are cared for as well as circumstances will permit, the leader is in a position to earn their confidence, respect, and loyalty.

2. **Motivate People.** Your greatest challenge is motivating subordinates to achieve the high standards set for them. *Motivation is the key to successful leadership*. Motivation is the moving force behind successful leadership. In fact, the ability to generate enthusiasm about the mission may be the single most important factor in leadership. Recognition of the efforts people put forth is one positive way in which motivation toward mission accomplishment pays

dividends. The leader who publicly applauds the efforts of unit personnel builds a cohesive organization, which will accomplish the mission.

Motivating people depends on understanding their needs and working to align these needs with unit requirements. Most people will work for an organization, which they know, cares about them, and one in whose mission they believe. Remember, the most powerful form of lasting motivation is self-motivation. One of your goals as a leader should be to provide an environment that fosters and rewards self-motivation.

3. **Be a Follower.** The Air Force expects all its leaders first to be followers. Airmen observe their leaders and take from them successful traits while avoiding those that are counterproductive. Good followers also understand and take personal pride in their contribution to the total Air Force mission; they have the strength of character to be gratified by the collective pride in a fine team effort without seeking individual reward. Effective followers have the strength of character to flourish without seeking "hero" status and are willing and able to participate in a team effort to effectively employ aerospace power.

4. **Know Your Job.** People who follow a competent person who has the knowledge needed to complete the mission successfully. The Air Force leader should have a broad view of the unit's mission, and should ensure all members understand how their jobs relate to mission accomplishment.

Between World War I and World War II, the Army Air Corps was fortunate to have men like General Henry Arnold and General Carl Spaatz. These men knew their jobs and how they could enhance the mission. Their preparation and vision paid substantial dividends when they were charged with building a force to fight the air battles of World War II. But, just as important as their own competence, these leaders ensured assigned people knew their responsibilities. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor stated, "One expects a military leader to demonstrate in his daily performance a thorough knowledge of his own job and further an ability to train his subordinates in their duties and thereafter to supervise and evaluate their work."

5. **Know Yourself**. Knowing your own strengths and weaknesses is important to successful leadership. You, the leader, must recognize your personal capabilities and limitations. Former Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force Robert G. Taylor put it this way: "Sure, everyone wants to be an effective leader, whether it be in the Air Force or in the community. You can and will be if you identify your strengths, capitalize on them, and consciously strive to reduce and minimize the times you apply your style inappropriately." Don't, however, ignore your weaknesses. Recognize them and strive to overcome them. In the interim, select team members whose strengths compensate for your weaknesses so that your collective efforts will get the job done.

6. **Set the Example.** You must set the standard for the unit. People will emulate your standards of person conduct and appearance. They will observe your negative characteristics as well as your positive ones. A leader's actions must

be beyond reproach, if he or she is to be trusted. Deviations from high standards will only be amplified and the message of a leader's actions will permeate the entire organization. Regardless of how strongly we feel about ourselves, it is the public perception of our actions that count in the end and become "reality." For example, the supervisor who violates basic standards of morality invariably ends up in a comprising situation. A leader who drinks excessively or who abuses controlled drugs sends a dangerous message: I cannot control myself; how can I control you? Lack of self-discipline in a leader destroys the unit's cohesion and, ultimately impairs its ability to perform the mission.

People do not expect their leaders to be saints. But they do expect leadership from a person who recognizes the importance of example. As General George S. Patton, Jr. once remarked, "You are always on parade."

7. **Communicate.** Information should flow continuously throughout the organization. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White believed, "Information is the essential link between wise leadership and purposeful action." Communication is a two-way process. An informed leader is able to evaluate realistically the unit's progress toward mission accomplishment. Successful leaders listen to what their people have to say, and are always looking for the good ideas which can flow up the chain. It is the leader's job to keep all channels open. The more senior a leader becomes, the more listening skills are required.

8. **Educate Yourself and Others.** People should be properly trained to do their jobs. Professional military education, professional development education, technical training schools, and on-the-job training are formal means by which Air Force personnel are trained. Informal training, practice, and personal experience at the unit level are crucial reinforcements to formal training. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur observed, "In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military." Greater efficiencies are possible with a highly trained and skilled force; therefore, education must be a top priority.

9. **Equip Your Troops.** It's your responsibility to ensure the unit is equipped properly to accomplish the mission. If they do not have the proper tools, obtain them. Proper tools include equipment and facilities that lead to mission accomplishment. Occasionally, needed tools are not available in enough quantity or are not available to you at all, despite your best efforts to obtain them. In these situations a good leader works to develop a creative alternative and solicits solutions from those doing the job. A poorly equipped force cannot capitalize on its extensive training and requires more personnel or time to accomplish its mission than a properly equipped force. Your leadership responsibilities include identifying needs, securing funds, and then obtaining the necessary weapons, tools, and equipment.

10. **Accept Responsibilities.** General Curtis E. LeMay was once asked to provide a one-word definition of leadership. After some thought, General LeMay replied, "If I had to come up with one word to define leadership, I would say

responsibility." As a leader you are responsible for performing the unit's mission. If you fail, you are accountable for the consequences. Any unwillingness to accept responsibility for failure destroys your credibility as a leader and breaks the bond of respect and loyalty. Accountability also includes the requirement for discipline within a unit. A leader should reward a job well done and punish those who fail to meet their responsibilities or establish standards. The former is easy, even enjoyable; the latter is much more difficult, but equally necessary. George Washington observed, "Discipline is the soul of an Army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to all."

11. **Develop Teamwork.** Leaders cannot accomplish the mission alone. It is also impossible for followers to accomplish the entire mission while working completely along. As a leader you must mold a collection of individual performers into a cohesive team that works together to accomplish the mission. The unit's mission will suffer if each person in your organization is "doing his own thing" in isolation. As the leader, you should know how the various functions within the unit fit together and how they must work in harmony. You should create and maintain an atmosphere of teamwork and cooperation to meet mission demands. Teamwork comes when people are willing to put the unit's mission before all else.

The Leadership Situation

Leadership has been defined as the art of influencing and directing people to accomplish the mission. Management is the manner in which resources are used to achieve objectives. Military leaders should also be aware of their responsibilities as Air Force managers. British Field Marshall Lord Slim made a clear distinction:

> *There is a difference between leadership and management. The leader and the men who follow him represent one of the oldest, most natural, and most effective of all human relationships. The manager and those he manages are a later product with neither so romantic, nor so inspiring a history. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality and vision--its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation, statistics, methods, timetables, and routine--its practice is a science. Managers are necessary; leaders are essential.*

In essence, you lead **people** and you manage **things**. The Air Force needs people who can do both. The requirement is for the proper division of attention between the two, with the proportion dependent on the situation. Approach each leadership situation paying careful attention to the four primary factors: the mission, the people, the leader, and the environment.

- **The Mission.** Most missions involve many tasks that must be completed if the unit is to fulfill its responsibilities. The leader must define the mission and set priorities for its various components. In many instances higher headquarters has defined the mission. Yet, the leader should translate the higher direction

into goals with which people will relate. When possible, the leader should involve unit personnel in setting these goals to ensure their support. Individual involvement is very important when total effort is needed from everyone. The goals must be challenging but attainable. Goals that are unrealistic frustrate even the most dedicated people.

Set reasonable and acceptable standards of job performance to make sure that goals are met. These standards must be consistent with the mission, and defined clearly for every individual. Recognize those who meet or exceed standards, prescribe additional training for those who cannot, and take corrective action for those who will not. When standards are not met, determine the reason and move quickly to correct the situation through training or, if appropriate, administrative or disciplinary action. Get the facts, then act.

- **The People.** Be sensitive to people. People perform the mission. Understanding people helps determine the appropriate leadership action to take in a given situation. You cannot be totally successful at getting the most out of people without first knowing the capabilities of those you are leading. Capabilities have two principal elements: training and experience.

  – Training. Assess the level of training in the unit. If the people are not trained, do what it takes to get them the necessary training. Your subordinates cannot successfully accomplish the mission without the proper training. Medal of Honor recipient Sergeant John L. Levitow credited his heroic action under fire to the training he received.

  – Experience. Levels of experience vary widely. A leader should identify each individual's experience and ability to perform in various situations. Do not base your evaluation of an individual's experience solely on rank. While rank may be a good overall experience indicator, the person may never have accomplished a particular job or been in a particular environment.

- **The Leader.** Successful military leaders adapt their leadership style to meet the mission demands, and use an approach that capitalizes on their strengths. For example, if you are able to communicate effectively with people on an individual basis but are uncomfortable when speaking to large groups, then use personal conferences as much as possible. If you write well, take advantage of this skill by writing letters of appreciation or using other forms of correspondence. If you are a good athlete, organize and participate in unit sporting activities. In other words, capitalize on your strengths and minimize your weaknesses.

- **The Environment.** Leaders should carefully consider the environment in which they work. Leadership methods, which worked in one situation with one group, may not work with the same group in a different environment. Consider the squadron that is permanently based in the United States, but deploys overseas for an extended period of temporary duty. Billeting or food service difficulties, equipment, or parts shortages, family separation problems,

inclement weather, etc. may occur. Any of these problems create an entirely new environment with which the unit's leader must cope. As a leader, you must alter your leadership behavior, as necessary, to accommodate changes in the environment of the given mission. Be sensitive to your surroundings.

Roles of Leadership and Management

To better explain the roles of management and leadership, we'll examine them in terms of three elements: behavior, personal characteristics, and organization situation.

Behavior. Managerial behavior is based on building organizational relations that mesh together like parts of a timepiece. Leadership behavior, on the other hand, concentrates on making the hands of the timepiece move so as to display the time of day. The behavioral focus of each is clearly important, but while the manager may be preoccupied with the precision of the process, the leader concentrates on the inertial forces that drive the process. Warren Bennis, a professor and researcher who has devoted years to studying leadership, summarizes the two behaviors as: "Management is getting people to do what needs to be done. Leadership is getting people to want to do what needs to be done."

Effective leaders are often described as "dynamic," which is regarded as beneficial because it denotes movement and change. The function of leadership is not only to produce change, but also to set the direction of that change. Management, however, uses the function of planning to produce orderly results, not change.

Managers use the management process to control people by pushing them in the right direction. Leaders motivate and inspire people by satisfying their human needs, keeping them moving in the right direction to achieve a vision. To do this, leaders tailor their behavior towards their followers' need for achievement, sense of belonging, recognition, self-esteem, and control over their lives. Bennis offers the following summary of this behavioral comparison:

MANAGERS	LEADERS
• Administers	• Motivates
• Maintains	• Develops
• Controls	• Inspires

Personal Characteristics. The following figure illustrates an interesting comparison of successful leaders and managers that was researched by Professor Robert White of Indiana University. Everyone has been exposed to both types of

characteristics from experience that neither is exclusively positive or negative depending on the prevalence of the characteristics.

MANAGERS	LEADERS
• Problem solvers	• Analysts of purposes and causes
• Statistics driven	• Values driven
• Seek conflict avoidance	• Not only accept but invite conflict
• Thrive on predictability	• Ambiguous
• Assure that the organization's objectives are achieved, even if they disagree with them	• Assure that **their** objectives and those of the organization become one in the same

The best managers tend to become good leaders because they develop leadership abilities and skills through practicing good management techniques. Seldom is there an effective leader who has not been a good manager. Similarly, managers who become successful leaders have humanized their management skills with inspiration, empowerment, and vision through a catalyst called charisma. Social scientist Alan Bryman goes so far as to suggest that management styles may set the stage for charisma.

Organizational Situation. What are the organization implications of these two concepts of management and leadership? Leaders launch and steer the organization towards the pursuit of goals and strategies. Managers ensure the resources needed to get there are available and are used along the way. An organization needs both leadership and management, and if they are combined in one person or persons, so much the better.

To achieve a plan, managers organize and staff jobs with qualified individuals, communicating the plan to those people, delegating the responsibility for carrying out the plan, and devising systems to monitor its implementation. What you, as an officer, will need to do, however, is not to organize people, but to align them, and that is a leadership activity.

Conclusion

What is the relative importance of effective leadership and management? Strong leadership with weak management is no better, and sometimes actually worse, than the opposite. The challenge is to achieve a balance of strong leadership and strong management. A peacetime military can survive with good administration and management up and down the hierarchy, coupled with good leadership concentrated

at the top. A wartime force, however, needs competent leadership at all levels. Good management brings a degree of order and consistency to key issues like readiness, availability, and sustainment. But no one has yet figured out how to manage people into battle. They must lead.

Embrace the proven leadership traits and principles. The Air Force requires every airman, officer and enlisted, to reflect these traits and principles, at every level, when performing the Air Force mission – our success in war and peace depends on it.

Bibliography:

1. Guidelines for Command: A Handbook on the Leadership of People for Air Force Commanders and Supervisors, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1995.
2. AFDD 1-2, Air Force Basic Doctrine: Leadership and Command, Department of the Air Force, 14 June 1999. (LS CAMs' office)
3. Benton, Jeffrey C. Col. (USAF Ret.), Air Force Officer's Guide, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996. (LS CAMs' office)

Commander's Perspective

Introduction

Though you may not be in a commanding role for many years, the techniques discussed in this lesson are valuable for strengthening your officership qualities. During your training, listen to what will be asked of you – how you'll be challenged everyday, then think about your reaction. You are the leaders of tomorrow, and everyone is watching. Your reading is an article written by General Bennie L. Davis while he was commander of the Air Training Command (the forerunner of Air Education and Training Command.)

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Comprehend the commander's perspective as it pertains to the expectations of newly arrived commissioned personnel.

Sample of Behavior: Based on the article *Officership, a Profound Commitment that Transcends Personal Gain* by General Davis, identify the expectations of senior commanders.

Information

Officership, a Profound Commitment that Transcends Personal Gain

General Bennie L. Davis

Were I called upon today for an assessment of the state of the Air Force, I could honestly report that it's good – strong, ready to carry out any assigned mission.

But I would add a thought once expressed by Oliver Wendell Holmes, an observation as pertinent now as it was when he uttered it. "In this great world today," he said, "it is not where we stand, but the direction in which we are moving."

The thought hits home because it gets to the heart of a problem that's been bothering me more and more recently – that the great social forces at work throughout our society, including the military, seem to be stressing personal welfare and comfort above the timeless virtues of loyalty, cooperation and selflessness.

Identity Crisis

Two recent Air Force studies have given substance to this nagging apprehension of mine. In one, Captain Frank Wood of the Air Force Academy interviewed 40 junior officers to try to determine their norms and values. He found that they're experiencing a confusing – and in my view quite dangerous – identity crisis. According to Wood's sample, many of us are coming to view ourselves more as managers or specialists than as Air Force officers.

Another study, by Majors Joseph Daskevich and Paul Nafziger, produced some similarly disturbing results. While the majority of officers surveyed felt that an Air Force career should be more than just an occupation, only 43 percent of them believed that other officers acted as if it were, and – even more telling – only one in four reported he personally felt a "deep personal commitment," a "calling" to serve the nation.

Test of the Century

I repeat: These perceptions and attitudes are not just unsettling; they're dangerous. Our country, which was founded on the ideals of individual equality bonded into collective responsibility and strength, cannot long endure in a climate in which personal and financial securities are the sole measures of success. Vince Lombardi, a former football coach of mine at West Point, was prescient in this regard. "The test of this century," he said, "is whether we mistake growth of wealth and power for growth in strength and character. We've weakened discipline and respect for authority and let the freedom of the individual predominate."

Some students of the military say the seeds of the problem were planted when we began to allow our traditional sense of ethics and responsibility to be replaced by the "pragmatic" ethos of the businessman, the marketplace, and the corporation. This, they say, has led to substitution of seminars on management practices for discussions of the qualities that constitute leadership. In short, the critic' contention is that we're shifting emphasis from developing our abilities to inspire and lead people into merely managing them.

There may be some merit to that premise. If so, a big contributor to this change in approach – philosophy, if you will – has been the steady growth of technology. Perhaps as our Air Force has become more technically oriented, we've become inclined to stress the skill factor at the expense of the military one, with the result that we're treating our subordinates more like employees than members of our fraternity, with an attendant loss of cohesion. Admittedly, career-minded, ambitious young men and women are healthy for the Air Force. I'll go even further: They're a necessity. But self-interest, when placed above commitment to the unit as a whole, can destroy a military organization.

In any event, these changes in attitude among our young officers and airmen have spawned some thorny problems. In the long run their negative impact could more than counterbalance our steady advances in the physical sciences.

What is Leadership?

To forestall that possibility, we're going to need the best leadership we've ever had. This raises an obvious question: "What is leadership?"

We don't know exactly. What we do know is that if we create, build, and sustain it, proper leadership will stimulate managerial skills and functions and bring other resources to life. Conversely, we know that without it, work in any office or ship, or on any flight line, must inevitably grind to a halt.

Leadership is a mysterious, only vaguely understood force. But it does immediately evoke other words and concepts – like professionalism, for instance. And that in turn leads logically to still another, which I believe encompasses the best elements of both. It's an attitude/concept/philosophy that we in Air Training Command have dubbed officership. In it professionalism, leadership, and good management are interwoven with the priceless qualities of integrity, honesty, and selflessness.

But officership also resists precise definition. One thing can be states with assurance: Officership is not a thing, not a commodity. While in many ways it could be labeled an intangible, paradoxically it's very real – the blood, breath, soul and muscle of a living institution, our Air Force.

Characteristics of Leadership

I guess the best way to try to analyze it – give it form and substance – would be to list some of its known qualities and discuss a few of it characteristics.

Certainly, one extremely important element of officership is loyalty, aptly described as the military touchstone.

Loyalty has many faces: First, there's "two-way-street" loyalty that which we expect from our superiors and in turn are obligated to extend to our subordinates.

A second, equally important face of loyalty is loyalty to ourselves, to our moral, ethical, and professional ideals, under girded with the courage to defend a position to all proper limits.

But transcending these is the loyalty spelled out in the oath we took when we became commissioned officers in the Air Force: loyalty to country. At that time we swore we would be guardians not only of the material blessings the people of this nation have enjoyed for more than 200 years, but would also be equally stalwart, committed defenders of the ideal, the dream and the glory that is America.

So let's grant that loyalty helps give the concept of officership a bit more tangible shape. What are some of the other ingredients?

Importance of the Individual

There are those who maintain – mistakenly – that as modern machines of war have become more versatile and effective, the importance of the individual in combat (along with concepts like officership) has been reduced. Nothing could be more in error: The demands on the individual have never been greater. Today one officer is often entrusted with potentially devastating force. In his hands could easily rest the survival of his comrades. So on what bases can we decide to entrust a particular person with such awesome responsibility? Experience? Yes. Skill? Yes. Proven capabilities and performance? Yes. Demonstrated courage? Yes.

But there are additional important criteria, albeit of a less specific nature, that must be considered. We must be sure that the person we select possesses unfaltering devotion to the sterling standards of duty, honor, country, and integrity. In the composite, these are the qualities that distinguish the true military professional. They serve a taskmaster, incentive, and guide.

Commitment

Another definite component of officership is commitment. Ours is a unique profession. We have committed ourselves to give our lives, if necessary, in the service of our country. Certainly no other calling makes the demand on its members.

But there's an equally compelling adjunct to that commitment – our commitment to those we lead. Some of you may already have had to order your subordinates into battle. Others may have to do so in the future. No leader should ever be given the responsibility of asking subordinates to risk their lives on his orders unless he believes utterly that life is sacred, that it should only be laid on the line for a purpose of transcendent value to society.

Sensitivity to Needs

There's yet another element integral to the leader/subordinate relationship: the professionals' sensitivity to the needs of those for whom we are responsible. Only by becoming knowledgeable about their problems and about them as individuals, can we become involved sufficiently to help them, thus creating a climate in which loyalty and discipline can thrive. This personal involvement and understanding has become especially urgent in recent years as many of our young NCOs and airmen have to struggle with the problems and frustrations caused by inadequate pay and compensation.

True officership has many other facets, among them the unique collective character of the officer corps, pride in service, our commonality of interests and a sense of challenge. Another – one I'd like to discuss – underscores the uniqueness of our profession mentioned above.

I refer to the breadth and depth of vision, the panoramic view of the world we gain from our career experiences in the Air Force. This education and growth, the

product of association and interaction with peers, superiors, subordinates, and our foreign allies, far transcends formal academic limits. As individually no man is an island, there is no career field in the Air Force that can survive in isolation. As an officer works with a myriad of others over the years, his or her horizons inevitable broaden.

Drive to Learn

There's a popular notion that leaders, including those who wear military uniforms, are born, not made. There may be a bit of truth in that; but I believe it's far more a case of a personal drive to learn – using that word in its broadest sense. The famed T.E. Lawrence, "Lawrence of Arabia," makes my case for me: "I was not an instinctive soldier, automatic with intuitions and happy ideas," he wrote. "When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant – and many an irrelevant – factor: Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards – all were at my finger ends.

"The same with tactics," he continued. "To use aircraft I learned to fly. The same with strategy, (where) I levied contributions from my predecessors of five languages. Generalship, at least in my case, came of understanding, of hard study and brainwork and concentration...Use me as a text to preach for more study of books and history, a greater seriousness in military art. With 2,000 years of examples behind us we have no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well." Various critics have argued that the military should be concerned with specialization in specific fields, rather than in officership. Some of our own officers have become almost obsessed with pay, benefits, working conditions, and types of tasks to be done. They have expressed discontent with what they feel is owed to the completion of a mission. Such self-centeredness automatically diminishes the importance of loyalty and esprit de corps, detouring the young officer from the road to officership.

Performance Takes Precedence

Please don't misunderstand: No one would think of arguing that benefits, pay and compensation, and the conditions under which we work, aren't important. Of course they are. But they cannot – must not – be permitted to take precedence over the fundamental tenet that each individual's performance as a team member determines the ultimate state of our nation's readiness.

For the record, let me interject once more that I, for one, am still not fully persuaded that traditional Air Force values have been completely abandoned. I know that when you chose to become officers in the American military, you certainly didn't expect to become millionaires. But I can personally assure you that the fulfillment that becomes yours as you pursue a selfless career is worth far more than a million. And as far as the nation is concerned, you talents and dedication, although perhaps not always fully appreciated, are priceless assets.

No. I reiterate that the "old-fashioned" values such as patriotism, loyalty, honor, integrity, and duty are still very much alive. They're the cornerstones on which

an effective defense posture will always be constructed. Because as has been said many times before (but it bears repeating): The most sophisticated weapon systems are worthless without quality, motivated people to operate, maintain and support them – plus, I insist, officership.

Balance Perspective

As stated earlier, I believe that an officer, whether pilot, infantry officer, engineer or personnel expert, must have a balanced perspective based on the widest reasonable exposure to different missions and functions. True, this conviction results partly from our need to fill everyday requirements. This openly acknowledged goal has given rise to the myth in some quarters that we try to train all our officers to be chief of staff. That's patently ridiculous. Not that it's not a worthy goal; but few reach it. No. What we're doing is attempting to develop the individual characters of all Air Force officers – nurturing officership.

Also, some think that because the military services collectively are huge, they resemble large civilian organizations. We do perform many similar functions, use many of the same techniques, and follow many of the same principles. But we're not a commercial airline. We're not an industrial corporation. We are an instrument of national policy, a guarantor of national security, a weapon of national defense.

To amplify that, an official of a civilian corporation may spend an entire career in a single area such as marketing, finance, or personnel management. And if an additional expert is needed – an engineer, a maintenance supervisor, a corporate vice-president – the company simply goes to the market place and hires one.

But that kind of management practice simply doesn't work in the military. There's a profound difference between the Air Force officer who possesses a specialized skill and his civilian counterpart: Our successes are measured in terms of national survival, not in annual profits or losses. And when we need to expand our operations to respond to a sudden increase in demand for our services – in case of war, for example – we don't go to a rival firm to hire additional experts, executives or leaders. We draw from our own. That's the basic "why" of officership; every officer must be ready to respond instantly, prepared and confident.

What it all boils down to, I suppose, is that in the Air Force we're in the business of producing disciplined but creative, innovated, broad-gauged thinkers. We want to develop officers who have every opportunity to speak out loudly and clearly in defending their point of view. There's just one caveat: They must never forget for an instant that they are members of the military – remember that in a time for decision always arrives eventually, and that when it does, as officers they are obligated to give the chosen course of action their unconditional support.

Character, Education

In closing, I'd like to leave you with another thought I remember Coach Vince Lombardi expressing. "Character, not education," he said, "is man's greatest need and man's greatest safeguard. For character is higher than intellect. The real difference between men is in their character and in their energy, in their strong will and their skilled purpose."

That dovetails neatly with my theme. Because officership is also constancy, tradition and possession of the "strong will and skilled purpose." As stated, officership means being able to innovate. But it also means being receptive to the innovation of others, demonstrating unassailable integrity while avoiding rigidity. Officership is being coolheaded in tense situations, but warm-hearted with people.

At the beginning of this essay I warned you that officership was an extremely difficult concept to define in precise terminology. I've done the best I can. It's somewhat like trying to describe a sunset. I know what causes it – the light of the setting sun creates the magnificent colors as it reflects from particles in the air.

But I would find it impossible to tell you what the sunset means to me, deep down.

It's the same with officership. I've enumerated many of the priceless qualities, both intangible and real, embodied in the concept. Each has its individual emotional and intellectual impact. It is in the aggregate that they constitute officership.

It will take work time and a lot of just plain living for you to grasp all that officership means. But I promise you that when you do, you will be rewarded with a sense of self-fulfillment such as you've never experienced before.

Conclusion

These words of General Davis ring as true today, as when he wrote them. As you continue your Air Force career, contemplate these words and consider how you can be the best possible officer, for the Air Force and for your country.

Bibliography:

1. Bennie L. Davis, General, USAF, "Officership: A Profound Commitment that Transcends Personal Gain," *Precommissioning Education Review,* Fall 1980.



CAPTAIN STEVEN LOGAN BENNETT

piloted a light aircraft flying an artillery adjustment mission on June 29, 1972. A large concentration of enemy troops was massing to attack a friendly unit. Captain Bennett requested tactical air and artillery support, but neither was available. Determined to aid the endangered unit, he elected to strafe the hostile positions. After four passes, the enemy began to retreat. On the fifth pass, a surface-to-air missile severely damaged his aircraft's left engine and landing gear. Captain Bennett's observer could not eject, because a missile had shredded his parachute. Although he had a good parachute, Captain Bennett knew if he ejected his observer could not survive. With disregard for his personal safety, he chose to ditch in the Gulf of Tonkin even though a pilot of this type aircraft had never survived a ditching. The impact trapped Captain Bennett, but the observer escaped and was rescued.

War and the American Military

INTRODUCTION

War isn't an unfamiliar phenomenon in America. Our 220+ year history, although a short span of time by world standards, is filled with both internal and external conflict. Today, we can look back at that time as a period of consolidation in which America developed and employed tremendous power. As Air Force officers, we have an obligation to understand the fundamental framework of social and military science so we might become more effective in the preservation of those liberties and institutions our forefathers fought so hard to obtain.

Past performance often becomes prophecy. War is a nasty, bloody, expensive business, and it takes a terrible toll in blood and treasure. Because of international power politics and human nature, we're going to have war again. And worse than that, the way it's going to happen won't be the type of war we expect. It'll be at the worst possible time, worst possible place, against the worst possible enemy. By studying the nature of conflict we can more intelligently anticipate the future. Armed with such knowledge, hopefully we'll be able to avoid the agonies of war for our country and next generations.

STUDY ASSIGNMENT

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Know the basis and characteristics of war.

Samples of Behavior:
1. State the difference between military doctrine and military strategy.
2. Define war according to AFDD-1.
3. State the three enduring truths that describe the fundamental nature of war.
4. Identify the ways war (as a multidimensional activity) can be categorized.

INFORMATION

Doctrine, Strategy, and War Doctrine Defined

Air and space doctrine is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs and warfighting principles that describe and guide the proper use of air and space forces in military operations. It is what we have come to understand, based on our experience to date. *The Air Force promulgates and teaches this doctrine as a common frame of reference* on the best way to prepare and employ air and space forces. Accordingly, air and space *doctrine shapes the manner in which the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces.* Doctrine prepares us for future uncertainties and, combined with our basic shared core values, *provides a common set*

of understandings on which airmen base their decisions. Doctrine consists of the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is the linchpin of successful military operations, and *Air Force doctrine is meant to codify accumulated wisdom and provide a framework for the way we prepare for, plan, and conduct air and space operations*. In application, doctrine must be treated with judgment but must never be dismissed out of hand or through ignorance of its principles.

Air and space doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge gained primarily from the study and analysis of experience, which may include actual combat or contingency operations as well as equipment tests or exercises. As such, doctrine reflects what has usually worked best. In those less frequent instances in which experience is lacking or difficult to acquire (e.g., theater nuclear operations), doctrine may be developed through analysis of theory and postulated actions. **It must be emphasized that doctrine development is never complete.** Innovation has always been a key part of sound doctrinal development and must continue to play a central role. Doctrine is constantly changing as new experiences and advances in technology point the way to the force of the future.

Levels of Air and Space Doctrine

The Air Force places air and space doctrine at different levels and depths of detail in the forms of basic, operational, and tactical doctrine.

Basic Doctrine. Basic doctrine states the most fundamental and enduring beliefs that describe and guide the proper use of air and space forces in military action. *It describes the "elemental properties" of air and space power and provides the airman's perspective.* Because of its fundamental and enduring character, basic doctrine *provides broad and continuing guidance on how Air Force forces are organized and employed*. As the foundation of all air and space doctrine, basic doctrine also sets the tone and vision for doctrine development for the future. AFDD 1 is the airman's basic doctrine.

Operational Doctrine. Operational doctrine, contained in AFDD 2-series publications, describes more detailed organization of air and space forces and applies the principles of basic doctrine to military actions. Operational doctrine *guides the proper employment of air and space forces in the context of distinct objectives, force capabilities, broad functional areas, and operational environments*. Basic doctrine and operational doctrine *provide the focus for developing the missions and tasks* that must be executed through tactical doctrine.

Tactical Doctrine. Tactical doctrine describes the proper employment of specific weapon systems individually or in concert with other weapon systems to accomplish detailed objectives. Tactical doctrine *considers particular tactical objectives* (blockading a harbor with aerial mines) and tactical conditions (threats, weather, and terrain) and *describes how weapon systems are employed* to accomplish the tactical objective (B-1s laying sea mines at low altitude). Tactical doctrine is

codified in Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-series manuals. (Formerly known as Multiple Command Manuals (MCM) 3-1 and 3-3 series.)

Types of Doctrine

Service Doctrine. Service doctrine, such as the AFDD and AFTTP series, out-lines Service competencies and guides the application of Service forces.

Joint Doctrine. Joint doctrine applies air and space doctrine to joint operations and describes the best way to integrate and employ air and space forces with land and naval forces in military action. Joint doctrine is published in the joint publication system.

Multinational Doctrine. Multinational doctrine applies air and space doctrine to joint multinational operations and describes the best way to It establishes the agreed upon principles, organization, and fundamental procedures between or among allied forces. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multi-national doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable. Service, joint, and multinational doctrine is published at the basic, operational, and tactical levels.

The Relationship of Military Doctrine to Strategy

Military doctrine describes how a job should be done to accomplish military goals; strategy defines how it will be done to accomplish national political objectives. Strategy differs fundamentally from doctrine even though each is necessary for employing military forces. *Strategy originates in policy and addresses broad objectives and the plans for achieving them.* Doctrine evolves from military theory and experience and addresses how best to use military power. However, political, economic, or social realities may dictate strategic and operational approaches that depart from accepted doctrine when leaders develop our national security strategy or develop plans for particular contingencies. When this happens, military commanders should delineate for political leaders the military consequences of those adaptations. However, because war is "an instrument of policy," military commanders must ensure that policy governs the employment of military power and be prepared to adapt operations accordingly.

The end of the Cold War transformed US national security requirements. The United States now enters into the twenty-first century with unprecedented prosperity and opportunity that are threatened by dangers of unprecedented complexity. The problems associated with fostering a stable global system will require the US military to play an essential role in building coalitions and shaping the international environment in ways that protect and promote US interests. A *National Security Strategy for a New Century* stresses "the imperative of engagement" through

integrated approaches that allow the nation to **shape** the international environment; **respond** to the full spectrum of crises; and **prepare today** for an uncertain future. This strategy depends not only on maintaining a strong defense and ensuring that America's military forces are ready to deter, fight, and win wars. *A key precept will be that those same forces will be increasingly called upon in peaceful military-to-military contacts, humanitarian intervention, peace support, and other nontraditional roles.*

National Military Strategy. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* **describes the objectives, concepts, tasks, and capabilities necessary to implement the goals set for the military in** *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. The national military strategy evolves as the inter-national environment, national strategy, and national military objectives change. *This strategy lays the basis for applying military instruments at the strategic and operational levels.* It requires responsive military forces to *cope rapidly and decisively* with diverse situations including:

- Nuclear and Conventional Threats
- Regional Instability
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Threats to Unilateral Peace-support Operations
- Drug-trafficking
- Terrorism
- Regional Wars
- Natural Disasters

To execute this national military strategy of flexible and selective engagement, our military forces must not only be trained, organized, and equipped to fight, but must also be ready to engage across the spectrum of peace, crisis, and conflict as part of any joint, combined, United Nations, or interagency force.

Fundamental Nature of War. Three enduring truths describe the fundamental nature of war. These are not likely to change, even as technology provides what is often referred to as a "revolution in military affairs." **War's political nature and the physical stress and agony of combat will outlive our attempts through technological progress and our most fervent desires to make it bloodless and devoid of violence.** The means may change, but the fundamental nature and risks of warfare will remain.

- **War is an instrument of national policy.** *Victory in war is not measured by casualties inflicted, battles won or lost, or territory occupied, but by whether or not political objectives were achieved.* More than any other factor, political objectives (one's own and those of the enemy) shape the scope and intensity of war. Military objectives and operations must support political objectives and must be coordinated and orchestrated with nonmilitary instruments of power.

- **War is a complex and chaotic human endeavor. Human frailty and irrationality shape war's nature.** *Uncertainty and unpredictability—what many call the "fog" of war—combine with danger, physical stress, and human fallibility*

to produce "friction," a phenomenon that makes apparently simple operations unexpectedly, and sometimes even insurmountably, difficult. Uncertainty, unpredictability, and unreliability are always present, but sound doctrine, leadership, organization, core personal values, technologies, and training can lessen their effects.

- **War is a clash of opposing wills. An enemy can be highly unpredictable.** War is not waged against an inanimate or static object, but against a living, calculating enemy. *Victory results from creating advantages against thinking adversaries bent on creating their own advantages.* This produces a dynamic interplay of action and reaction in which the enemy often acts or reacts unexpectedly. *While physical factors are crucial in war, the national will and the leadership's will are also critical components of war.* The will to prosecute or the will to resist can be decisive elements.

Air and Space Power in War

The overriding objective of any military force is to be prepared to conduct combat operations in support of national political objectives—to conduct the nation's wars. War is a struggle between rival political groups or nation states to attain competing political objectives. War does not have to be officially declared for armed forces to be thrust into wartime conditions or engage in combat operations; in fact, the vast majority of military operations are not conducted under the banner of a declared war or even preplanned combat operations. Once political leaders resort to the use of force, or possibly even the threat of force, they may place their forces "at war," at least from the perspective of those engaged. *War is a multidimensional activity, which can be categorized in various ways: by intensity (low to high); by duration (short or protracted); by the means employed (conventional, unconventional, nuclear); or by the objectives/resources at stake (general or limited war).*

Warfare is normally associated with the different mediums of air, land, sea, and space. *In addition, information is now considered another medium in which some aspects of warfare can be conducted.* The US Air Force conducts air, space, and information warfare to support the objectives of joint force commanders (JFCs). In addition, air and space forces accomplish a wide variety of traditional and information-related functions, classically described as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). *These functions can be conducted independently from land and sea operations and can complement, sup-port, or be supported by, land and sea operations.*

Air and Space Power in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

The challenges our armed forces face today are more ambiguous and regionally focused than during the Cold War. These challenges can no longer be described as a single threat (the Soviet Union) but as multiple risks: economic and political transitions, repressive regimes, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation of cutting-edge military technology, violent extremists, militant nationalism, ethnic and religious conflict, refugee overflows, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth, and terrorism. The military instrument of national power, either unilaterally or in combination with the economic and diplomatic instruments, may be called upon to meet these challenges. Under such circumstances, military operations other than war may deter war, resolve conflict, relieve suffering, promote peace, or support civil authorities.

MOOTW Operations MOOTW are military actions not associated with sustained, large-scale combat operations. Application of global strategic air and space forces can still be appropriate and effective, as can the special operations component. Military actions can be applied to:

- **Enforcement of Sanctions**
- **Enforcing**
- **Exclusion Zones**
- **Protection of Shipping**
- **Strikes and Raids**
- **Arms Control Support**
- **Domestic Support Operations**
- **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance**
- **Nation Assistance***
- **Show of Forces**
- **Support to Insurgency***
- **Combating Terrorism**
- **Counterdrug Operations**
- **Ensuring Freedom of Navigation**
- **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations**
- **Peace Operations**
- **Recovery Operations Typical**
- **Combat Operations Typical**
- **Noncombat Operations**

**** Note:*** *The US reserves the right to use force during NCA-approved support to counter-insurgency (part of nation assistance) and during NCA-approved support to insurgency when it is in its interests to do so.* ***Caution:*** *A distinct characteristic of MOOTW is the ever-existing possibility that any type of MOOTW may quickly change from noncombat to combat and vice versa. Therefore, even when a typical combat operation is planned, remember that actual force may not be needed if deterrence works, e.g., protection of shipping. Likewise, in some typical noncombat operations, some level of force may be*

required if the situation deteriorates. Regardless, use of appropriate self-defense measures are always authorized.

MOOTW operations often include specialized equipment and specialized skills. *MOOTW Operations* complement any combination of the other instruments of national or international power. To leverage effectiveness, it is particularly important that actions be integrated, mutually reinforcing, and clearly focused on compatible objectives throughout the engaged force, whether US, allied, military, civilian, or nongovernmental organizations. *The overall goal of MOOTW is to pursue US national policy initiatives and to counter potential threats to US national security interests.* MOOTW may be classified as typically combat, typically noncombat, and a group of operations that may be either combat or non-combat. Even though there are many types of MOOTW typically not involving combat, **airmen must understand that violence (and casualties) may occur in virtually any type of operation** and, therefore, must be ready and able at all times to defend themselves and their units. **Air, space, and information functions are adaptable to MOOTW,** and certain assets may be applied to attain strategic-, operational-, or tactical-level effects against limited objectives as effectively as those mounted against more traditional wartime targets. Whether providing rapid, focused global mobility; supporting information operations that shape and influence the situation; isolating operations from air or ground interference; or providing the eyes and ears of a sophisticated command and control system; the flexibility of air and space forces is integral to any operation. Air and space forces can be the supported force (airlift or special operations to provide foreign humanitarian assistance or to conduct a limited raid; counterair to enforce an air exclusion zone; or information operations to determine treaty compliance), an enhancing force (air- and space-based ISR), or a supporting force (close air support, some interdiction, and some suppression of enemy air defenses [SEAD]). Air and space forces are an essential element in successful MOOTW.



SECOND LIEUTENANT ERWIN RUSSELL BLECKLEY was a DH-4 observer with the 50th Aero Squadron. On 6 October 1918, near Binarville, France, Lieutenant Bleckley and his pilot were on their second trip to drop supplies to a surrounded battalion in the Argonne Forest. Subjected on the first trip to violent enemy fire, they attempted now to fly still lower in order to deliver the supplies even more precisely. The plan was brought down by enemy ground fire, resulting in fatal wounds to Lieutenant Bleckley who died before he could be taken to a hospital. In the course of this mission, lieutenant Bleckley showed the highest possible devotion to duty, courage, and valor.

Law of Armed Conflict

Introduction

War has been a predominant feature throughout our history. While the methods of fighting these wars have changed dramatically throughout history, certain elements have remained constant. One of the most obvious characteristics is the incredibly violent nature of war. In an attempt to prevent unnecessary harm to civilians and societies at large, nations have adopted a series of treaties and laws that are known as the Law of Armed Conflict.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Know how the law of armed conflict affects the parties in war.

Samples of Behavior:
1. State your responsibilities for reporting a violation of the Law of Armed Conflict.
2. List the people who are entitled to Prisoner of War status under the Law of Armed Conflict.
3. State when medical personnel may carry firearms.
4. Identify how occupying forces must treat civilians.
5. State when aircraft can attack targets located in an area densely populated with civilians.

Information

History

Throughout the history of war, belligerents have recognized that it was best to treat certain people, property, and places as exempt from armed conflict. While there is evidence of international law dating back thousands of years, the law of war is a fairly recent development. Francis Lieber prepared the first code on the proper conduct of war in 1863. Lieber developed the *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*, which covered areas such as protection of private property, noncombatants, prisoners of war, and punishment for war crimes.[1] While these laws were enforceable only on US forces, the principles were acknowledged by many countries, and the rules were instrumental in developing the Hague Conventions on land warfare in 1899 and 1907.

Another critical development in the Law of Armed Conflict occurred at a similar time in Europe. In 1859, Henry Dunant witnessed the battle of Solferino, in Northern Italy. His experience treating the wounded after the battle led to the eventual creation

[1] Schindler, Dietrich. *The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions Resolutions and Other Documents*. 2d ed. Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1981. p. 1.

of the International Committee of the Red Cross.[2] He was also instrumental in drafting the first series of Geneva Conventions in 1864.[3] These conventions, over the period of several decades, have focused on the treatment of the sick and wounded, prisoners of war, and civilian personnel in times of war.

Terminology

The law of armed conflict is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities; it is often termed the "law of war." The United States and several other countries have stated the law of armed conflict is the preferred term, as we have not officially declared war since World War II.

Your Professional Responsibility

As a professional military officer, these laws bind you. The Constitution of the United States, in Article VI, Clause 2, states:

> *The Constitution...all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.*

You are responsible for your compliance and your subordinates. If at any time, you become aware of a violation of the law of armed conflict; you are to report the violation to your immediate commander.[4] The immediate commander is the lowest ranking individual with command responsibilities. This person may be different from your supervisor who may or may not have command responsibility. If the commander is apparently involved in the incident, then the report should be made to the next higher person with command authority. The commander will then consult the Staff Judge Advocate and the proper investigative agency to deal with the violation.

The Law of Armed Conflict

International law governs the conduct of nations and serves to protect their interests, to ensure citizens are treated equally, and to predict, with some degree of assurance, what other nations will do in a given situation.[5] The Law of Armed Conflict is a subset of international law.

It's interesting that we use the term "Law of Armed Conflict" as though there were a single set of laws that apply to all countries. In reality, the Law of Armed Conflict is a series of conventions, treaties, and customs that have been established by "civilized" nations throughout history.

---

[2] W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou. *The Laws of War*. Vintage Books, New York, 1994.
[3] The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940., T.S. No. 377; The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick of Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, T.S. No. 847, 118 L.N.T.S. 303; The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
[4] Air Force Regulation 110-32, Training and Reporting to Ensure Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict, 2 Aug. 1976.
[5] Darrell Phillips. "The Law of Armed Conflict" lecture, September 1995.

Customary international law arises out of the conduct of nations during hostilities and is binding on all nations. Customs are often difficult to define in concrete terms because they are constantly changing and adapting to new situations. Thus, customary law is constantly evolving and adapting itself to new situations. For example, today, the law is evolving rapidly in the areas of computer networks, space law, and intellectual property. Despite a lack of concrete code, elements of customary law may be found in international conventions, declarations, judicial decisions, international and national tribunals, and other documentary materials.[6]

It's important to note treaties and conventions are binding only on those nations, which have ratified the treaty or convention. While the United States has entered numerous treaties, there are only two treaties that have the greatest influence on the Law of Armed Conflict: The Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions.

The Hague Conventions

At the end of the nineteenth century, Czar Nicholas II of Russia called together the principle nations of the world to discuss and resolve the problems of maintaining universal peace, reducing armaments, and improving the conditions of warfare. Twenty-six countries attended the conference in 1899, and the delegates from the conference signed three formal conventions, or treaties. The first convention setup permanent procedures for the optional arbitration of controversial issues between nations. This treaty created the Permanent Court of Arbitration, popularly known as The Hague Court or Hague Tribunal. The second and third conventions revised some of the customs, whether individuals qualified as combatants, noncombatants, or neutrals. These two conventions were supplemented by three declarations: to stay in force five years, forbidding the use of poison gas, expanding (or dumdum) bullets, and bombardment from the air by balloons or by other means. The great nations of this time refused to adopt compulsory arbitration because it infringed on their national sovereignty.

The second Hague Conference took place between June and October 1907, and was attended by representatives from 44 countries. The second conference created 13 conventions, which were concerned principally with clarifying and amplifying the understandings arrived at in the first conference.

This conference was complicated by the introduction of new technologies, most notably the zeppelin and the airplane. While different states had different perspectives on the legitimate use of aerial attack, it was decided that the restrictions on attacking cities through the air could no longer be enforced. There was no concise decision made, but Article 25 of the 1899 Land Warfare Convention was amended to read:

> *"The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended is prohibited."*

Several problems emerged from this amendment. First, the Land Warfare Convention conflicted on certain occasions with the Conferences Ninth Convention,

[6] AFP 110-31, International Law--The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, p. 1-7.

"Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War." Article 2 of the Naval Convention identified particular military objects that were to be considered lawful targets for bombardment to include the following:

> *"Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war materiel, workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbor."*

The conflicting information between the two conventions left much of the information subject to interpretation. It was further compounded by the ambiguous term "undefended" city. For example, at the outset of World War I, the British debated whether placing anti-aircraft guns in London would make it a "defended city." If the Germans perceived it to be defended, then they could openly attack any military target in the city, but if no guns were emplaced then it would be undefended. In the end, the guns were emplaced.[7] Ironically, the Germans placed little consideration whether there were guns in place or not. They viewed London as a legitimate military target because it contained the administrative offices concerned with the direction of the war.[8]

The attending delegates arranged a third Hague conference, but it was canceled because of the outbreak of World War I. Following World War I, a number of treaties and agreements were signed, but few had the strength of the Hague Conventions.

The Geneva Conventions

World War II demonstrated the inadequacies of the previous conventions and the abuses that some countries were willing to commit in attempting to achieve their objectives. Following the war, the world powers agreed that stronger conventions needed to be made. The Geneva Conventions signed in 1949 are the laws currently recognized and are actually four separate agreements: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Force in the Field; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. It's important to note that although these are official conventions (i.e. they should be enforced only against countries signing the convention); they are considered in large part to be customary international law to be enforced on all countries.

Prisoners of War Convention (POW)

The fate and treatment of captured enemy combatants owes much to the principle of humanity. In the past, victorious armies have frequently slaughtered the defeated enemy, enslaved them, and held valuable prisoners for ransom. These practices officially ceased with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which called for the release of prisoners without ransom.[9] The general principle is that a combatant

[7] Air Campaign Course, 1994. "Air Power and the Law of War" Tami Davis Biddle, p. 42.
[8] Ibid., p. 43.
[9] W. Flory, Prisoner of War, A Study in the Development of International Law, 1942. p. 15.

without arms is defenseless and therefore entitled to protections granted other noncombatants. However, captors are justified in taking precautions to prevent prisoners from taking up arms against them again.

International law also states combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian population in order for the civilian population to be protected. A lawful combatant is authorized to engage in acts of war on behalf of his state, and he is also a legal target of an act of war.

The Third Geneva Convention specifies the categories of personnel who qualify to be treated as POWs if captured by the enemy. Members of a nation's military force are entitled to POW status. The member of the military force is uniformed, armed, and subject to an internal disciplinary system which includes a chain of command. Militia and volunteer units would also constitute part of the armed force.[10] Mercenaries fighting along side of a nation's armed force are not given POW status as they are motivated by a desire for private gain.[11]

Members of an armed force of a government not recognized by the detaining power are entitled to POW status. This provision was implemented because the Germans did not recognize the Free French during World War II and refused to grant POW status to its captured members.[12] It's also important to note states do not have to officially declare war to be entitled POW status. The North Vietnamese, therefore, violated the Geneva Convention when they failed to recognize American airmen as POWs because the United States did not declare war against Vietnam.

General Population

When their homeland is being invaded, the population has the right to rise up and take arms to resist the invasion. They do not have the obligation to be organized or bear a fixed distinctive symbol. They are entitled to POW status as long as they carry their arms openly and generally adhere to the law of armed conflict. They are lawful combatants only during the invasion. Once the area becomes occupied, a civilian has no legal right to engage in warfare; if he does, he can be tried and punished for his actions.

Many times, a conquering nation will face one or more resistance groups. Resistance movements in France constantly harassed the Nazis, during World War II. These resistance members are given combatant status if they meet the following four criteria:

(1) The force has a responsible command structure.
(2) The members wear a fixed distinctive insignia recognizable at a distance and they are distinguishable from the civilian population.
(3) The members carry their arms openly.
(4) The resistance must conduct its operations in accordance with the laws of armed conflict.

[10] Ibid., p. 16,
[11] Ibid., p. 281.
[12] P. Rowe, Defence: The Legal Implications, 1987. p. 159.

Certain individuals who do not engage in acts of war may be entitled to POW status. Civilians who accompany the armed forces, news correspondents, technical representatives, and supply contractors are granted POW status.

Spies are not protected under the law of armed conflict. A spy is defined as an individual "acting clandestinely, or on false pretenses, he obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. Thus soldiers not wearing a disguise, who have penetrated into the zone of operations of a hostile army for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies."[13] Spies, once they rejoin their army, are entitled to protected status and are not responsible for their previous acts of espionage.[14]

POWs "must at all times be humanely treated."[15] The Geneva Convention specifically requires a detaining power to protect the individual and his dignity. It prohibits killing or torturing prisoners. Prisoners may not be used for scientific or medical experimentation. Although a captured prisoner may slow a troops' movement, expose the capturing troops to greater danger or consume the troops provisions, a member of the detaining power is not justified in executing the prisoner.

Wounded and Sick

International law grants special protection to those who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked, as well as those who care for them. The wounded, sick, or shipwrecked are no longer in a defensible position, and they are no longer engaged in hostilities.[16]

After an engagement, parties must search for and collect the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked. The military may appeal to the local civilian population to assist in the search for, or care of, the wounded and sick.[17] The civilian population may not expose these protected persons to violence. For the purposes of treatment, all persons collected must be treated as if they were the party's nationals. There can be no distinction between friend and foe. Distinctions for treatment will be based only on grounds of medical priority only.[18]

The Geneva Convention also requires parties to search for the dead that after an engagement. The search should be made immediately.[19] Records must be maintained of the dead, and this information along with articles of sentimental value must be passed to the descendant's nation. The descendant's remains must be

[13] Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, Article 29.
[14] Regulation Annexed to Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, Article 29. p. 36. Stat 2277, T.S. No. 539.
[15] Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
[16] J. Pictet, Humanitarian Law, 1975. p. 77.
[17] Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949. U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S., Article 15.
[18] Pictet, p. 76.
[19] Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick, Article 15.

honorably interned, preferably in individual graves for later identification if necessary. Cremation is only authorized on hygienic or religious grounds.[20]

Medical and Religious Personnel

Medical and religious personnel are considered "protected persons" because of their humanitarian missions. As protected persons, they may not be subjected to attack and must be allowed to carry out their mission. In return for this protection, medical and religious personnel may not engage in hostile operations.[21] Medical personnel are those who are exclusively assigned to treat, search for, and transport the wounded and sick. Religious personnel include those personnel who are attached to the military's chaplaincy. Officer medical personnel may carry a shortarm (e.g. handgun) for self-defense without running the risk of losing protected status. Enlisted personnel are authorized to carry a long arm (e.g. rifle or M-16).

If medical or religious personnel fall into the hands of the enemy, they do not become prisoners of war; instead they should be retained only as long as the medical or spiritual needs of the prisoners of war require.[22]

Medical facilities and equipment are also safeguarded from attack. The Geneva Convention requires that medical facilities and transports be marked in order to maintain protected status. They must display a clearly visible symbol, the Red Cross, red crescent, or a red lion and sun on a white background.[23] Even though the marking should protect the medical facilities from attack, the United States reserves the option of not marking its facilities. The line commander, not the medical commander, is responsible for determining if a facility should be marked. For example, a commander may choose not to mark a facility if the enemy does not recognize the facility's protected status even if the facility is marked.

A medical facility may be subject to capture. The captors must allow medical personnel to carry on their care for the wounded and sick. A medical facility may lose its special protection if it is being used for military and not humanitarian purposes. In such a case, the facility would become a lawful object of attack. However, the belligerent must warn the facility of the violation and of its intention to attack it.[24] A warning is not required if it would be impractical.

Properly marked medical transports being used for humanitarian purposes may not be the subject of attack. Medical transports may include aircraft, hospital ships, and ambulances. The enemy may not see the Red Cross if an airplane is flying at thirty thousand feet. Therefore, the commander should tell the enemy the nature of the mission, the route, time, and altitude. This helps ensure the enemy will not accidentally shoot down the aircraft thinking it was a legitimate military target.

Civilians

[20] M. Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare, 1979. p. 77.
[21] Pictet, p. 79.
[22] Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick, Article 28.
[23] Ibid., Article 38.
[24] Ibid., Article 36.

During the twentieth century, the civilian population has experienced great suffering due to the affects of war. Civilians are not permitted to take up arms or to participate in the conflict, and are granted certain protections under the Geneva Convention.

While a territory is engaged in battle, special zones protect civilians. A "safety zone" may be created to protect the especially vulnerable portion of the population, such as the elderly and sick.[25] Temporary shelter may be provided in a combat area in a "neutralized zone" for all civilians who are endangered.[26]

If a belligerent is employing an economic blockade or siege against an enemy, the belligerent must allow medical supplies to pass through for the benefit of civilians.[27] Additionally, food and clothing for the benefit of children under the age of fifteen and for expectant mothers are also allowed to pass through the blockade. The belligerent is entitled to search the contents of the shipment and assurances of the destination of the consignment.

Once a belligerent occupies enemy territory, the civilian population comes under its control. The occupation begins once the occupier has replaced the territory's government. The primary focus of the Civilian Convention is to restrict the occupier's power over the civilian population. The occupier is the administrator for the territory.[28] It is responsible for the well being of the population. The occupier is responsible for order. The occupier may punish those civilians resisting its occupation.[29] It may not engage in collective punishment.[30] Members of the population may not be tried for acts committed before the occupation. The Civilian Convention limits the power of the occupier by allowing the death penalty to be imposed only when the offense would have been punishable by death in the territory before occupation.[31] Less serious offenses are to be dealt with by internment or imprisonment.

Aerial Bombardment

Airpower in times of war can be a decisive factor in the conflict. It can strike at the enemy's core facilities without having to first defeat massed armies in the field. Today's high-powered aircraft can attack virtually any legitimate military target. One of the primary concerns in developing an air campaign is what constitutes a legitimate military target. The Law of Armed Conflict relating to aerial bombardment traces its origin to the Hague Conference of 1899. The countries party to the conference adopted a declaration forbidding bombs to be dropped from balloons for five years.[32]

---

[25] Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 6. U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, Article 14.
[26] Ibid., Article 15.
[27] G. von Glahn, Law Among Nations, 6th ed., 1992. p. 797.
[28] von Glahn, p. 774.
[29] Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 64.
[30] Ibid., Article 33.
[31] Ibid., Article 68.
[32] AFP 110-31, p. 5-1.

Since then airpower has changed dramatically and the law governing aerial bombardment has been refined as well. One of the most critical periods in the development of aerial bombardment law regarding was during World War II. Both Allied and Axis powers conducted strategic bombing campaigns against enemy facilities. Many times, these raids resulted in devastating casualties to the enemy's civilian population. When we look back at this period, there are three critical forces responsible for the casualties. First, the bombing itself was inaccurate. In order to destroy a target the size of a house took approximately 4500 B-17s carrying a total of nine thousand tons of bombs.[33] A second factor was the escalating nature of reprisals and counter reprisals by all sides in the conflict. A third factor was the failure to effectively separate war industry and other vital targets from the population centers, thereby necessitating target area bombing.[34]

Today, the laws governing aerial bombardment consist of guidance in part found in the original Hague Conferences, experiences in World War II, and the Geneva Conventions. One of the most important of these rules is the general protection granted to individual civilians and civilian objects. Places such as schools and houses are protected from military operations, to include aerial bombardment.[35] This does not mean that military operations cannot inflict civilian casualties. Rather, the population itself cannot be viewed as a military target. Therefore, air forces can attack key military targets in heavily populated areas so long as the overall military gains from the attack outweigh the risks posed to the civilian population.[36] It's important to note that the defending country is responsible for ensuring that its populace is removed from key military targets. That is, the enemy should not use its people as shields.

The United States, and its coalition partners, confronted Iraq's use of human shields on numerous occasions throughout the Gulf War. The most publicized incident during the war was the bombing of the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad. Many people have questioned the attack, which resulted in the death of scores of Iraqi civilians, but according to the law, coalition forces conducted a legitimate attack. Evidence was presented stating that the facility was converted to a military command and control center. Intelligence collected indicated a ten-foot-thick concrete ceiling, camouflaged exterior to make it look as though it were already struck, a military presence detected through satellite imagery, and intercepted military command signals.[37] Iraqi civilians sought refuge in the bunker on a floor above the command post during the nighttime coalition air raids. Coalition planners were unaware of the civilian presence in the bunker, and authorized the attack.[38]

The responsibility for the unfortunate civilian deaths lies ultimately with the Iraqi government. The government ignored their legal obligations on two counts. First, they failed to prevent noncombatants from entering a military facility. Second,

---

[33]Meilinger, Phillip, Colonel. Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power. Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995. p. 43.
[34] AFP 110-31, p. 5-4 and 5-5.
[35] Ibid., p. 5-5.
[36] Humphries, John G. Lt Col. "Operations Law and the Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm" *Airpower Journal*, Fall 1992. p. 38.
[37] Ibid., p. 35.
[38] Ibid., p. 36.

they converted an air raid shelter to a Command, Control, and Communications bunker, thereby locating a military objective in an area surrounded by the civilian populace.[39]

If the coalition planners had been aware of the civilian presence, the target may not have been attacked. Evidence exists indicating that the air campaign, known as Instant Thunder was the most discriminate air campaign in history. The coalition's rules of engagement were much more stringent than the Laws of Armed Conflict in regards to aerial bombardment. If a coalition aircrew could not locate its target or find an alternative one, the rules required the pilots to return, weapons loaded. Consequently, approximately 25 percent of all combat missions culminated in undelivered ordnance.[40]

Enforcing the Law of Armed Conflict

There are a wide variety of sanctions the international community can place against a state in violation of the law of armed conflict. While there are several cases throughout history demonstrating one or two of these principles, the sanctions imposed against Iraq immediately following the Persian Gulf War are a good example of what can be done. During the Gulf War, Iraq committed numerous violations of international law and the law of armed conflict. Due to the wide range of flagrant violations, Iraq received universal criticism.

Instruments of Enforcement

Condemnation is the least threatening method of ensuring compliance.[41] Its purpose is to raise international public opinion against the offending state in order to encourage them to correct their offending behavior. In the case of Iraq, condemnation came on numerous occasions with the strongest measures coming from the U.N. Security Council. Condemnation was evident throughout the conflict starting with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, spanning through their numerous political, human rights, and law of armed conflict violations.

Since condemnation is the least threatening, it is also seen as the least effective method. When countries seek to send a stronger message they sometimes choose to *rupture diplomatic relations*.[42] This is done by severing diplomatic relations with a state as a form of protest to the offending state. While this sanction sends a serious message to the offending state, it makes it difficult to rectify the problem because diplomatic communication has stopped.

When several states seek to send a strong message to the offending state, the offending nation may also be expelled from membership in an international

[39] Ibid., p. 37.
[40] Ibid., p. 38.
[41] Laura H. Fuster, Major. "Law of Armed Conflict Part II" The American Legal System: Issues for the Soldier-Scholar. USAFA Department of Law, 1994. p. 134.
[42] Ibid., p. 135.

organization.[43] Similar to rupturing diplomatic relations, this sanction can make it extremely difficult to solve a poblem through peaceful means. As a result, the U.N. has expelled states on only two separate occasions. The first state was South Africa due to its continued support of apartheid, and the second was the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav federation in an attempt to pressure the Serbs to abate their human rights violations.[44]

Countries and international organizations may also enforce economic sanctions. Unilateral economic sanctions, during times of peace, must be authorized by the U.N. Security Council. Economic sanctions may come in a variety of forms including embargoes, boycotts, blockades and seizure of property belonging to the offending state. For example, the Security Council approved Resolution 661 (6 August 1990) against Iraq. The sanctions included the following:

1. A boycott on the import of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait. The key target was oil, which accounted for 95% of Iraq's export earnings.
2. With the exception of humanitarian assistance, a total embargo was imposed against the sale or supply of all products to anyone in Iraq or Kuwait.
3. All financial transactions and transfers of funds to the Iraqi government or to any other entity in Iraq or Kuwait were forbidden.
4. To protect the assets of Kuwait from Iraqi confiscation, such assets in any member state were to be frozen.
5. All contracts with Iraq or Kuwait, which could impede the sanctions program, were to be suspended.[45]

If these sanctions do not yield the desired end-state, then more serious measures may be taken. *Reprisals* are the commission of acts that, although illegal, may, under the specific circumstances of the given case, become justified. The guilty adversary has himself behaved illegally, and the reprisal is taken as the last resort.[46] In order for a reprisal to be considered lawful, it must meet certain criteria:

1. It must be in response to a serious violation of international law.
2. It must be for the purpose of compelling the adversary to observe the law of armed conflict.
3. There must be reasonable notice that reprisals will be taken.
4. Other reasonable means to secure compliance must be attempted.
5. A reprisal must be direct against the personnel or property of an adversary.
6. The reprisal must be in proportion to the original violation.
7. It must be publicized.
8. It must be authorized by national authorities at the highest political level, and entails full state responsibility.[47]

[43] Ibid., p. 135.
[44] Ibid., p. 135.
[45] C.C. Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance and International Law: Reflections on the United Nations' Experience Against Iraq, 32 Virginia Law Review. 1, 8-15 (1991)
[46] AFP 110-31, p. 10-3.
[47] Ibid., p. 10-4, 10-5.

It's important to note the Geneva Conventions strictly prohibit reprisals against the sick and wounded, prisoners of war, shipwrecked persons, and buildings or equipment protected by the conventions.

Although reprisals have been effective in stopping violations of international law, they also have a tendency to escalate the conflict, or if used improperly cause counter-reprisals. Reprisals are also controversial from a military operations perspective. Specifically, in diverting scarce military resources to reprisals, a nation weakens its overall fighting effectiveness and may strengthen the enemy's will to fight.

Reciprocity refers to the customary view that one nation's adherence to many of the rules of law is conditional to an opposing forces' adherence to the law. Reciprocity, similar to reprisals, can escalate the conflict. The vital difference between reciprocity and reprisals involves the nature of the act. Reprisals focus on a single violation, whereas reciprocity stems from a permanent disregard for international law.

Compensation or *reparations* are monetary payments incurred by states to make amends to parties for injuries suffered.[48] In the case of Iraq, the Security Council demanded Iraq accept liability for damages in Kuwait, and set the payment 30% of Iraqi oil revenues.[49]

Finally, violations of the law of armed conflict may be subject to *criminal enforcement.* As stated earlier, the United States recognizes all treaties as being equivalent to U.S. law. In these cases, Americans violating the laws of armed conflict are in effect violating U.S. law and may stand trial for such offenses.

The United States, as well as other nations, may try captured enemy personnel for deliberate, violations of the law of armed conflict. After World War II, the United States conducted or took part in over 800 of these trials, of which the Nuremberg Trials are the most famous. These trials must meet certain minimum standards of fairness and due process, set out in detail in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Failure to accord captured personnel the right to a fair trial is itself a serious violation of the law of armed conflict.[50] American pilots experienced this first hand during the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese refused to grant aircrews prisoner-of-war status, as they were all branded war criminals without receiving due process of the law.

Despite all of its inherent enforcement problems, the Law of Armed Conflict has a central role in modern warfare. The United States respects and upholds the law and expects its officers to follow it under all circumstances. History has demonstrated the positive impact a foundation in the Law of Armed Conflict has upon military members in time of war. The law has a central role in the development of roles of engagement, campaign planning, and execution. Efforts to educate military personnel on the law

[48] Ibid., p. 10-2.
[49] C.C. Joyner, 11-12.
[50] AFP 110-34 Commander's Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict. 25 July 1980. p. 8-1.

are reflected in our current operations in the Middle East, Bosnia, Kosovo and other hot spots around the world.



MAJOR RICHARD IRA BONG,
though assigned to duty as gunnery instructor and neither required nor expected to perform combat duty, Major Bong voluntarily and at his own urgent request engaged in repeated combat mission in a P-38, including unusually hazardous sorties over Balikpapan, Borneo, and in the Leyte area of the Philippines during the period 10 October to 15 November 1944. Major Bong's aggressiveness and daring resulted in his shooting down eight enemy airplanes during this period. Major Bong was killed in a P-80 crash on 6 August 1945, in Burbank, California.

Department of Defense

Introduction

> *"We are warfighters first, and as warfighters we have no match. With the same dedication and patriotism that makes us the world's finest fighting force, we are proud to perform other important missions for the American people and our allies. Whether we're saving lives, protecting property or keeping the peace, the U.S. military stands ready to keep America strong and free. We have never -- and will never -- compromise on the quality of our most important resource. It is not tanks, planes or ships, but people. People who have chosen to serve you and serve the nation. They are your sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives, people of whom you can be very proud. They are America's best. Everything we do supports our primary mission -- to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the United States. Nothing less is acceptable to us, or to the American people. This is our bottom line."* – excerpt from "DoD 101"

Have you ever stopped to think what an enormous task it must be to command, coordinate, and control the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force? Well, that responsibility goes to the Department of Defense (DoD)--the largest bureaucracy in the American political system.

With these thoughts in mind, our examination of the DoD will not just include the upper levels of command, like the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the military headquarters in Washington, DC.; we'll also take a look at the organizations that provide "jointness" to the Department of Defense - a major service issue for the next century.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Know the critical organizations and personnel in the Department of Defense.

Samples of Behavior:

1. Identify the role of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Identify the members of the National Command Authority, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Commands.
3. State the relationships between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Command Authority, unified commanders and the component commanders.
4. Define Unified and Specified Command.

Information

With our military units tracing their roots to pre-Revolutionary times, you might say that the DoD is America's oldest company. And, if you look at it in business terms, many would say we're not only America's largest company, but also its busiest and most successful.

There's no other company in the world that can take a group of new employees, from a wide variety of backgrounds, and in less than three months make them part of a cohesive, organized and productive work team. They will be well trained, highly motivated and very fit. They will treat others with dignity and respect, and will willingly obey their leaders.

Our military services are older than our country. The Army lays claim as the oldest, formed in June 1775. The Navy soon followed in October, and the Marine Corps in November. The War Department, which encompassed all three Services, was formed in 1789. Nine years later the Navy formed its own department to manage Naval and Marine Corps affairs, with the Army remaining under the War Department. That's the way it stayed up until the end of World War II. However, experiences during that conflict proved that unified control of the military at the national and major command levels was critical to national defense.

The United States Constitution establishes the basic principle that the armed forces must be under civilian control. By giving the President the position of Commander-in-Chief (CINC), the Constitution provides the basic framework for military organization. This lesson discusses the structure of the DoD and the National Command Authority (NCA). It briefly discusses the roles of the military departments and the JCS, as well as unified and specified commands. Directions for military operations emanate from the National Command Authority – a term used to collectively describe the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The Commander-In-Chief

Our commander-in-chief is the President of the United States. He, along with the National Security Council, which includes the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense (as well as, since 1993 by executive order, the Secretary of Treasury and the head of the National Economic Council) determine the security needs of the nation and then take courses of action to ensure that those are met. The President, in his constitutional role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, is the senior military authority in the nation and as such is ultimately responsible for the protection of the United States from all enemies, foreign and domestic.

As part of the Constitution's system of checks and balances, our budget must be approved by the U.S. Congress, which acts as our board of directors. We accomplish this by working with various committees of both houses, primarily those dealing with funding, military operations and intelligence. Their decisions affect our well-being and range from setting civilian pay raises to funding major troop deployments. Following World War II, an increasing need to integrate military policy

with national policy compelled the President to assume a more active role as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In this position, the President has the final word of command authority; however, as head of the executive branch, the Commander-in-Chief is subject to the "checks and balances" system of the legislative and judicial branches.

Nevertheless, the heavy demands of domestic and foreign duties require the President to delegate authority broadly, but wisely. The President, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, is the ultimate authority. The Office of the Secretary of Defense carries out the Secretary's policies by tasking the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands. The military departments train and equip their forces. The Chairman plans and coordinates deployments and operations. The unified commands conduct operations.

The Department of Defense (DoD)

In 1947 Congress passed the National Security Act to establish a civilian Secretary of Defense. He was in charge of a new overreaching department called the National Military Establishment. The Act also created a new Service, the Air Force, as its own department, while converting the War Department to the Department of the Army. Then, in 1949, Congress created the Department of Defense, consolidating the three Services under the Secretary's direct control, and making the Secretary of Defense the only military representative on the President's cabinet. This National Security structure has remained, for the most part, intact for the past 50 years.

The DoD is the nation's largest employer. (As of 1998,) its all-volunteer force included 1.4 million men and women on active duty, 705,000 civilians and another 1.35 million serving in the Guard and Reserve. The DoD also supports 1.8 million retirees and families who receive benefits. Whether on land or at sea, no other company can match its size with employees located at about 600 fixed facilities and more than 40,000 properties amounting to 18 million acres of land. These include 250 major installations. The DoD also operates 100,000 vehicles, from trucks to tanks, and maintains a fleet of more than 22,000 aircraft. It operates 550 public utility systems and hundreds of oceangoing vessels around the world.

Today, DoD employees are located in more than 140 countries; some 340,000 troops and civilians are overseas both afloat and ashore. They operate in every time zone and in every climate and they're busier than just about any of the nation's largest companies in terms of people and operations. Compared to some of the world's largest companies, the Department of Defense has a larger budget, more employees and more bases of operation. Its headquarters, the Pentagon, is the nation's largest office building under one roof. It took only 16 months and $83 million to build and was completed in January 1943. A recognized symbol around the world, the Pentagon has 17 1/2 miles of corridors, 29 acres inside the building, and 67 acres for parking, 25,000 people come to work each day in the Pentagon.

As the nation's busiest company, the DoD cuts 5 million paychecks every month, takes 920,000 contract or purchase actions, fits our troops with 50,000 pairs of boots and serves 3.4 million meals. On any given day, the DoD buys enough fuel to

drive a car around the world 13,000 times, maintains 12,000 miles of waterways, operates 24 percent of the nation's hydropower capacity, manages 232 schools and provides day care for 200,000 children.

Although the end of the Cold War implied a less dangerous world, this has not been the case. Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, and the downsizing of the U.S. military, American operational commitments since 1990 have made us busier than ever.

As the civilian head of the DOD, the Secretary of Defense reports directly to the President. The functions of the DOD, as prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments, are to:

- support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;
- ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest; and
- uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

The President appoints the Secretary of Defense with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Secretary of Defense is the principal defense policy advisor to the President and is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy and policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the DoD, and for the execution of approved policy. Under the direction of the President, the Secretary exercises authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense.

Therefore, the operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders, who exercise authority over their unified or specified command. (Note: Operational chain of command is one in which those involved, have executive authority to actually direct actions of those at lower echelons.) DoD Directive 5100.1 places the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in the communications chain of command such that communications between NCA (President and Secretary of Defense or their successors) and the combatant commanders pass through the CJCS. (Note: This means that the JCS can only advise actions for consideration, they have no executive authority.) Furthermore, the CJCS can be assigned oversight responsibilities for the Secretary's control and coordination of the combatant commanders. That is, the CJCS provides feedback to the Secretary about the Secretary's control of the combatant commanders. The JCS are not in the operational chain of command.

The Secretary, like the President, must also delegate authority. For example, the responsibility for strategic and tactical planning is given to the JCS. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense assigns the military administration missions (organize, train, and equip) to the military departments and the military operational missions (warfighting) to the unified and specified commands.

The Secretary of Defense's demanding duties require the help of many assistants, chief of whom is the Deputy Secretary of Defense. A number of advisory bodies and individual advisors also assist the Secretary of Defense in considering matters requiring a long-range view and in formulating broad defense policy. In addition, the Secretary receives staff assistance through a number of special agencies. Included among these are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Investigative Service (DIS), and Defense Logistics Agency. These agencies, as well as others, provide special skills, expertise, and advice to the Secretary of Defense.

Finally, the most important policy advisory body working directly with the Secretary of Defense is the Armed Forces Policy Council.

The Armed Forces Policy Council not only advises the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces, but also considers and reports on any other matters that, in the opinion of the Secretary, need attention. The Council consists of the Secretary of Defense (Chairman); the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the CJCS; the Under Secretaries of Defense; the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition; the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Officials of the DoD and other departments and agencies in the executive branch may be invited to attend appropriate meetings of the Council.

Two other groups are noteworthy at this level. The National Command Authority (NCA), is made up of the President and Secretary of Defense together or their duly deputized alternates or successors. This term is used to signify constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces in their execution of military action. Both movement of troops and execution of military actions must be directed by the NCA; by law, no one else in the chain of command has the authority to take such actions.

The other group is the National Security Council, which was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as the principal forum to consider national security issues that require presidential decision. It has four statutory members: the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. The CJCS and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as statutory advisors to the NSC.

The Military Departments

The military departments consist of the Army, the Navy (including the Marine Corps and, in wartime, the Coast Guard), and the Air Force. Although operational command rests with the DoD, the military departments exist as separate agencies. Except in operational matters, the Secretary of Defense issues orders to a service through its secretary. While the service secretaries aren't accountable for military operations, they are responsible for the economy and efficiency with which their departments operate. Service secretaries also assist the Secretary of Defense in managing the administrative, training, and logistic functions of the military departments. Each service develops and trains its forces to perform the primary functions that support the efforts of other services. Carrying out their primary functions, the forces help to accomplish overall military objectives.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, members of the JCS serve as the communicational chain of command and military staff to the unified and specified commanders. The JCS prepares strategic plans and provides for the strategic direction of the armed forces. It reviews the plans and programs of unified and specified commands, considers major personnel and logistic requirements of the armed forces, and establishes unified doctrine. The JCS is also responsible for the assignment of logistic responsibilities to the military services, the formulation of policies for joint training, and the coordination of military education.

The members of the JCS consist of the CJCS; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Chief of Naval Operations; Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and Commandant of the Marine Corps. The CJCS not only serves as a member of and presides over the JCS, but also furnishes the recommendations and views of the JCS to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), or the Secretary of Defense. Other members of the JCS may also provide advice to these bodies, when requested. If a JCS member submits advice that differs from the Chairman's view, then the CJCS must present that advice to the appropriate body along with his or her own. When the CJCS isn't present, the Vice-Chairman of the JCS serves in his or her place. Though not originally included as a member of the JCS, Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993 vested the Vice-Chairman as a full voting member.

Joint Staff

Consisting of more than 1,500 military and civilian personnel, the Joint Staff is the primary support for the JCS. The staff is composed of a relatively even number of officers from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. By law, the direction of the Joint Staff rests exclusively with the CJCS.

National Military Command and Control

The National Military Command System provides our command authorities with all the information they need to make decisions and the means to transmit these decisions to subordinate levels. At the top of the communications system is the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The NMCC receives data from various command and control centers of the unified and specified commands. It also receives data from such defense agencies as the National Security Agency and the DIA. Members of the Joint Staff analyze and process this information and pass pertinent messages on through the State Department Operations Center and the National Indications Center of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Situation Room in the White House.

Unified Commands

The President, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, establishes unified commands for the performance of military missions e.g. warfighting. To form these commands, forces are acquired through the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Then, a commander is assigned to each unified command for the purpose of deploying, directing, controlling, and coordinating the actions of the command's forces. In addition, the commander conducts joint training exercises and controls certain support functions. Not surprisingly, the unified commanders are responsible to both the Secretary of Defense and the President. Normally organized on a geographical basis, the number of unified combatant commands is not fixed by law or regulation and may vary from time to time.



Figure 1. Organizations Reporting to the Secretary of Defense Through the Chairman of JCS

Having a broad continuing mission, a unified command comprises forces from two or more military services and falls under one commander. Once forces come under a unified command, only the authority of the Secretary of Defense and transfer them. Moreover, the capability of the unified commander can expand through the formation of either a subordinate unified command or a Joint Task Force (JTF). Each consists of joint forces under one commander. The primary difference between the two lies in the scope of the operation. The subordinate unified command has a continuing mission and command arrangement. JTF is a temporary organization that is limited by a specific time, place, and mission.

Currently, there are nine unified commands; five are geographically based and four are functionally based. The geographical or theater commands are USJFCOM, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM. The functional commands are USSPACECOM, USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USTRANSCOM. Each military department

has a component commander who exercises operational command for that branch of service. Essentially, a component commander brings land, sea, air, or other specialized competence and forces for employment under the operational authority of commanders of combatant commands. Under the component commander are those individuals, organizations, or installations of the military (normally a MAJCOM or Number Air Force, etc.) command assigned to the unified command. Figure 3 illustrates these command relationships.



Figure 3. Unified Command Relationships

The USMC type commander in Figure 3 also illustrates how other individuals, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the component commander.

Specified Command

Having a broad, continuing mission, specified command, which is normally composed of forces from one military service. Currently there are no Specified Commands in existence. The provision is left open so in the future if need arises we have the command framework already in-place.

The bottom line...

If the President is our CEO and the Congress is our Board of Directors, then our stockholders are the American people. And they know the DoD pretty well since almost everyone's had a family member or buddy who used to -- or still does -- work for the Department of Defense. We exist to protect these "citizen stockholders." Without their support, the DoD would go out of business.

Unified Command Summary

Unified Commands	Location	Geographic Area of Responsibility
US Joint Forces Command	Norfolk, VA	The Atlantic Ocean, (excluding the waters adjoining South and Central America,) the Arctic Ocean, Greenland and other islands (except the United Kingdom and Ireland) in all assigned water areas.
US Central Command	MacDill AFB, FL	Northeastern Africa and Southwest Asia, including the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea.
US European Command	Stuttgart, Germany	Europe (including Eastern European countries), the United Kingdom and Ireland, the Mediterranean Sea littoral [including Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the continent of Africa (except Northeastern Africa).
US Pacific Command	Camp H. M. Smith, HI	The Pacific (except the area assigned to USLANTCOM), the Indian Ocean, Japan, Korea, China, and other countries of Southeast Asia.
US Southern Command	Miami, FL	Central and South America (except Mexico), the islands south of Florida and the Gulf of Mexico.
US Special Operations Command	MacDill AFB, FL	Assigned SOF, including providing combat-ready SOF to other unified or specified commands.[1]
US Space Command	Peterson AFB, CO	Assigned forces and systems for missile warning and space surveillance functions in conjunction with NORAD; planning for, developing requirements for, and commanding systems and forces for strategic and space-based tactical ballistic missile defense; ITW & AA.
US Transportation Command	Scott AFB, IL	Assigned airlift, sealift, surface lift, air refueling, terminal services, and commercial air, land, and sea transportation to support the deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces.
US Strategic Command	Offutt AFB, NE	Assigned forces and systems for strategic nuclear forces to support strategic deterrence.

[1]Unique among the CINCs, USCINCSOC has been granted execution authority for MFP-11 programs, to include submitting program recommendations and budget proposals. USCINCSOC also is charged with developing and acquiring special-operations-peculiar equipment, material, supplies, and services.

Unified Combatant Commands

Introduction

As future Air Force officers, it is important for you to be able to distinguish between the missions of Major Commands such as Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command with the responsibilities of the Unified Combatant Commands. Operational Control of the US combat forces is assigned to the nation's Unified Combatant Commands. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Unified Commanders in Chief. Orders and other communications from the President or Secretary are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A Unified Combatant Command is composed of forces from two or more services, and has a broad and continuing mission, normally organized on a geographical basis. The number of unified combatant commands is not fixed by law or regulation and may vary from time to time.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Know the United States' responsibility according to its standing alliances and how the United States military is organized to function in wartime situations.

Samples of Behavior:
1. Identify the main purpose of each unified combatant command.
2. Identify the United States' responsibility according to the Rio Treaty.
3. Describe the current status of the ANZUS treaty.

Information

Unified Combatant Commands

Definition

A command which has a broad, continuing mission under a single commander composed of forces from two or more Services, and which is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

History

The history of the current combatant command arrangement begins with the lessons learned in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War. Between 1903 and 1942, the joint Army and Navy Board sought cooperation between the Army and

Navy, but accomplished little in the way of improving joint command. In effect, decisions on joint matters in dispute between the Services went to the level of the commander in chief. The President was the single "commander" who had a view of the entire military theater and authority over both the Army and Navy on-site commanders. Interestingly, one product of the Joint Board, an agreement on "mutual cooperation" in joint operations, was in effect at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Early in World War II, General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, realized that a unified command arrangement, not mutual cooperation, had been made necessary because of the complexity of modern warfare.

The experiences of World War II fully supported the theory and practice of unified command. Then, quite unlike today, the unified commanders reported to their executive agents on the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The executive agents have alternately been the military chiefs of Services (World War II and 1948) and the civilian secretaries of the military departments (1953-1958). Confusion rose from the understanding that the suppliers of the support and administration, the military departments, should also share in the direction of the forces in combat.

The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 was the first definitive legislative statement "to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." The act went on to say that it was the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security," and the President would establish unified and specified combatant commands to perform military missions. The military departments would assign forces to the combatant commands; the responsibility for their support and administration would be assigned by the Secretary of Defense to a military department. Forces not assigned would remain under the authority of the military department. Now, it was thought, the nation could make more effective use of its military resources.

Organizational Relationships

The unified command structure is flexible, and changes as required to accommodate evolving U.S. national security needs. A classified document called the Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the combatant commands, identifies geographic areas of responsibility, assigns primary tasks, defines authority of the commanders, establishes command relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise of combatant command. It is approved by the President, published by the CJCS, and addressed to the commanders of combatant commands.

Five combatant commanders have geographic area responsibilities. These CINCs are assigned an area of operations by the Unified Command Plan and are responsible for all operations within their designated areas: US Joint Forces Command, US Central Command, US European Command, US Pacific Command, and US Southern Command.

The CINCs of the remaining combatant commands have worldwide functional responsibilities not bounded by any single area of operations and they are US Space Command, US Special Operations Command, US Strategic Command and US Transportation Command.

US Central Command

US Central Command (USCENTCOM) located at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, is the unified command responsible for U.S. security interests in 25 nations that stretch from the Horn of Africa through the Arabian Gulf region, into Central Asia. It is one of five geographically defined unified commands in the Department of Defense, covering the area of the globe between the European and Pacific commands. In recent years, USCENTCOM has become known for its success in the war against Iraq and for humanitarian intervention in Somalia. It continues to confront challenges in its assigned part of the world.

When the United States found itself thrust into a more prominent role in world affairs following the end of World War II, it viewed the countries of the Central region through a Cold War prism. National policies focused on denying further territory and resources to the Soviet Union, including access to Middle East oil. Until the late 1970s, the United States relied on the twin "pillars" of Iran and Saudi Arabia to promote peace and stability in the Central region. This policy was in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine that called upon friends and allies to deal with threats from countries other than the Soviet Union or China.

History

This strategy began to unravel in 1979, when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran raised questions about America's ability to secure access to Arabian Gulf oil and honor commitments to friendly Arab states and Israel. In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed that any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the region would be regarded as an assault on U.S. vital interests.

Organization

The headquarters staff includes over 900 personnel from each of the four military services. Each of the services also provides USCENTCOM with component commands, which, along with our joint special operations component, make up USCENTCOM's primary warfighting and engagement organizations.

As previously mentioned, United States Central Command's Area of Responsibility includes 25 nations, ranging from Egypt in the West to Pakistan in the East, from Kazakhstan in the North to Kenya and the Horn of Africa in the South. It includes the waters of the Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, and the Western portions of the Indian Ocean. The region comprises an area larger than the continental United States, stretching more than 3,100 miles East-to-West and 3,600 miles North-to-South. It includes mountain ranges with elevations exceeding 24,000 feet, desert areas below sea level and temperatures ranging from below freezing to more than 130 degrees Fahrenheit. It remains, as it has for centuries, a region of diversity, with different cultures, religions, economic conditions, demographics, and forms of government.

US Transportation Command

World War II, the Berlin blockade, the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, all demonstrated the need for a strong, vigorous and responsive transportation system within the US and the means to move forces abroad to protect our interests and meet the commitments of our allies. In 1978, command post exercise Nifty Nugget pointed out some serious problems in our nation's ability to mobilize and deploy forces on a large scale. Over the next decade the Department of Defense worked to improve strategic mobility through command and control initiatives. In 1979, it established the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) to give the transportation operation agencies a direct reporting chain to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the JDA, with a two-star at its helm, did not have directive authority.

On 1 April 1986, acting on a recommendation made by the Packard Commission, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 219, directing the formation of a unified transportation command under a four-star Commander in Chief reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, JCS. As a result, the Office of the Secretary of Defense established USTRANSCOM on 18 April 1987, at Scott AFB, Illinois, with three component commands: the Air Force's Military Airlift Command (MAC), the Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), and the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC). However, the evolution of transportation in the DoD as envisioned following Nifty Nugget was not yet complete because the component commands, under USTRANSCOM's original charter, were not assigned to USTRANSCOM in peacetime. Also, the components retained their single manager charters for their respective modes of transportation.

To continue to strengthen the Department of Defense's ability to carry out its transportation missions effectively and efficiently, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney on 14 February 1992 directed that the mission of USTRANSCOM would be to provide air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense, both in time of peace and time of war. Secretary Cheney's memorandum also designated the Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM as the nation's single manger of defense transportation resources.

As a result, USTRANSCOM now provides cohesiveness in the procurement of commercial transportation services, activation of sealift and airlift augmentation programs, financial resource control, and receipt of transportation movement requirements. In the face of numerous challenges, including Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm, United Nations peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, evacuation of American citizens and foreign nations from Liberia, and humanitarian relief support operations — such as Hurricanes Andrew (Florida) and Marilyn (Florida), Restore Hope (Somalia), Support Hope (Rwanda), Uphold Democracy (Haiti), and in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing — USTRANSCOM has proven its worth.

USTRANSCOM is the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps working together under one commander in chief overseeing a vital element of support to our national defense. Tested under fire and almost daily in support of humanitarian

efforts, USTRANSCOM, its component commands, and its commercial partners continually exceed customer expectations.

US Strategic Command

In 1945, World War II was over, the nuclear age was upon us, and the Cold War would soon develop between the US and Soviet Union. Established in March 1946, the US Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC), with its bomber force, symbolized the cornerstone of national strategic policy: deterrence -- deterrence against the growing nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union.

As its contribution to national deterrence, the US Navy began developing nuclear forces. In the late 1950's, with the advent of the Navy's Polaris ballistic missile submarine and the Air Force's first intercontinental ballistic missile, national leadership recognized the need for a single agency to plan and target all US nuclear forces. As a result, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) was established in 1960. Its mission was to produce the Nation's strategic nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). The JSTPS was housed with SAC to take full advantage of SAC's existing war planning expertise, intelligence capability and an extensive communications network.

It was the combination of the unique capabilities of the Navy's submarine launched ballistic missiles along with the Air Force's bombers and ICBMs that came to be known as the Strategic Nuclear Triad. For almost forty years, the Triad provided a visible, credible deterrent against Soviet aggression.

On 1 June 1992, with the Berlin Wall down, the Warsaw Pact a memory and the Soviet Union nonexistent, SAC and the JSTPS also took their place in the history books of the Cold War. That same day, US Strategic Command was established. Its mission of deterrence would sound familiar, but its structure and role would reflect the changing international political landscape. With STRATCOM, for the first time in US history, the planning, targeting and wartime employment of strategic forces came under the control of a single commander while the day-to-day training, equipping and maintenance responsibilities for its forces remained with the services -- the Air Force and Navy.

As STRATCOM embarks on this era of strategic disengagement marked by sharp decreases in the nuclear arsenals of the US and former Soviet Union, other more profound, more complex challenges wait on the horizon. Most significant of these challenges is countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical and nuclear.

The Triad--submarine-launched ballistic missiles, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers--remains the foundation of deterrence. Deterrence provided by safe, secure, reliable and operationally efficient nuclear forces. These strategic forces constrain the behavior of potential adversaries by ensuring any would-be aggressors take into serious consideration the existence of the US nuclear deterrent force.

Vigilant and ready, US Strategic Command is prepared for the fast-paced changes and threats in the post-Cold War world. Peace is our Profession.

US Space Command

US Space Command was created in 1985, but America's military actually began operating in space much earlier. With the Soviet Union's unexpected 1957 launch of the world's first man-made satellite, Sputnik I, President Eisenhower accelerated the nation's slowly emerging civil and military space efforts. The vital advantage that space could give either country during those dark days of the Cold War was evident in his somber words. "Space objectives relating to defense are those to which the highest priority attaches because they bear on our immediate safety," he said.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Army, Navy and Air Force advanced and expanded space technologies in the areas of communication, meteorology, geodesy, navigation and reconnaissance. Space continued to support strategic deterrence by providing arms control and treaty verification, and by offering unambiguous, early warning of any missile attack on North America.

On 23 September 1985, the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed the ever-increasing value of military space systems by creating a new unified command — U.S. Space Command — to help institutionalize the use of space in US deterrence efforts.

The US-led coalition's 1991 victory in the Persian Gulf War underscored, and brought widespread recognition to the value of military space operations. Communications, intelligence, navigation, missile warning and weather satellites demonstrated that space systems could be indispensable providers of tactical information to U.S. warfighters.

Since then, U.S. Space Command has further strengthened its focus on war fighting by ensuring that Soldiers and Marines in the foxhole, Sailors on the ship's bridge, and pilots in the cockpit have the space information they need — when they need it.

US Joint Forces Command

The United States Atlantic Command was officially established on 1 December 1947, making it one of the original unified commands within the Department of Defense. As the name implies, it was primarily a maritime command, with responsibility for the Atlantic Ocean, especially the sea lanes between the United States and Europe. From its beginning, Atlantic Command has devoted much of its resources to protecting the north Atlantic against Soviet submarines. Two sub-unified commands in Iceland and the Azores were important outposts of the United States, to be used for anti-submarine warfare, refueling of aircraft, and early warning of air attack. In 1952 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization created the Allied Command Atlantic, with its headquarters adjacent to Atlantic Command's headquarters in Norfolk. The Commander in Chief of Atlantic Command also became NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic.

In 1956 Atlantic Command received responsibility for the Caribbean Islands. A communist revolution in Cuba in 1959 transformed the Caribbean into one of the most turbulent regions within the command's area of operations. Some of the most important operations in the Caribbean have included the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, and the intervention in Haiti during the 1990s. The 1997 Unified Command

Plan, however, transferred oversight of the Caribbean to the United States Southern Command, changing Atlantic Command's role to a supporting one.

Although it was a unified command, the maritime nature of Atlantic Command's area of operations ensured that it would be overwhelmingly Navy or Marine Corps. Aside from the sub-unified commands in Iceland and the Azores, the Navy's Atlantic Fleet, with its Marine Corps components, remained the only peacetime component of Atlantic Command. During crises, such as the ones in the Dominican Republic or Grenada, Atlantic Command received temporary control of components from the Army and Air Force; but the organization remained primarily naval until 1993. A greater recognition of the importance of joint (multi-service) operations during the 1990s led to significant changes in the mission and organization of Atlantic Command. Sensing the requirements for better coordination and interoperability between the services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Atlantic Command assume responsibility for training and integrating the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in joint operations. President Clinton approved the recommendation in the 1993 Unified Command Plan, which directed Atlantic Command to assume peacetime command of the Army's Forces Command, and the Air Force's Air Combat Command. Atlantic Command became the provider, trainer, and, integrator for joint forces within the U.S. military structure.

Although the United States Atlantic Command has evolved from a primarily naval organization to a leader in the military's efforts to enhance its joint operations, much has remained constant. It still retains responsibility for the North Atlantic sea-lanes, working with our NATO allies. Most importantly it relies upon the professionalism of its service members to fulfill its responsibilities for the national defense.

US European Command

The Headquarters, United States European Command (HQ USEUCOM) was formally activated at "0001 Zebra [sic] hours, 1 August 1952." Primarily a response to the Korean War--and the perceived threat to U.S. interests in Western Europe--the establishment of USEUCOM can also be seen as a milestone in the evolutionary process of American engagement in Europe that began during the Second World War. This ongoing process, which reflects the changes taking place within the European Theater, has historically provided both continuity and stability through a robust American forward presence.

The name "European Command," or "EUCOM" as the command is often referred to, does not fully describe its area of responsibility (AOR) that includes eighty-three countries in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Together, these countries constitute a vast expanse of over 13 million square miles, inhabited by over one billion people. These inhabitants and their institutions reflect an equally vast diversity in: economic development, political stability, religion, and attitude towards the United States. For planning purposes, the USEUCOM AOR has been sub-divided into four regions: Western Europe and NATO, Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The USEUCOM area of interest (AOI) extends beyond the USEUCOM AOR into the AOR's of the other four area unified commands, as well as into countries not

presently assigned to any unified command (e.g. Russia and states of the former Soviet Union). Close continuous coordination with these commands and the Joint Staff is necessary to ensure both the protection and advancement of U.S. national interests.

US Pacific Command

The Asia-Pacific region, with economies, people, and sea-lanes, is a vital national interest. It contains over half of the world's surface, sixty percent of its population, largely along its littorals. The confluence of security, economic and diplomatic interests in the Asia-Pacific requires us to work security issues concurrently. Security provides the foundation for stability, which in turn, yields opportunities for nations to pursue economic prosperity.
The Pacific Command strategy has six elements for ensuring regional security:

- U.S. Military forces--credible, combat capable; trained and ready to fight and win; balanced and joint.

- Forward stationing of critical capabilities--today the capability represented by about 100,000 U.S. troops--that provide the standard of U.S. commitment.

- Positive security relationships with all nations in the region--including our formal alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines; our emerging relationship with China, and nascent relationships such as with Vietnam. We believe multilateral relationships hold promise for future stability in the region.

- Long-term commitment and long-haul solutions--the U.S. is here to stay.

- Teamwork with the State and Commerce Departments, and other U.S. government agencies--ensuring our views are reflected in the interagency process.

- Measured responses to regional events--promoting peaceful resolution, including preparation to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Combined Commands

Another command structure our military is familiar with is the combined command. Combined commands have forces from two or more nations, and they don't necessarily come under the control of the DOD. U.S. Space Command is part of one such combined command--the North American Air Defense Command, which includes Canadian and U.S. forces.

Combined commands operate similarly to unified commands, except that command is much less structured. Units from the member nations retain their national identities, and much negotiation between nations takes place to ensure that the command function effectively. Let's look now at the agreements that are in place to integrate our forces with other countries'.

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Agreement

NORAD is the first binational multiservice organization to function on this continent. It also represents the first peacetime defense agreement between Canada and the US, placing military forces at the disposal of a single commander in chief.

When NORAD was first established in 1957, the command's mission was limited to air defense-related responsibilities. Specifically, its mission was to provide surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States in addition to providing an appropriate response against air attack.

In 1975, the commands mission broadened to include warning and assessment of an aerospace attack. This expanded responsibility recognized the growing Soviet ballistic missile and space threat to North America.

In April 1991, the United States and Canada signed a five-year renewal of the NORAD Agreement, the seventh extension of the pact. In their diplomatic notes, the two partners emphasized NORAD's significant role in counter narcotics efforts, particularly the command's mission of detecting and monitoring aircraft suspected of smuggling drugs into North America.

Treaties

The North Atlantic Treaty

The way for collective action was cleared when the Senate, in the Vandenberg Resolution of 11 June 1948, voiced the opinion that the U.S. should, among other measures for promoting peace, associate itself, "by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security." The treaty--a pronounced break with the principle of "no permanent alliances"--was signed April 4, 1949, by twelve nations of the North Atlantic and Western European areas. This number was increased to fifteen with the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952 and West Germany in 1955. The parties agreed to settle peacefully all disputes between themselves and to develop their capacity to resist armed attack "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." But the heart of the treaty was Article 5, which declared that an armed attack upon any one of the members in Europe or North America would be considered an attack upon all, and pledged each member in case of such an attack to assist the party attacked "by such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." Thus began the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO. The preamble to the treaty reads as follows: "The parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic treaty."

Generally, the forces of member countries remain under their own national command in peacetime. In wartime, all NATO assigned forces come under control of the NATO commander. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) provide U.S. forces to NATO.

Rio Treaty

There was one portion of the world where the threat of Communism seemed insignificant in the early postwar period. The Western Hemisphere appeared dedicated to the ideals of human freedom and free enterprise. The governments of Latin America, too often undemocratic in practice, were still democratic in theory, and the trend, it was hoped, was toward an ever-truer democracy.

In reality, however, that elaboration was accompanied by deterioration in the cooperative spirit and in the degree of cordiality shown to the United States by its southern neighbors. Old-fashioned outcries against "Yankee imperialism" and "dollar diplomacy" were mingled with new complaints that Uncle Sam sent floods of dollars in every direction except southward. Governmental and financial instability, a low standard of living, and an unhealthy distribution of property and income combined to make parts of the region, within fifteen years after the war, a tempting field for exploitation by communist agitators.

The Rio Treaty was the first of a number of regional collective security agreements concluded by the United States in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. It makes it the duty of every American state to assist in meeting an armed attack upon another American State until the U.N. Security Council should have taken effective measures to repel the aggression. The nature of the action to be taken by the American states to meet such an armed attack was to be determined by a two-thirds vote of a meeting of foreign ministers with the proviso that no state should be required to use armed force without its consent.

The Treaty of Rio was signed on 2 September 1947, by 19 of the 21 American Republics, only Ecuador and Nicaragua withholding their signatures. The treaty, following ratification by two-thirds of the signatories, went into force on 3 December 1948. Cuba withdrew from the treaty on 29 March 1960. The Treaty of Rio formed the basis of a series of bilateral treaties of assistance concluded by the U.S. with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru and Uruguay after 1951. The U.S. Southern Command is responsible for providing U.S. forces to Rio Treaty coalitions.

ANZUS Pact

When war came again to Australia, the nation's response was firm--some 30,000 Australians died in World War II and 65,000 were injured. From early in the war, the Royal Australian Air Force was active in the defense of Britain. The Australian Navy operated in the Mediterranean (1940-41), helping to win the Battle of Cape Matapan (March 1941). Australian troops fought in the seesaw battles of North Africa. In mid-1941, Australians suffered heavy losses both in the Allied defeats in Greece and Crete, and in the victories in the Levant.

After the Japanese attacked the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (7 December 1941), however, the focus shifted homeward. The Japanese victories of the following months more than fulfilled the fantasies that fear and hate had long promoted in Australia. On 15 February 1942, 15,000 Australians became prisoners of war with the fall of Singapore, and four days later war came to the nation's shores, when Darwin was bombed.

The U.S. became Australia's major ally. In a famous statement (December 1941), Prime Minister Curtin declared: "I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free from any pangs about our traditional links of friendship to Britain."

New Zealand

The alacrity with which New Zealand went to war in 1939 showed that autonomy had not weakened the country's ties with Great Britain. At first, the war resembled that of 1914; troops were sent to Egypt to train for the European conflict. Once there, they were directly involved in stopping the enemy advance and saw action in Greece, Crete, North Africa, and Italy. After 1914, New Zealand was directly threatened by Japan, and before the end of the war, the strain upon the country's manpower, together with the demands of home production, forced a reduction of commitments in the Pacific.

During World War II, the U.S. dominated the Pacific Theater, providing New Zealand's sole defense. The fact that disaster was averted by Americans, and not by British forces required a change in New Zealand's attitude; security was conferred by a foreign, though friendly, power. External relations in the postwar period reflected this new situation, chiefly through the ANZUS Pact (1951), a defensive alliance between Australia, New Zealand, and the US.

The possibility of a pact between the three countries was discussed in February 1951, when the U.S. President's advisor on foreign affairs, John Foster Dulles, visited the Australian and New Zealand capitals. A tripartite security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. was signed on September 1, 1951, in San Francisco, and came into force on 29 April 1952. The treaty is known as the Pacific Security Treaty or, more usually, the ANZUS Pact. The latter name derives from the initials of the three signatory countries.

Dislocation of the treaty occurred in February 1985, when the New Zealand Labour Party, newly elected on a popular mandate to establish a nuclear-free New Zealand, refused port entry to the U.S. Navy ship, USS Buchanan. This was done in response to a U.S. refusal, in accordance with Defense Department policy, to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear arms or power on board any U.S. ships. The New Zealand government asserted that denial of port access to nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered vessels was its sovereign right and within the confines of ANZUS.

The U.S. avowed that unrestricted port access was a contiguous part of any alliance. Both parties stood on positions of fundamental principal that, according to each, were irreconcilable. The treaty itself was open to either interpretation. The

ANZUS Treaty remains in existence, but "in a state of suspense," as was noted ambiguously by Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden.[1]

Australia and the U.S. have reaffirmed their bilateral defense interests; New Zealand has been struck from the US list of bona fide allies.

Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties

Japanese and Philippines Treaties

A security treaty, signed at the same time as the peace treaty with Japan permitted US armed forces to remain in Japan "to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan." The right was to continue as long as it was needed to assure those objectives. Upon the enactment of the two treaties, the war in the Pacific officially came to an end, and Japan regained her sovereignty. As a sequel to the security treaty, the United States and Japan on 8 March 1954, signed a mutual defense assistance agreement providing for progressive Japanese rearmament with American military and economic aid.

The “Peace of Reconciliation” with Japan did not please some members of the region. The Philippines, Australia and New Zealand wished to guard themselves against the dangers involved with rearming Japan. To alleviate their fears, the U.S. signed, a few days before the Japanese treaties, a security treaty with the Philippines and another jointly with Australia and New Zealand. These treaties, less definite in their commitments than the NATO treaty, promised consultation in the event of any threat to the independence, territorial integrity, or security of any of the parties.

Korea

During 1954, the Big Four foreign ministers, meeting in Berlin, agreed that the Korean question should be answered. Subsequently, the Republic of Korea and fifteen countries of the United Nations that had participated in World War II confronted North Korea, Communist China, and the Soviet Union. The Communists rejected the United Nations’ proposal for the unification of Korea after supervised free elections throughout the country had taken place, and the United Nations had no stomach for Syngman Rhee's demand that Korea be unified by force. As a result, representatives of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea signed a treaty of mutual defense, similar to others being negotiated by the U.S. in the Pacific area, on 1 October 1953. Korea consented to the stationing of U.S. armed forces "in and about" its territory. Two American army divisions remained in Korea, nominally as part of a U.N. force. The U.S. continued to provide the Republic of Korea with economic aid annually to help arm and sustain the Korean army at unspecified cost.

Bibliography:

1. "A History of United States Foreign Policy" Julius W. Pratt, 3rd Edition 1972 by Prentice Hall Inc., New Jersey
2. "Treaties and Alliances of the World" Henry W. Aegenhardt, 3rd Edition 1981 Longman group Ltd., United Kingdom
3. "The New Encyclopedia Britannica" Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 15th Edition 1987.
4. "Kavanagh, Wing Cinder Brian L. The Changing western Alliance in the South Pacific" cadre paper Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL: 1987.

MAJOR GEORGE ANDREW DAVIS, JR.,
while leading four F-86 Saberjets on a combat patrol near the Sinuiju-Yalu River area, Korea, 10 February 1952, two aircraft returned to base due to mechanical difficulties. He and the remaining F-86 continued, sighting approximately 12 enemy MIG-15s speeding toward friendly fighter-bombers conducting operations. Disregarding the odds, Major Davis dived at the MIGs, destroying one. Under continuous fire from enemy fighters to his rear, he downed another MIG. Rather than maintain speed to evade enemy fire concentration, he reduced speed, sought the third MIG, was his, and crashed. His bold and selfless attack disrupted the enemy and permitted the fighter-bombers to complete their mission.

Military Operations Other Than War

Introduction

The mission of the United States Armed Forces is to defend the United States and its vital interests. The Armed Forces organize, train, and equip themselves to fight wars. This also gives them the ability to do many other things in support of U.S. interests. These other jobs are called *military operations other than war* (MOOTW). The majority of the day-to-day "real world" missions of the U.S. Air Force are MOOTW. MOOTW aim at deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, and promoting peace. Air and space power is vital for success in MOOTW. The speed, range, flexibility, lethality, and precision of aerospace power provide a range of options useful in many MOOTW situations. MOOTW may or may not involve the threat or use of force. The number of MOOTW conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces has continued to increase over recent years, even as the size of our forces continued to shrink. The use of our Armed Forces in MOOTW is not a new concept; this type of activity has been a part of the fabric of the military since the birth of this nation.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Know the fundamental characteristics of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

Samples of Behavior:
1. List current characteristics of the world situation facing the United States.
2. Define each principle of MOOTW.
3. List the key planning considerations of MOOTW.
4. State the overall goal of MOOTW.

Information

Definition

MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across a wide range of military operations. The overall goal of MOOTW is to pursue U.S. national policy initiatives and counter potential threats to U.S. national security interests. To understand MOOTW, it is useful to understand how they differ from operations in war.

War. In war the nation uses the military instrument of power to conduct large-scale combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the

United States and its multinational partners. Operations are focused on the destruction of the war making capability of the enemy.

MOOTW. MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace. They are closely coordinated with the other instruments of national power (political, economic, and informational). It is possible both war and MOOTW can simultaneously occur in a theater of operation. It is important to understand that the difference between war and MOOTW is not that war is violent and MOOTW are peaceful. Rather, it is that in war, the military instrument of national power is used for large-scale combat operations. In MOOTW, political objectives dominate at all levels of the operation in planning and execution. In some MOOTW the Department of Defense (DoD) is often in a supporting role to another agency, such as the Department of State (DoS). In certain types of other operations, the DoD is the lead agency, but they will still require interagency coordination and may also involve nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private voluntary organizations (PVOs). These operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than war.

As in war, the goal in MOOTW is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. The specific goal of MOOTW may be a peaceful settlement of a conflict, assistance rendered to civil authorities, or providing security for a humanitarian assistance operation.

MOOTW is initiated by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and are usually conducted as joint operations (operations involving more than one service, under a single command), and may be multinational (operations involving forces from more than one nation). Finally, although MOOTW are generally conducted outside of the United States, some types, when consistent with existing law, may be conducted within the United States in support of civil authorities. Specifics regarding MOOTW types are discussed in a later section.

Political Objectives

Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. First, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions, which may have adverse political effects. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions, which have significant political implications. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious. However, commanders should strive, through continuing mission analysis, to detect subtle changes which over time, may lead to disconnects between political objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes in political objectives early may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military operations.

Strategic Aspects

MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence and crisis response options.

One purpose of MOOTW is to deter war. The Armed Forces of the U.S. help deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Deterrence stems from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains. Various MOOTW options (such as peace enforcement, strikes and raids, and shows of force) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve to use force when necessary. Other MOOTW (such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping) support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability.

MOOTW also demonstrate U.S. forward presence activities. This lends credibility to our alliances, enhances regional stability, and provides a crisis response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access.

U.S. forces need to be able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort. Crisis response may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities.

Range of Military Operations

MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, and promoting peace. These operations provide the NCA with a wide range of possible response options ranging from non-combat operations such as humanitarian assistance to combat operations such as strikes, and raids.

MOOTW involving the use or threat of force occur when conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. The use of force will normally be used only after non-forceful military actions in conjunction with the other instruments of national power (political, economic, and informational) are unable to successfully influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation. Military force demonstrates U.S. resolve and capability to impact the situation.

The use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict and maintain U.S. influence in foreign lands. Although these operations do not normally involve combat, military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to changing situations.

There are also a number of operations where noncombat MOOTW may occur simultaneously with combat MOOTW. In these complex cases, military commanders must have an increased awareness of not only their operation, but also the other simultaneous operations (see figure 1). Both missions increase their chances of success if their efforts are coordinated and integrated when possible.

Range of Military Operations

	Military Operations	General US Goal	Representative Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large Scale Combat Operations: Attack, Defend, Blockades
NONCOMBAT	Military Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement, Counterterrorism, Support to Counterinsurgency, NEO, Show of Force, Raids, Strikes
NONCOMBAT	Military Operations Other Than War	Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authority	Counterdrug, Peacekeeping, Nation Assistance, Humanitarian Assistance, Antiterrorism, Domestic Support

Figure 1

Types of MOOTW

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, currently defines 16 illustrative types of MOOTW. That list is reflective of current cumulative experiences, and is not all-inclusive. The MOOTW mission types discussed in Joint Pub 3-07 include:

- Arms Control Support. Arms control involves any plan, arrangement, or process in an agreement to limit weapon systems or armed forces.

- Combating Terrorism. Combating terrorism includes defensive measures called antiterrorism, and offensive measures called counterterrorism. Antiterrorism helps protect against terrorist acts through training and defensive measures. Counterterrorism includes offensive operations in response to actual or potential terrorist acts.

- DoD Support to Counterdrug Operations. This refers to DoD efforts to improve the ability of law enforcement agencies to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

- Domestic Support Operations (DSO). DSO includes support to civil authorities and support to civilian law enforcement agencies. Help given during natural disasters and military assistance for civil disturbances are the most common types of DSO.

- Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations. These operations stop the movement of certain types of cargo into or out of a nation or specific area.

- Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. Freedom of navigation is a right according to international law. These operations confirm U.S. rights to sail ships and fly aircraft in certain international waters and air space.

- Humanitarian Assistance (HA). HA operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters that cause human pain, disease, hunger, or distress. These operations are conducted outside the United States. Domestic support operations are conducted in the United States.

- Nation Assistance. Nation assistance is any help (other than HA) given to a nation by U.S. forces. We coordinate all nation assistance actions with the U.S. Ambassador to that nation. Nation assistance programs may include the following:

  - Security Assistance. Programs through which the United States provides defense equipment and supplies, military training, and other defense-related services.

  - Support to Counterinsurgency. The United States may support a foreign nation's efforts to defeat an insurgency. We call all such help Foreign Internal Defense (FID). It includes all political, economic, informational, and military support used to assist a foreign nation in its fight against subversion, insurgency, or lawlessness.

  - Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA). HCA is only provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises. The operation must fulfill unit-training requirements while incidentally creating humanitarian benefits to the local people.

- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). These operations remove noncombatants from danger in a foreign country. Although they are mainly used to evacuate U.S. citizens, NEO may also help citizens from other countries as well. NEO may be opposed or unopposed, but in all cases, U.S. forces conducting NEO prepare for handling possible opposition.

- Peace Operations. Peace operations support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. They include peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

  - Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). PKO monitor and help carry out agreements ending hostilities (usually a cease fire, or truce). They are conducted with the consent of all major parties to the conflict.

  - ♦ Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO). PEO use military force, or the threat of force, to compel compliance with steps to keep or restore peace and order.

- Protection of Shipping. The U.S. Armed Forces have the mission to defend U.S. shipping. When necessary, they provide protection for U.S. flag vessels, U.S. citizens (whether embarked on U.S. or foreign vessels) and their property against unlawful violence in or over international waters.

- Recovery Operations. Recovery operations search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return people or human remains, sensitive equipment, or critical national security items to U.S. control.

- Show of Force Operations. This type of MOOTW uses the physical presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. resolve. A quick show of resolve may defuse a tense situation that otherwise might lead to aggression, or instability. Such operations lend credibility to U.S. promises, and display a readiness to use military force when necessary.

- Strikes and Raids. Strikes are conducted to damage, seize, or destroy an objective. They punish offending nations or groups, or prevent those nations or groups from launching their own offensive operations. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to get information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations.

- Support to Insurgency. An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The insurgents' try to seize power or establish an independent state. The U.S. Government may support an insurgency against a government threatening U.S. interests. U.S. forces may provide logistics and training support to an insurgency, but normally do not conduct supporting combat operations.

Principles of MOOTW

MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes. The principles of war, though principally associated with large-scale combat operations, generally apply to MOOTW, though sometimes in different ways. Political considerations and the nature of many MOOTW require an underpinning of additional principles. The six principles of MOOTW reflect the political nature of these operations and include objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Each is described below in detail.

Objective refers to the necessity of directing every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. In MOOTW the success of the mission depends on the activities of many agencies, military, civilian, governmental and private sector. It is essential that the strategic aims are mutually understood, and that conflicts are resolved. Establishing a clear objective is important, especially when the military is not the lead agency.

Unity of effort (derived from unity of command) refers to the need for ensuring all actions are directed to a common purpose. The numbers of non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective complicates achieving unity of effort. Unity of effort is usually only gained by working for consensus among the players. This entails command attention to establishing thorough communication and coordination through extensive liaison with all parties to the operation. If all members involved in a MOOTW understand the informal and formal command relationships and objectives, then unity of effort is significantly enhanced.

Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense from the unit level to the individual applies in all operations. This protection may be virtually against any person or group hostile to the operation, and must take into account protection against natural crises such as storms and floods. It is critical that commanders understand that MOOTW does not mean lack of physical threat.

Restraint ensures commanders apply appropriate military capability prudently. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. The desired end state may be jeopardized if there is unrestrained use of force. Clear, definitive ROE help ensure restraint is practiced.

Perseverance ensures commanders prepare for measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW require years to achieve the desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution

Legitimacy means sustaining the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. Legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. This audience may be the U.S. public, foreign nations, the populations in the area of operations, or the participating forces. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives, suiting the action to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. Domestically, legitimacy is strengthened if there are obvious national or humanitarian interests at stake, and if there is assurance that American lives are not being needlessly risked.

In MOOTW, commanders should rely on their knowledge of warfighting and training doctrine, but must understand the demands of MOOTW and be prepared to tailor warfighting skills to meet the MOOTW situation. Forces engaged in noncombat MOOTW should always prepare for transition to combat. Finally, success during MOOTW is founded in professional, skilled, trained, educated, and disciplined Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and CoastGuardsmen.

Selected MOOTW Operations

Operation Allied Force

The Kosovo crisis began in early 1998 when large-scale fighting broke out, resulting in the displacement of some 300,000 people. A cease-fire was agreed in October 1998, which enabled refugees to find shelter, averting an impending humanitarian crisis over the winter. A Verification Mission was deployed under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). However, violence continued and the situation worsened significantly in January 1999. A peace conference, held in Paris, broke up on 19 March with the refusal of the Yugoslav delegation to accept a peaceful settlement.

Operation Allied Force was a NATO contingency response aiming at ensuring full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (23 Sep 98). Operation Noble Anvil was the American component of this NATO action to promote regional stability, cooperation and security, in support of the international community. At 1900 hours GMT on 24 March 1999, NATO forces began air operations over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These air strikes against Serbian military targets in the Former Yugoslavia sought to:

1. Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo;
2. Withdrawal from Kosovo of Serbian military, police and para-military forces;
3. Agreement to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
4. Agreement to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and
5. Provide credible assurance of Serbian willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

NATO was prepared to suspend its air strikes once Belgrade unequivocally accepted the above mentioned conditions and demonstrably began to withdraw its forces from Kosovo according to a precise and rapid timetable. This would follow the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution requiring the withdrawal of Serb forces and the demilitarization of Kosovo and encompassing the deployment of an international military force to safeguard the swift return of all refugees and displaced persons as well as the establishment of an international provisional administration of Kosovo.

The multinational force was tasked by NATO to bring a swift end to hostilities committed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against ethnic Albanians in the southern province of Kosovo. The military objective of Operation Allied Force was to degrade and damage the military and security structure that Yugoslav President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) delegated authority for the implementation of Operation Allied Force to the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces

Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), whose headquarters is in Naples, Italy. CINCSOUTH delegated control of the operation to the Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), also based in Naples. Operational conduct of day-to-day missions was delegated to the Commander 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, at Vicenza, Italy.

The Yugoslavs apparently thought that they could wipe out the Kosovar Liberation Army in five to seven days as part of Operation Horseshoe. They thought once they did that, they could negotiate an arrangement for peace. The Serbian leadership apparently also assumed that NATO would never launch air strikes, and that once the air strikes were launched they would be pinpricks lasting a few days. And they assumed that NATO would not remain unified long enough to carry out significant air attacks, which would quickly end due to political divisions within NATO.

Operation plan OPLAN 10601 "Allied Force" covered altogether five phases, which went from the transfer over a possible application outside of and within the air space of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia up to redeployment. The Application instruction (ACTORD) was effective from 13 October 1998, with simultaneous approval and preparatory exercises. The decision by NATO of 27 October 1998 was to maintain the ACTORD with execution dependent on further a NATO council decision. Constrained by the directive that collateral damage was to be avoided as far as possible, the concept of operations envisioned targeting based on a phasewise gradual, situation-adjusted application of NATO air forces, depending upon political and military developments. Operation Allied Force implemented, when ordered by the North Atlantic Council, phased operations which differ according to the attack targets and their geographical location.

- Phase Zero – During Phase 0, released on 20 January 1999 as political signal, air forces of NATO were shifted for the accommodation of practice flight operation to their operational airfields.

- Phase One – Conduct limited air operations, such as air strikes against designated militarily significant targets. Phase 1 began on 24 March 1999 with attacks on the integrated air-defense system (e.g. weapon systems, radar facilities, control devices, airfield/aircraft) in the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

- Phase Two – Since the authorization of this phase on 27 March 1999 attacks extended to the security forces infrastructure military in Kosovo and reinforcement forces (e.g. headquarters, telecommunication installations, material and ammunition depot, systems for production and storage of fuel, barracks). The authorization of this phase took place with the unanimous resolution of the NATO allies.

- Phase Three – The focus of this phase, which was not authorized, was the expansion of the air operations against a broad range of particularly important targets of military importance north of the 44th parallel in the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (24 April 1999 NATO Press Conference). By a month

into the air campaign it became apparent to NATO that a constrained, phased approach was not effective. At the insistence of US leaders, NATO widened the air campaign to produce the strategic effects in Serbia proper. At the April NATO Summit SACEUR was given the flexibility to strike at additional targets, within the existing authority of phase 1 and phase 2 of the operation that were necessary to keep the pressure up, both on the tactical side in Kosovo and on the strategic side elsewhere in Yugoslavia.

- Phase Four -- *[support of stabilization operations?]*

- Phase Five -- *[redeployment operations?]*

The Phase One "Limited Air Response" provided a fast available temporally limited and supported with small strength feasible air operations against military targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - exclusive to the use of precision standoff weapons. Additional operations outside of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were provided for observation and for the air defense of the air space of NATO nations and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as to the protection of SFOR. The selection of target categories with the target of the minimization of collateral damage with at the same time high political and military significance. Operation execution was required within 48 hours after decision of the NATO advice possible. This Operations Concept was approved on 21 August 1998, with application instruction ACTORD from 13 October 1998; the decision NATO advice of 27 October 1998 for maintenance ACTORD with execution dependent on further NATO council decision.

The early goal of Phase One of the campaign was to attempt to force Yugoslavia to the bargaining table. Some countries in NATO argued that it might be possible to do that with a few days or a week of attacks, without demolishing the whole country. Some of the NATO partners were initially prepared to wage only a phased air operation to show NATO's resolve in the hope of achieving an early settlement. The campaign did not begin the way that America normally would apply air power -- massively, striking at strategic centers of gravity that support Milosevic and his oppressive regime. The phased concept of operations of Operation Allied Force did not apply principles of military operations such as surprise and the use of overwhelming force, and this cost time, effort and potentially additional casualties, the net result being that the campaign was undoubtedly prolonged. NATO did not succeed in this initial attempt to coerce Milosevic through air strikes to accept its demands, nor did it succeed in preventing the FRY pursuing a campaign of ethnic separation.

Initial air operations started at an altitude that was estimated to be appropriate for the air defense threat that was expected, which allowed attacks against fixed targets with guided munitions in Kosovo and around Belgrade. Flying at or above 15,000 feet, attack aircraft were flying only at night and were instructed not to make multiple passes or other maneuvers that would entail unnecessary risks. NATO gained air superiority over Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia by degrading Milosevic's integrated air defense system. As Yugoslavia demonstrated that it was completely unmoved and intransigent, the pressure and the tempo of the attacks grew, with the decision at the NATO Summit here on 23 April 1999 to expand the campaign. As the

campaign continued, the target list expanded into so-called sustainment targets -- petroleum, lines of communication, electrical grids, and command and control targets.

Air operations did not attack some strategic targets because of anxiety among NATO's 19 governments that further accidental civilian casualties could erode public support for the operation. On 7 May 1999 NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The planned target was the Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement in Belgrade but the wrong building was attacked. Following NATO's mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy, the alliance stopped hitting targets in the city for nearly two weeks while NATO authorities sought to ensure that another such mistake would not occur.

By mid-May NATO pilots had grown increasingly familiar with Kosovo's terrain and with the tactics of the Serbian Armed Forces on the ground. Pilots increasingly knew where Serbian forces were concentrated, which explained the change in the tactics of Serbian forces. They were operating in smaller and smaller units to make them harder to detect from the air. The downside for the Serbian forces is that this made them increasingly vulnerable to KLA ambushes, and it also made Serb forces less mobile to the benefit of those Kosovars still living within Kosovo.

The fundamental factor in the conclusion of ALLIED FORCE was NATO's unity and resolve. NATO acted in a way that was tough, progressively tougher throughout the campaign. It failed to be deflected from its goals. This lesson was very clear to Milosevic, who had hoped he could outwait NATO. Secondly, both the precision and the persistence of the air campaign were fundamental factors in convincing Milosevic that it was time to end the fight. The air campaign, which started slowly but gathered momentum as it went on, became systematically damaging to his entire military infrastructure, not just the forces in the field in Kosovo, but throughout the entire country. The pounding his forces took during the last week had to have a huge impact on his determination to continue the fight. It had a big impact on the morale of the forces. Desertions were increasing, and there were increasing reports of lack of food, lack of fuel, lack of equipment, lack of will, lack of morale, and increasing dismay with the leadership not only of the forces but of the country, and an increasing feeling that they just saw no way out. And they realized, because of NATO's persistence, the situation was just going to get steadily worse.

On 3 June, President Slobodan Milosevic finally accepted peace terms presented by EU envoy President Martti Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin. With the authorization of the United Nations on 10 June 1999, NATO forces deployed into Kosovo.

Operation Selva Verde

Operation Selva Verde is a cooperative, bilateral operation between DEA's Bogota Country Office and the Colombian National Police (CNP) Anti-Narcotics Unit. The primary purpose of this operation is to locate and destroy clandestine laboratories, airstrips and storage sites. A secondary purpose is to form a strong narcotics intelligence and operational alliance between DEA and the Government of Colombia. The Bogota Country Office assists the CNP in developing and managing

sources of information, as well as debriefings and payments to these individuals. In addition, DEA provides aircraft and the Air Intelligence Group as aerial intelligence platforms to support this program. During 1996, four major HCL laboratory sites were identified and destroyed -- three of the sites were destroyed by the CNP in cooperation with the Bogota Country Office in Operation Selva Verde. The fourth site consisted of an HCL laboratory and a separate stand alone large chemical synthesis complex. This fourth laboratory site was identified and destroyed by the Colombian Army after a site visit by DEA.

Operation Desert Fox

On 16 December 1998, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) military forces launched cruise missile attacks against military targets in Iraq. These strikes were ordered by the President of the United States and were undertaken in response to Iraq's continued failure to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as their interference with United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors. The strikes were designed to deliver a serous blow to Saddam Hussein's capability to manufacture, store, maintain and deliver weapons of mass destruction and his ability to threaten or otherwise intimidate his neighbors.

Operation Northern Watch

This is a U.S. European Command Combined Task Force (CTF) charged with enforcing the United Nations mandated no-fly zone above the 36th parallel in Iraq. The mission also entails monitoring Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security Council directives. The coalition partners of the United States, United Kingdom, and Turkey provide approximately 45 aircraft and more than 1,400 personnel to support Operation Northern Watch. The joint U.S. force of some 1,100 U.S. personnel includes sailors, soldiers and airmen from the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps.

Operation Northern Watch is the successor to Operation Provide Comfort, which officially ended in December 1996. With the closing of the Military Coordination Center in 1996 the Secretary of Defense approved a modification of the mission in Northern Iraq. Since 1991, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT had provided humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and enforcement of the northern no-fly zone.

Operation Southern Watch

United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, passed in April 1991, demanded that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein end the repression of the Iraqi civilian population. Iraqi military bombing and strafing attacks against the Shiite Muslims in Southern Iraq during the remainder of 1991 and during 1992 indicated Hussein chose not to comply with the UN resolution. President George Bush announced 26 August. 1992, a decision by a coalition of UN forces to begin surveillance operations in Iraq below the 32nd parallel. The goal was to ensure Iraq's compliance with UNSCR 688. To facilitate the monitoring, the coalition barred all Iraqi fixed and rotary wing aircraft from flying over the surveillance area. With the president's announcement, U.S. Central Command activated Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, a command and control unit for coalition forces monitoring the no-fly zone. The mission was dubbed Operation

Southern Watch. The first Southern Watch sortie was flown 27 August 1992 less than 24 hours after the announcement.

At first, Iraq complied with the no-fly restriction, but Hussein began challenging Southern Watch operations after the U.N.'s decision to retain sanctions against Iraq, 24 November 1992. A U.S. Air Force F-16 on patrol in the no-fly zone 27 December 1992 encountered a MiG-25 Foxbat. When the MiG pilot locked his air-to-air radar on the F-16, the American pilot destroyed the Foxbat with an air-to-air missile. Shortly after the shoot down, Hussein positioned surface-to-air missiles in Southern Iraq below the 32nd parallel. Since these missiles threatened pilots flying Southern Watch missions, the coalition ordered Hussein to move them above the 32nd parallel. Hussein ignored the ultimatum, even after warnings from the UN.

On 6 January 1993, four U.N. allies, the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, agreed to work together in enforcing UNSCR 688. A week later, coalition aircraft destroyed surface to air missile sites and their command and control units in Southern Iraq. In addition to this action, on 17 January coalition naval forces disabled an Iraqi nuclear facility with Tomahawk cruise missiles in support of UNSCR 687, the resolution demanding the destruction of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The following day, the allies launched a successful air raid against Iraqi SAM systems below the 32nd parallel. Three months later, on 18 April 1993, a coalition F-4G aircraft fired a missile into an Iraqi anti-aircraft position after being illuminated by radar from that site. In April 1992, the Iraqi government sponsored an assassination attempt on President Bush during his visit to Kuwait. This plot prompted a unilateral U.S. Tomahawk missile strike 26 June 1993.

Although Iraq challenged the no-fly zone several times in 1992 and 1993, the first nine months of 1994 passed without incident. Due to the relative calm in the Operation SOUTHERN WATCH area, Joint Task Force - South West Asia (JTF-SWA) began a force drawdown in February 1994, with the redeployment of the 49th Fighter Wing and other USCENTAF assets to CONUS from Khamis Mushiat, Saudi Arabia. The operation consisted of a four-phased redeployment of personnel and equipment, and involved the movement in February of 8 F-117's, approximately 300 personnel, and 958 short tons of equipment to home stations in the United States. In March 1994, JTF-SWA continued the drawdown of forces in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH by redeploying 3 F-16, 3 F-15E, and 3 F-15C aircraft from Dhahran, Saudi Arabia to the United States. SOUTHERN WATCH operations continued without incident until October 1994, when Iraq began troop movements south towards Kuwait, prompting U.S. and coalition forces to react with force deployments into theater under Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.

In October 1994, Hussein, upset about continued UN sanctions, began a series of verbal threats. He insisted on a date upon which the sanctions would end. He deployed a significant number of armored vehicles and mechanized infantry troops to Southern Iraq and to the Kuwaiti border. Coalition forces responded with increased surveillance operations, deployment of additional aircraft and forces to the AOR and a firm resolve to deter Iraqi aggression, and if necessary, defend the Arabian Peninsula from attacking Iraqi forces. The coalition governments, at the same time, said they would not be intimidated into deciding an end-date for the sanctions. Hussein insisted

he had the right to move his troops anywhere he wanted to within his own borders but decided to withdraw them in response to appeals from friendly parties in the Gulf region. Iraqi radio reported that the U.S. had backed down.

Operation Joint Forge

On 20 June 1998 the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina transitioned to a slightly smaller follow-on force. Simultaneously, Operation Joint Guard ended and Operation Joint Forge began. The United States has agreed to provide a force of approximately 6,900 U.S. Service members to help maintain the military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. No timetable for the duration of Operation Joint Forge has been determined. The mission will be assessed periodically and the force size will be adjusted, as circumstances require. No timeline for the duration of Operation Joint Forge has been established.

Operation Shepherd Venture

On 10 June 1998, United States European Command deployed forces to Dakar, Senegal as part of contingency planning in response to the deteriorating situation in Guinea-Bissau. Upon arrival, Joint Task Force Shepherd Venture was formed to enhance the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens in the region. The deployment included command support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other elements. The total force consisted of about 130 personnel. With the final American citizens safely evacuated from the city of Bissau, EUCOM ordered the personnel of JTF Shepherd Venture to redeploy to their home bases on 15 June 1998. Redeployment was completed and the JTF was disestablished on 17 June 1998.

Operation Noble Response

Operation Noble Response delivered more than two million pounds of food to Kenyans who were devastated by unseasonable rains and flooding in the northeastern part of Kenya. The Marine-led JTF Kenya supported ongoing humanitarian relief efforts coordinated by the government of Kenya and the United Nations World Food Program.

Operation Assured Response

In 1996, the US Military assisted in safeguarding and evacuating Americans from Liberia when that nation's civil war re-ignited into factional fighting and general violence in Liberia. During the first week of April 1996, as a result of intense street fighting during the ongoing civil war in Liberia, about 500 people sought refuge on American Embassy grounds and another 20,000 in a nearby American housing area. On April 6, the president approved the US ambassador's request for security, resupply and evacuation support. Between 9 April and 18 June, a US Joint Task Force Operation Assured Response evacuated 2444 peoples (485 Americans and 1959 citizens of other countries). The bulk of forces were from Special Operations Command Europe, and the last elements redeployed 3 August.

Air Force special operations forces led the evacuation effort, Operation Assured Response. Air Force KC-135 tankers and C-130 transports were put on alert in Europe

to support 24-hour operations, while other mobility aircraft began to deliver critical medical supplies, food, water, fuel and communications gear. On April 9, less than 72 hours after the decision to deploy U.S. forces, the first MH-53 helicopter landed in Monrovia to begin the operation. Those evacuated continued on US helicopters through Freetown, Sierra Leone, then on MC-130s to Dakar, Senegal, all under the cover of AC-130 gun ships. Throughout the rest of the week, the evacuation continued, as well as airlift of critical supplies to sustain the effort. By April 14, the evacuation was essentially complete, however, security and sustainment operations continued through Aug. 3. In this operation, Air Force special operations forces safely evacuated over 2,400 civilians representing 68 countries.

USAFE provided three KC-135s from the 100th Air Refueling Wing, two C-130s and an Emergency Medical Treatment Team from the 86th Airlift Wing, and a Flying Ambulance Surgical Team from the 52d Fighter Wing. The tankers, supported by about 100 people, deployed to Dakar, Senegal, 9 April. After flying over 50 missions and providing 1.5 million pounds of fuel to receivers, they returned to Mildenhall on 28 April. The C-130s and 51 people from the 37th Airlift Squadron flew to Dakar 10 April. They helped ferry people from Freetown, Sierra Leone, to Dakar and returned to Germany 19 April. In early April, elements of the Guam (LPH 5) amphibious ready group (ARG) and the 22nd MEU (SOC), were ordered to the vicinity of Monrovia, Liberia. Upon arrival, the 22d MEU (SOC) commanding officer assumed command of Joint Task Force-Assured Response (JTF-AR), which included Air Force, Navy and Marine forces. With additional support from an HC-4 MC-53E helicopter detachment and other Navy-Marine Corps aircraft, embassy security and transportation were provided and 309 noncombatants were evacuated -- including 49 U.S. citizens.

While still conducting this operation, elements of JTF-AR were ordered to Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct similar operations. A special purpose Marine air-ground task force, embarked on the Ponce (LPD 15) and with 10 days' notice, relieved the Guam task force and assumed the duties of CJTF-AR. This was done to allow the Guam ready group and the 22nd MEU (SOC) to return to the Adriatic Sea and provide the European Command's desired over-the-horizon presence during the Bosnian national elections.

Operation Uphold Democracy

In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic priest, won 67 percent of the vote in a presidential election that international observers deemed largely free and fair. Aristide took office in February 1991, but was overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the army and forced to leave the country in September of the same year. From October 1991 to June 1992, Joseph Nerette, as president, led an unconstitutional de facto regime and governed with a parliamentary majority and the armed forces. In June 1992, he resigned and Parliament approved Marc Bazin as Prime Minister of a de facto government with no replacement named for president. In June 1993, Bazin resigned and the UN imposed an oil and arms embargo, bringing the Haitian military to the negotiating table. President Aristide and Gen. Raoul Cedras, head of the Haitian armed forces, signed the UN-brokered Governors Island Agreement on 3 July 1993, establishing a 10-step process for the restoration of constitutional government and the return of President Aristide by 30 October 1993. The military derailed the process and the UN reimposed economic

sanctions. The political and human rights climate continued to deteriorate as the military and the de facto government sanctioned repression, assassination, torture, and rape in open defiance of the international community's condemnation.

In May 1994, the military selected Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonassaint to be provisional president of its third de facto regime. The UN and the U.S. reacted to this extraconstitutional move by tightening economic sanctions (UN Resolution 917). On 31 July 1994, the U.N. adopted Resolution 940 authorizing member states to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military leadership and restore constitutional rule and Aristide's presidency.

In the weeks that followed, the United States took the lead in forming a multinational force (MNF) to carry out the UN's mandate by means of a military intervention. In Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY U.S. objectives were fostering democratic institutions and reducing the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States. Despite the pledges of a military-backed regime in Haiti to return power to the democratically elected government it had ousted, the regime did not relinquish authority but became increasingly repressive and presided over a deteriorating economy. As the result of deteriorating conditions, tens of thousands of impoverished Haitians fled the country, many attempting to enter the United States.

The United States responded with Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the movement of forces to Haiti to support the return of Haitian democracy. The U.S.-led Multinational Force for Haiti (MNF) began on 19 September 1994 with the approval of the Security Council, which, at the same time, approved the follow-on UN operation. In preparation for this contingency, DoD simultaneously planned for an invasion and for the peaceful entry of forces into Haiti, and executed portions of both scenarios. For the invasion, an airdrop was planned involving 3,900 paratroopers. Most of this force was airborne when Haitian officials agreed to a peaceful transition of government and permissive entry of American forces. With U.S. troops prepared to enter Haiti in a matter of hours, President Clinton dispatched a negotiating team led by former President Jimmy Carter to discuss with the de facto Haitian leadership the terms of their departure. As a result, the MNF deployed peacefully, Cedras and other top military leaders left Haiti, and restoration of the legitimate government began, leading to Aristide's return on 15 October.

Air refueling was used extensively for reconnaissance and combat air patrol missions, with 297 sorties and 1,129 flying hours logged by KC-135 and KC-10 tankers. To transport personnel and materiel from the continental United States to the Caribbean basin, strategic airlift relied on three stage bases close to unload locations: C-5s staged at Dover AFB, Delaware, primarily, and also at Griffiss AFB, New York, while C-141s staged at McGuire AFB, New Jersey. In Haiti, Port-au-Prince was the destination of the strategic airlifters. Airfield conditions at another offload site, Cap Haitian, precluded its use by C-5s and C-141s. C-5s and C-141s delivered troops and cargo to Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, where the personnel and supplies were transloaded to C-130s for movement to Cap Haitian and other Haitian locations.

The credible threat of overwhelming force--combined with skillful, eleventh-hour diplomacy--enabled U.S. forces to land unopposed and avoid the negative

consequences that combat would have brought. The MNF initially employed over 20,000 U.S. military personnel, plus some 2,000 personnel from a dozen other countries. The mission was to restore democracy by removing the de facto military regime, return the previously elected Aristide regime to power, ensure security, assist with the rehabilitation of civil administration, train a police force and judiciary, help prepare for elections, and turn over responsibility to the U.N. a prior but unfulfilled political agreement between the parties on Governor's Island (New York) in 1991 served as a template to shape objectives.

There was a major commitment to peace building by civilian agencies of the U.S. government, particularly USAID, closely coordinated with the U.N. and numerous other international, regional, and non-governmental organizations. U.S. special operations forces played an essential role in establishing security and assuring de facto public administration in rural areas.

The Maritime Administration activated 14 of its Ready Reserve Force vessels, this time to support UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. The ships transported military cargo from various U.S. ports to Port-au-Prince, Haiti. All were fully crewed by a total of more than 400 civilian American seafarers and were operational within four days of being requested, ahead of the military's activation requirement. General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, praised the "flawless, timely response" of everyone involved in activating the RRF ships to support American troops serving in Haiti.

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY succeeded both in restoring the democratically elected government of Haiti and in stemming emigration, thanks to well-executed political, military, diplomatic, and humanitarian activities. On March 31, 1995 the United States transferred the peacekeeping responsibilities to United Nations functions. Advanced planning and coordination for the transition were well managed by the U.S. and the UN, as was the selection and training of senior leaders to sustain continued cooperative international action. In contrast to the Somalia transition, the U.N. deployed an advance headquarters element to Haiti six months prior to the change of command. On 31 March 1995, a smaller U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti (UNMIH) succeeded the powerful MNF, with a March 1996 deadline for completion, after a newly elected President is scheduled to take office.

Operation Restore Hope

Expanded peacekeeping in Somalia began after the failure of UNOSOM I accompanied by the specter of 500,000 Somalis dead from famine by the fall of 1992 and hundreds of thousands more in danger of dying. Clan violence in Somalia interfered with international famine relief efforts, and President Bush sent American troops to protect relief workers in a new operation called Restore Hope. The U.S.-led coalition approved by the Security Council in December 1992 had a mandate of protecting humanitarian operations and creating a secure environment for eventual political reconciliation. At the same time, it had the authority to use all necessary means, including military force.

The U.S. Army, responding to a presidential directive, participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia from 3 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. A joint and multinational operation, Restore Hope--called UNITAF (unified task force)--was a U.S.-led, U,N,-sanctioned operation that included protection of humanitarian assistance and other peace-enforcement operations.

During Operation Restore Hope, USCENTCOM was the unified command. It provided guidance and arranged support and resources for the operational commander. The commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) commanded a JTF/CTF composed of air, naval, Marine, Army, and special operations forces (SOF) components, in addition to the forces provided by countries contributing to the U.S.-led, combined coalition. As the responsible unified command, USCENTCOM performed numerous tasks contributing to the success of Operation Restore Hope. Key areas included shaping a clear, achievable mission statement for the operational commander, shaping an international coalition, and orchestrating the transition to eventual U.N. control.

In 1992, three Ready Reserve Force vessels were activated to support the United Nation's humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Somalia. Although Somalia was a U.S. Central Command responsibility, USAFE provided air-refueling support at Moron Air Base, Spain, and sent contingents of security police, communicators, and postal specialists to Somalia and Kenya. Throughout Operation Restore Hope, MP units were in great demand because of their ability to serve as a force multiplier. Marine force (MARFOR) and ARFOR commanders quickly took advantage of the MP's significant firepower, mobility, and communications and used them effectively as a force multiplier conducting security-related missions as one of their combat forces.

Doctrinal missions included security of main supply routes (MSRs), military and NGO convoys, critical facilities, and very important persons (VIPs); customs; detention of local civilians suspected of felony crimes against US force or Somali citizens; and criminal investigative division (CID) support as the JTF's executive agency for joint investigations. MPs responded to a significant number of hostile acts taken against US forces, NGOs, and civilians by armed bandits and "technicals" and to factional fighting that threatened US forces or relief efforts. They also supported the JTF weapons confiscation policy by conducting recons and gathering information and intelligence (human intelligence [HUMINT]) about the size, location, and capabilities of factions operating throughout the ARFOR and MARFOR AOs. This information included the location of sizeable weapons caches. MPs also had an expanded role in the actual confiscation of weapons by establishing checkpoints and roadblocks along MSRs, within small villages, and within the congested, confined urban environment of Mogadishu. Serving in both a combat and CS role, MPs also participated in a larger, combined arms show-of-force operation (air assault) in the city of Afgooye.

By March 1993, mass starvation had been overcome, and security was much improved. At its peak, almost 30,000 U.S. military personnel participated in the operation, along with 10,000 personnel from twenty-four other states. Despite the absence of political agreement among the rival forces, periodic provocations, and occasional military responses by UNITAF, the coalition retained its impartiality and avoided open combat with Somali factions--blending its coercive powers with political dialogue, psychological operations, and highly visible humanitarian activities.

Operation Restore Hope demonstrated the usefulness of engineers in operations other than war. Somalia's austere landscape and climate posed challenges similar to or greater than the ones encountered during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, including a harsh desert environment, resupply over great distances limited resources, and a devastated infrastructure. The deployed engineer force was a joint and multinational effort, building on the engineer capabilities found with each service component and coalition partner. Engineers provided standard maps and imagery products, detected and cleared hundreds of land mines and pieces of unexploded ordnance built base camps for US and coalition forces, and drilled water wells. They constructed and improved over 2,000 kilometers of roads, built and repaired several Bailey bridges, upgraded and maintained airfields, and participated in local civic action projects that helped open schools, orphanages, hospitals, and local water supplies.

On 4 May 1993 the UN-led operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations.

Operation Desert Storm

Iraq's army poured across the border into Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and President Bush ordered the deployment of troops and equipment to defend Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein's rejection of diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis led to the decision to restore Kuwait's sovereignty by military force. The ensuing air war and the effects of the economic embargo decimated Iraq's military infrastructure, severed communication and supply lines, smashed weapons arsenals, and destroyed morale. Overall, the coalition air campaign accumulated a total of 109,876 sorties over the 43-day war, an average of 2,555 sorties per day. Of these, over 27,000 targeted Scuds, airfields, air defenses, electrical power, biological and chemical weapons, headquarters, intelligence assets, communications, the Iraqi army, and oil refining. One can get some perspective on the scope of the Gulf air war by comparing it to some predecessors.

The Gulf War was not an exercise in massive bombing unparalleled in previous air war history; neither the sortie rates nor the bomb tonnage statistics made it so. The Air Force's tonnage expenditure in the Gulf War was only 11 percent of that expended against Japan (537,000 tons), less than 4 percent of that expended against Nazi Germany (1,613,000 tons), and less than one percent of the tonnage which the Air Force dropped in Southeast Asia. In measures of tonnage dropped per month, the Gulf air war ranked significantly below Vietnam, and was only 85 percent of that in the Second World War.

Yet it was more decisive overall in what it achieved than any of these previous wars. After a 38-day air campaign, the DESERT SABRE ground offensive began with allied forces sweeping through Iraqi defenses. The Iraqi army was crushed after a mere 100 hours. Iraqi troops--tired, hungry and war-weary from 6 months of economic blockade and more than a month of relentless allied bombing--surrendered by the thousands.

Operation El Dorado Canyon

Three carrier task forces of the Sixth Fleet with 225 aircraft assembled off the Libyan coast for maneuvers in March 1986. On 24 March, six SA-5s were launched from the new missile base at Surt against American aircraft. None was hit, however, because the SA-5, with a range of 240 kilometers, could threaten high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra but was relatively ineffective against high-performance jet fighters. Subsequently, the missile site was put out of action by carrier-based A-6 Intruders firing High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), that homed in on the Libyans' radar guidance signals. A second strike followed the next day to knock out a replacement radar unit. Although Soviet technicians were believed to be present to oversee the installation and operation of the SA-5 batteries, none was reported injured in the exchanges.

At the same time, a French-built Combattante-class missile attack craft was destroyed when it approached United States Navy ships protecting the aircraft carriers. The Libyan vessel was hit by two Harpoon missiles launched from an A-7 Corsair aircraft. The most serious loss for the Libyans was one of the eight Soviet supplied Nanuchka-class missile corvettes in an attack by two A-6s shortly after midnight on 26 March. A total of five attacks were carried out on Libyan ships. Ten days later, on 5 April 1986, a bomb exploded in a discotheque in Berlin frequented by United States service personnel. Of the 200 injured, 63 were American soldiers; one soldier and one civilian were killed.

On the late evening of 15 April and early morning of 16 April 1986, under the code name El Dorado Canyon, the United States launched a series of military air strikes against ground targets inside Libya. The timing of the attack was such that while some of the strike aircraft were still in the air, President Reagan was able to address the US public and much of the world. He emphasized that this action was a matter of US self defense against Libya's state-sponsored terrorism. In part, he stated, "Self defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission...a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter."

The use of force was specifically prompted by what the President claimed was "irrefutable proof" that Libya had directed the terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque 9 days earlier which had killed one American and injured 200 others. The impetus for the President's decision to authorize the raid was the American intelligence interception of a message from Gadaffi ordering an attack on Americans "to cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties." Another communications source, an intercepted Libyan message outlined the attack being planned in West Berlin.

The raid was designed to hit directly at the heart of Gaddafi's ability to export terrorism with the belief that such a preemptive strike would provide him "incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior." The final targets of the raid were selected at the National Security Council level "within the circle of the President's advisors." Mission planners decided, as part of the effort to attain tactical surprise, to hit all the selected targets simultaneously. This decision had crucial impact on nearly every aspect of the operation since it meant that the available U.S. Navy resources could not perform the mission unilaterally. The only two types of aircraft in the U.S. inventory

capable of conducting a precision night attack were the Navy's A-6s and the Air Force's F-111s. The Navy had two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean at the time planning for the raid.

The America and The Coral Sea. Each had ten A-6 aircraft, but these were not the total of 32 aircraft estimated as required to successfully hit all five targets with one raid. The closest F-111s were based in the United Kingdom (UK); and use of these UK based aircraft dramatically affected the scope and complexity of the operation.

Planning was even further compounded when the French refused to grant authority to overfly France. This refusal increased the distance of the flight route from Great Britain to Tripoli by about 1300 nautical miles each way, added 6-7 hours of flight time for the pilots and crews, and forced a tremendous amount of additional refueling support from tanker aircraft.

The size of the strike force's final configuration was immense and complex. Approximately 100 aircraft were launched in direct support of the raid. In fact, the total size of the force was criticized as excessive from various sources. All combined, the whole operation involved (to some degree) "more aircraft and combat ships than Britain employed during its entire campaign in the Falklands."

The first aircraft to launch were the 28 tankers from Britain followed closely by the F/EF-111s. Four refuelings and several hours later, these planes rounded the tip of Tunisia and were integrated into the Navy's airborne armada by an Air Force officer aboard a KC-10 tanker which had been modified to function also as an airborne command coordination center.

Although joint in nature, the actual execution of the strike was operationally and geographically divided between the Navy and Air Force. Navy A-6s were assigned the target in the Benghazi area, and the Air Force F-111s hit the other three targets in the vicinity of Tripoli. This division of responsibility was done largely to simplify and deconflict command and control of the operational aspects of the raid. The modified KC-10 tanker was given charge of the Air Force resources while the carrier America controlled the Navy aircraft. The airborne E-2C Hawkeyes provided early warning, air control vectors, and operations.

The actual combat commenced at 0200 (local Libyan time), lasted less than 12 minutes, and dropped 60 tons of munitions. Resistance outside the immediate area of attack was nonexistent, and Libyan air defense aircraft never launched. One FB-111 strike aircraft was lost during the strike. The entire armada remained in the vicinity for over an hour trying to account for all aircraft. Although retaliation for the Berlin bombing had been anticipated, Libyan air defenses seemed almost wholly unprepared for the attack. In fact, it was reported that antiaircraft fire had not begun until after the American planes had passed over their targets at Tripoli. It was reported that some Libyan soldiers abandoned their posts in fright and confusion and officers were slow to give orders. Also, Libyans fighters failed to get airborne to challenge the attacking bombers.

Operation Urgent Fury

On 13 March 1979, the New Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (New Jewel) movement ousted Sir Eric Gairy, Grenada's first Prime Minister, in a nearly bloodless coup and established a people's revolutionary government (PRG), headed by Maurice Bishop, who became Prime Minister. His Marxist-Leninist Government established close ties with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other communist-bloc countries. In October 1983, a power struggle within the government resulted in the arrest and subsequent murder of Bishop and several members of his cabinet by elements of the people's revolutionary army.

Following a breakdown in civil order, U.S. forces, in conjunction with contingents of the security forces of several neighboring Caribbean states, invaded the independent state of Grenada on 25 October in response to an appeal from the governor general and to a request for assistance from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. The mission was to oust the People's Revolutionary Government, to protect U.S. citizens and restore the lawful government.

To secure objectives in Grenada and to facilitate operations, the island was operationally split in half. The Marines covered the northern half of the island while Army rangers covered the south. The invasion in the south focused on an unfinished runway at Point Salines. A Navy SEAL team, which was to have provided intelligence on the airfield at Salines, was unable to get ashore. At 0534 the first Rangers began dropping at Salines, and less than two hours elapsed from the first drop until the last unit was on the ground, shortly after seven in the morning. After the rangers had secured the runway, 800 more troops would land, freeing the rangers to press northward where they were to secure the safety of American medical students and bring under control the capital of St. Georges.

At the end of the first day in Grenada, the Rangers had secured the airfield and True Blue Campus at a cost of five dead and six wounded. Once the Rangers had secured the runway, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division landed, and late in the evening of the 26th the 82d Division's 3d Brigade began to deploy across the island. In the north, 400 Marines would land and rescue the small airport at Pearls. Preceding the operations in the north and south, Navy seal teams were airdropped near St. Georges to secure the safety of the Grenadine Governor General who was being held under house arrest by opposing forces in the governor's mansion and to capture the government radio station at St. Georges. The 22d Marine Amphibious Unit was diverted to Grenada while en route to Lebanon. The Marine amphibious unit conducted landings as part of Operation Urgent Fury at Grenada on 25 October and at Carriacou on 1 November. By 3 November, the Marine amphibious unit was reembarked aboard its amphibious shipping and had resumed its passage to Lebanon.

In total, an invasion force of 1,900 U.S. troops, reaching a high of about 5,000 in 5 days, and 300 troops from the assisting neighboring islands encountered about 1,200 Grenadines, 780 Cubans, 49 Soviets, 24 North Koreans, 16 East Germans, 14 Bulgarians, and 3 or 4 Libyans. Within three days all main objectives were accomplished. Five hundred ninety-nine (599) Americans and 80 foreign nationals

were evacuated, and U.S. forces were successful in the eventual reestablishment of a representative form of government in Grenada.

That is not to say, however, that the invasion went without challenge. The first challenge was the lack of good intelligence data. For example, at Point Salines operations bogged down because resistance was much greater than expected. In attempting to rescue the Governor General, American forces were stymied by larger Cuban and Grenadine forces than anticipated. By listening to Cuban radio broadcasts, it seemed that the resistance was being directed from a place called Fort Frederick. As it turned out, but not previously known, Fort Frederick was the nerve center for the Cuban and Grenadine forces and once it was destroyed resistance simply melted away.

The invasion force lacked precise data on the location of the American medical students they were to rescue. One account noted that attack planners did not realize that the American medical students were spread out over three locations. The final challenge to invading forces was the lack of a fully integrated, interoperable communications system. Unlike the fighting elements, which were organized to conduct operations independent of one another, communications systems were not allowed such freedom. Communications was to have been the glue that would tie together the operation of the four independent United States military service elements. Unfortunately, communications support failed in meeting certain aspects of that mission. It cannot be said that communications capability itself was abundant. Several participants cite shortages of communications.

Shortages were not the only communications problems found during the invasion of Grenada; interoperability was another. For example, uncoordinated use of radio frequencies prevented radio communications between Marines in the north and Army Rangers in the south. As such, interservice communication was prevented, except through offshore relay stations, and kept Marine commanders unaware for too long that Rangers were pinned down without adequate armor. In a second incident, it was reported that one member of the invasion force placed a long distance, commercial telephone call to Fort Bragg, NC to obtain C-130 gunship support for his unit which was under fire. His message was relayed via satellite and the gunship responded.

Several factors have been cited as the cause of the communications problems, which were confronted in Grenada. Among them were insufficient planning for the operation, lack of training, inadequate procedures, maldeployment of communications security keying material for the different radio networks, and lack of preparation through exercise realism.

One of the more noted intelligence shortcomings of the operation was the lack of up to date topographical information (maps) on Grenada. When adequate maps were found, they apparently had to be flown to the Grenada task force rather than being sent by electrical transmission.

No journalists were on the island of Grenada to provide live reporting on the invasion, nor had any been taken along with the invading force. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, in charge of the operation, had originally planned to exclude the media

completely from the operation until he was convinced that they could do no harm. As word of the imminent invasion spread, hundreds of journalists moved into the area but were blocked from proceeding to Grenada. Indeed, there were no first-hand reports from Grenada until 2½ days after the operation began. The media, citing the American people's right to know, and frustrated at their inability to provide the current reporting that they would have liked, protested loudly about the military's gross oversight in failure to permit journalists to accompany the operation.

An advisory council, named by the governor general, administered the country until general elections were held in December 1984. The New National Party (NNP), led by Herbert Blaize, won 14 out of 15 seats in free and fair elections and formed a democratic government. Grenada's constitution had been suspended in 1979 by the PRG, but it was restored after the 1984 elections.

Bibliography:

1. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War*, 5 Oct 96.
2. Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 Jun 95.
3. Military Analysis Network website, Military Operations fact sheets, Federation of American Scientists webpage, www.fas.org, Oct 99.

Expeditionary Aerospace Force

Introduction

Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) is basically the Air Force's guiding vision for how we're organized, trained, and equipped to deploy and sustain our aerospace forces for military operations overseas. The EAF is the United States Air Force. We recognize that aerospace power is increasingly used by our nation to influence world events, and in order to do so we have the expeditionary mindset that we may be sent abroad as a routine way of business. This isn't new to the relatively junior members of our force who came in within the last ten years. However, today we are a much smaller force than we were a decade ago at the end of the Cold War, yet we're four times as busy. EAF seeks to balance the workload by widening the resource pool of people and units that can deploy. It's not just the deploying piece, but addresses forces that fight in place, forces that commute to the expeditionary operation, forces that telecommute to expeditionary operations, forces that provide transportation to those operations, forces that sustain the expeditionary operations, and forces which train, organize, equip and manage the expeditionary forces. EAF is inclusive to the entire Air Force.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Know the characteristics and structure of the EAF concept and AEF construct.

Samples of Behavior:
1. Define the EAF concept.
2. Define what the EAF concept means to Air Force members.
3. State the AEF construct in terms of force packaging, scheduling, presentation of forces, and how the AEF applies across the spectrum of conflict.

Information

EAF is truly about embracing and understanding the concepts and implications of engagement and presence articulated in our current vision *Global Engagement: Strategy for the 21st Century*. The EAF is a proactive move away from the Cold War USAF. It is reaffirmation of the vital role aerospace power plays across the full spectrum of conflict in support of the National Military Strategy. It is recognition of the growing tendency to employ aerospace power frequently and over sustained periods as a part of that strategy, and it is recognition that this demand for aerospace power is driven by it's unique characteristics – range, speed, flexibility, and precision.

Force Management

At its core, EAF is about structural and cultural changes to create more effective force management tools. A key objective is to understand where USAF resources are limited and how over committing them to meet requirements today can result in less capability to meet essential requirements tomorrow.

Today, any time we deploy forces we are using parts of our "two MTW" force and are introducing some risk to planning factors. There are no residual USAF forces. If we don't fence our train, organize, equip and sustain forces during engagement, we aggravate the impact with reduced readiness.

Kosovo is a case study of the issues the EAF concept was intended to address. Kosovo was the first large contingency for the USAF using the post-Cold War force structure. It is the first large contingency executed from a fully "engaged" posture. Kosovo also is the first USAF reconstitution needed since Korea. Finally, Kosovo showed that even during a large effort, other rotational commitments continue.

The EAF is already paying dividends in reconstitution planning. Using the force management tools, the USAF was able to measure and articulate the impacts Kosovo operations, on top of our other worldwide commitments, had on the force. The Joint Staff and CINCs are currently working alternatives to allow the USAF time to reconstitute its forces.

EAF structural changes enable more responsive force packaging; provide better visibility into force TEMPO and better detection when the force is stressed; and focus relief on stressed areas. As already discussed, these structural changes provide Air Force senior leadership with a force management tool that better assesses readiness, quantifies tempo impacts, and guides investments.

Cultural changes involve how we recruit, train, nurture and retain our Airmen and how we structure, manage and invest in the force. Airmen need the skills to excel in the expeditionary world … and the stability to pursue a rewarding personal life. It is the major task still facing the EAF.

Many processes we use to grow and manage these expeditionary airmen haven't evolved to the reality that recurring expeditionary rotation and contingencies are part of normal Air Force operations. Over the past nine years, most airmen have come to understand this reality. But, since the system hasn't adapted, it doesn't always provide the skills or resources the airmen need in deployed environments.

Training must adapt to this environment. Training must involve subjects like buddy care and basic survival skills for expeditionary airmen who will live in "field" conditions on a recurring basis. Airmen must understand what makes aerospace forces expeditionary and how to make them more expeditionary. We must know how to measure, limit and sustain long-term engagement (steady-state contingencies); how to quickly transition to surge operations up to and including MTWs; and then smoothly reconstitute back to sustainable engagement.

How we manage the force also hasn't evolved fully to the new reality. We must institutionalize the rule sets and the planning concepts that create more effective force packaging; make TEMPO visibility and relief happen; and target investments to create more sustainable, ready and responsive forces. These concepts embody the "expeditionary warrior mindset".

Operational change encompasses innovative approaches and new technologies that make us light, lean, lethal and rapidly deployable/employable worldwide. More simplistically: light and lean means smaller forward footprint; more lethal means less force required for a desired effect; and rapid response reduces demand for forward presence. They reduce the burden engagement places on the force.

Doctrine, material and logistics are the primary accounting systems, but the key to innovation is fostering concept development and learning. Formal experimentation is needed to test new ideas and doctrines or to try new organizational, logistics and employment concepts. In addition to developing concepts, experimentation supplements education and skills training by allowing airmen to test innovative ideas and helping them learn new ways to accomplish the mission. We must also do a better job of implementing lessons learned from past operations. Finally, acquisition, research and development must leverage technology to enable our evolution toward the EAF vision.

EAF focuses on managing available forces against joint tasks. EAF force management tools help identify force structure shortfalls that may merit investment. The force is essentially MTW sized, resulting in shortfalls in some capabilities, which in turn leads to excessive tempo for some AF people. Finally, EAF does highlight force attributes that reduce the burden of engagement.

But, EAF does not drive specific changes into employment concepts. EAF has not added any new missions, tasks or functions to USAF. And, EAF is not a program.

Main EAF points:

- EAF is about structural and cultural changes to create more effective force management tools
- In a heavily engaged environment, the USAF must have processes to smoothly transition across the spectrum of military operations
- Force management tools define sustainable engagement: the levels of deployment/tempo our forces can sustain
- Force management tools provide "Trigger Points" to determine when commitments are exceeding sustainable levels (surge)
- Efforts to mitigate impact and plan for reconstitution must begin simultaneously with start of surge operations

- Any time we deploy forces we are using parts of our "two MTW" force and are putting the execution of at least parts of one MTW planning at risk

- Light and lean means smaller forward footprint; more lethal means less force required for a desired effect; and rapid response reduces demand for forward presence

- We must manage deployment and other requirements to keep them within sustainable levels

Why is it important?

EAF addresses the high demands the strategy of Global Engagement places on USAF forces. These demands include maintaining high deployment tempos and multiple sustained forward operating locations while retaining rapid crisis response capability...and the ability to conduct two Major Theater Wars. These demands are stressing our people and our assets. The symptoms include lower retention rates, decreasing readiness rates, increasing cannibalization rates and lower mission-ready rates. EAF steps up to a dual challenge: sustaining our aerospace assets and retaining our people while presenting timely, relevant forces to meet the demands of our national strategy.

How was it developed?

This expeditionary approach, while renewed and refocused, is strongly rooted in the history and traditions of airpower. (The 40-year history of expeditionary airpower is covered in *Immediate Reach, Immediate Power: The Expeditionary Force and Aerospace Power Projection in the Post Cold War Era*, by Dr Richard Davis.) It is further embodied in the core competencies of the US Air Force and the USAF's central mission of providing timely and responsive land and space-based aerospace power. In turn, it helps to implement the key concepts found in Joint Vision 2010. Finally, it reflects the lessons learned from the "Air Expeditionary Forces" we have deployed for carrier gap filler and other short duration missions.

The EAF is still evolving!

It is a journey, not a destination. New EAF concepts are already evolving out of our lessons learned from surging into, sustaining, and planning to reconstitute from Operations ALLIED FORCE and SHINING HOPE.

Aerospace Expeditionary Force

Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) are the most visible of the changes being implemented under the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) concept.

EAF embodies the Air Force vision to organize, train, equip and sustain its Total Force – Active, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve – to meet the security challenges of the 21st Century. The EAF addresses these challenges through

enhanced sustainability, readiness and responsiveness. The fundamental objective of the EAF is to enhance the operational capabilities the US Air Force provides today to its clients, the warfighting Commanders in Chief (CINCs), while sustaining a viable force that can also provide those capabilities in the future.

Force Management

At its core, EAF is about structural and cultural changes to create more effective force management tools. A key objective of the EAF vision and the expeditionary mindset is force management. USAF resources are limited and over committing them to meet requirements today can result in less capability to meet essential requirements tomorrow. Therefore, we needed more responsive force packaging; better visibility into force TEMPO; better detection when the force is stressed; and finally, a mechanism to focus relief on stressed areas.

Aerospace Expeditionary Forces are force management tools. The Air Force will organize the majority of its Total Force into ten AEFs, two dedicated on-call Aerospace Expeditionary Wings (AEWs), and five Mobility Leadership Wings. AEFs are a composite of pre-designated units from which the Joint Force Commander can tailor a force package to meet a specific task. Each AEF will have roughly equivalent capabilities, composed of fighter and bomb squadrons, assigned theater lift and tanker forces, tactical leadership and a full complement of combat support.

- AEFs are not deployable units.
- AEFs do not have commanders or separate command authority.

Aerospace Expeditionary Wings (AEWs), Groups (AEGs), and Squadrons (AESs) are deployable units tailored from the AEFs capabilities. It is probable that AEFs will deploy forces simultaneously to more than one regional CINC at the same time; and these forces will be dispersed to numerous forward operating locations.

Each AEF draws forces from across the Total Force. This includes the Air Reserve Component (ARC) – the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. The objective is to pre-identify as many deployable people and assets as possible in order to distribute deployment loads. Total Force integration of ARC people, equipment and aircraft allow better force and personnel tempo management.

Nearly every active duty wing will have forces aligned to multiple AEFs. Each flying squadron will be aligned with a different AEF. The wing's expeditionary combat support personnel and equipment will be put into modular teams and distributed across even more AEFs. This approach distributes deployments across multiple wings with the objective of reducing disruption of home base operations.

Note that traditional command and organizational structures remain. Squadrons still report to wings that report to Numbered Air Forces (NAFs) that report to major air commands (MAJCOMs). These traditional structures serve several important functions, two of them of interest here.

- One is the service responsibility to train, organize, equip and sustain USAF capabilities. These functions will not change and responsibility still rests with the traditional command structure.

- A second is to respond to a major theater war (MTW). Today, traditional structures are still the way USAF forces are provided to OPLANs and respond to MTWs.

Two AEFs help define the level of deployment commitments the USAF can sustain over time. This sustainable commitment is measured in terms of combat power, independent expeditionary combat support deployments and the number of forward operating locations that can be supported.

AEFs represent a specific level of aerospace capabilities: air superiority; suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses; air-to-ground including bombers and precision munitions; mobility; expeditionary combat support such as civil engineers and security police; and tactical level leadership.

AEFs include a cross section of Air Force weapon systems (150+ total aircraft of dissimilar types) and people (10,000-15,000) providing forces for theater commanders.

Each AEF also has a designated lead wing and each pair of AEFs has a designated mobility lead wing. Lead wing commanders and staffs do not command the AEFs. They add group or wing-level leadership to the set of capabilities in the AEF. These commanders and staff will deploy to expeditionary locations where there is no pre-existing command structure – and would fall under command of the gaining CINC or designated joint force commander. The mobility leadership would be tapped should the expeditionary locations require leadership with mobility expertise. Examples include setting up a base to receive lift support for a humanitarian relief operation or a non-combatant evacuation operation.

The AEFs provide Air Force senior leadership with a Force Management Tool that better assesses tempo and readiness, quantifies tempo impacts, and guides investments.

AEFs, combined with new force management policies, will allow the Air Force to better schedule units for deployments, making the process much more predictable to Air Force personnel. The objective is to keep individual personnel tempo at or below 120 days of TDY per year. To accomplish this, an individual can only be aligned to one AEF; and each AEF will only be eligible for deployment 90 days every 15 months. This allows other TDY days for training and exercises.

The AEF cycle defines the policy and procedures by which these forces will rotate through scheduled deployment requirements.

Deployment/On-call Eligibility

Pairs of AEFs will fill 90-day eligibility periods during which their constituent units will deploy forward or remain at home in an On-Call status. After 90 days the

next two AEFs take up the load. During the eligibility period, AEF units will fill all scheduled combat and combat support deployment requirements worldwide. The residual forces from these AEFs will be prepared to respond to pop-up crises.

Because of force structure limitations, these residual AEF assets do not provide a credible offensive response to crises. Until these shortfalls can be corrected, two "on-call", rapid response AEWs, will provide rapid force projection capability. These composite AEWs contain counter air, SEAD, precision munitions, stealth, and conventional bomber forces. They will rotate on-call status, 90 days on and 90 days off but will not normally deploy unless a crisis occurs.

Preparation Period Spin-Up

Roughly two months prior to deployment eligibility AEFs enter a preparation period. During this period units are notified of where and when they will deploy. Final deployment and force beddown planning is accomplished. Units receive AOR orientation, theater intelligence and threat briefings, and Rules of Engagement training. Personal mobility requirements are updated. Finally, prior to deploying or going "on-call" units are certified ready.

In this way, AEFs provide for better presentation of tailored force packages to CINCs for scheduled deployments and small contingencies.

Recovery

After each deployment eligibility period, units that deployed will receive up to two weeks of recovery time. The time period is based on time deployed and determined by existing policy.

Normal Training and Exercises

The AEF cycle provides roughly ten months of "normal" duty. Units reconstitute equipment and training backlogs. People get quality time with families and leaves can be scheduled. Skills and upgrade training and exercises are to be accomplished. Professional military education, enlisted promotion testing and continuing education can occur with minimal interruption. Units would conduct the day-to-day business of gaining and maintain proficiency and combat readiness.

AEF members will know when they are "in the window" for deployment, when they will be in spin-up for deployment, and when they will be in normal status. They can plan their lives accordingly. The 15-month schedule, Total Force integration and the force management rules should provide TEMPO predictability, stability and leveling to AEF members.

Two AEFs and an on-call AEW are sized such that they could have handled all deployments and pop-up crises between DESERT STORM and Operation NORTHERN ANVIL. This minimizes the risk that USAF combat forces will have to surge for a small crisis.

As already discussed, each EAF will deploy some forces forward with the remainder on-call to respond to any pop-up contingencies. The on-call, composite AEW provides the power projection punch if required.

These forces will be presented to theater commanders as Aerospace Expeditionary Task Forces (ASETFs). When deployed, the ASETFs are assigned to joint chain of command structures established by the gaining CINC. While on-call, in normal training, or in recovery, AEF aligned units remain in their assigned chains of command. Since AEFs have no commanders and are cross-MAJCOM, some form of centralized control was needed.

The AEF Center (AEFC) is cross-functional, centralized management team. It is designed to facilitate AEF/AEW management tasks to include: AEF/AEW tasking; providing AEF/AEW continuity; identifying AEF training requirements; developing training and planning templates; guiding all aspects of AEF/AEW planning; and monitoring AEF/AEW readiness.

The AEFC consists of two teams (blue and silver) that provide AEFs expert advice on planning and preparation to include operations, mobility, training, C2, and combat support. Team composition includes theater and functional experts from the active duty, guard and reserves. Each team guides a pair of AEFs through their spin-up and certification before entering the deployment/on-call eligibility period. The AEFC then monitors the deployments, captures lessons learned, and oversees subsequent tasking of the on-call units.

The AEFC, located at Langley, maintains coordinating authority across all MAJCOMs, USAF components, and AEF/AEW scheduled units to facilitate readiness and accomplish required planning activities. It is a facilitating staff designed to leverage the advantages of a central focal point for AEFs/AEWs. The AEFC has no chain of command authority with AEF units.

Engagement and presence missions have significant implications for deliberate and crisis action planning. As we transition back and forth across the spectrum of operations we find three different processes; each with its own systems and data bases. Unit type codes (UTCs) developed for OPLANs are not adaptible to small-scale deployments, leading to extensive use of individual augmentees to fill requirements. Unfortunately, the separate systems are not connected. During Kosovo this has resulted in double tasking of some personnel and general lack of visibility into the true status of the force.

Implications of Engagement and Presence

Finally, there is no formal system for reconstitution planning. A major task for EAF/AEF implementation is to develop a common UTC-based Database and a common planning system that stretches across the spectrum.

Main AEF Points:

- AEFs are force management tools.
- AEFs are pre-designated combat, mobility, support and leadership capabilities from which the Joint Force Commander can tailor the desired operational effect.
- AEF elements fulfill a 90-day "on call" period every 15-months. AEF-affiliated members will know when they are "in the window" for deployment, when they are training and when to prepare for the "on call" rotation so they can plan their lives accordingly.
- AEFs are not deployable units, and do not have a command authority. Aerospace Expeditionary Wings (AEWs), Groups (AEGs) or Squadrons (AESs) are deployable units tailored from the capabilities in an AEF pair. These units deploy with tactical-level command and control.
- When deployed, AEWs, AEGs, or AES' align to joint command structures, normally as an Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force (ASETF), under the command of the COMAFFOR.
- Total Force integration of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve people and their frontline combat and support aircraft allow better force and personnel tempo management.

Why is it important?

EAF and the AEFs address the high demands the strategy of Global Engagement places on USAF forces. These demands include maintaining high deployment tempos and multiple sustained forward operating locations while retaining rapid crisis response capability and the ability to conduct two near-simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTWs). These demands are stressing our people and our assets. The symptoms include lower retention rates, decreasing readiness rates, increasing cannibalization rates and lower mission-ready rates.

Conclusion

We need to stop managing the nation's aerospace force as if deployments are extraordinary events warranting disruption of sustaining functions. In "normal" expeditionary operations, adherence to the AEF schedule and its rule sets is an essential part of EAF mission accomplishment...the mission of sustaining and retaining the force while still meeting Joint Force tasks.



FIRST LIEUTENANT EDWARD RICKENBACKER

was a pilot of the 94th Aero Squadron. While on patrol in his SPAD over the lines near Billy, France, 25 September 1918, he attacked five Fokkers, which were protecting two Halberstadts. He dived on them and shot down on of the Fokkers then attacked on the Halberstadts shooting it down also. In his dedication to United States victory in the air, Lieutenant Rickenbacker totally disregarded the odds of seven to one against him.

Substance Abuse Control Program

Introduction

Since it's very true that the Air Force is merely a microcosm of the nation as a whole, it should come as no surprise that the Air Force, like the rest of the country, has its share of drug and alcohol abusers. The Air Force's programs and policies for substance abuse control are described in AFI 44-121, Alcohol/Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment Program. The Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) office is no longer responsible for the substance abuse control program. This program is now administered by the Life Skills clinic at the base hospital.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Know the Air Force Substance Abuse Control Program.

Samples of Behavior:
1. State the steps a supervisor should take when a subordinate's duty performance reveals a possible substance abuse problem.
2. Identify referral agencies available for suspected substance abusers.
3. State the five means for identifying substance abusers.
4. Describe the four methods of urinalysis testing.
5. Describe the treatment services available under the ADAPT program.
6. List the administrative issues associated with the ADAPT program.

Information

Substance Abuse Control Program

Substance abuse control policies and programs are thoroughly integrated into every facet of Air Force quality force management. The policies have been in place for over two decades and have evolved to meet changing conditions within the Air Force. The policy is clear: substance abuse is absolutely incompatible with Air Force standards. Our members are held to high standards of discipline and accountability. Those who require treatment will receive it, but all will face the consequences of their actions. The goal is maximum substance abuse deterrence and firm, swift action if abuse occurs.

Policy on Drug Abuse

The Air Force expects everyone to maintain standards of behavior, performance, and discipline consistent with the UCMJ, public law, and Air Force publications. Illegal or improper use of drugs by an Air Force member is a serious breach of discipline, is

incompatible with serving in the Air Force, and automatically places the member's continued service in jeopardy. Because the Air Force does not tolerate such conduct, drug abuse can lead to criminal prosecution and discharge under other than honorable conditions. Illegal or improper use of drugs can also seriously damage physical health, impair judgment, cause psychological injury, and jeopardize the user's safety and the safety of others. It is Air Force policy to prevent drug abuse among its personnel. Failing this, the Air Force is responsible for identifying and treating drug abusers and disciplining or discharging those who use or promote illegal or improper use of drugs.

Using, Possessing, Manufacturing, Distributing, and Introducing Drugs. Air Force military members must not use, possess, manufacture, distribute, or introduce into a military unit, base, station, post, ship, or aircraft any illicit drugs (including nonnarcotic drugs). Violations of these prohibitions are chargeable under the UCMJ. These prohibitions do not apply:

1. to any act performed within the proper scope of official duties,

2. to using, possessing, or introducing legally prescribed drugs on an Air Force installation,

3. when a drug or substance within the United States is obtained by an over-the-counter, nonprescription purchase from a retail establishment maintained according to local laws, or

4. when legal purchases are made from an exchange, ship's store, or other merchandising facility operated by the federal government or any of its agencies.

Steroid Abuse

Air Force policy on the use of steroids is clear: "The illegal use of anabolic/androgenic steroids by otherwise healthy active duty personnel is prohibited." Therefore, Air Force members involved in the illegal use of steroids will be subject to separation. Steroids are derived from male hormones. The primary medical use of anabolic steroids is to help build body tissues and prevent the breakdown of tissue that occurs in debilitating diseases. The dangers of misuse are increased when the steroids are taken without the supervision of a physician. There are only a few approved anabolic steroids on the market, and the Food and Drug Administration has been narrowing the approved uses of anabolic steroids. Abusers of these potent prescription drugs risk congestive heart failure, strokes, lung cancer, and cardiovascular system impairment which is considered to be the most hazardous of all side effects reported.

Policy on Alcohol Abuse

The Air Force recognizes alcoholism as a progressive, preventable, and treatable noncompensable disease that affects the entire family. It's Air Force policy to prevent alcohol abuse and alcoholism among its people and their family members. Air Force members must always maintain Air Force standards of behavior, performance, and discipline. Failure to meet these standards must be based on demonstrated unacceptable performance and conduct, rather than solely on the use of alcohol.

Commanders must respond to unacceptable behavior or performance with appropriate corrective actions. If individuals cannot or will not maintain Air Force standards, then the Air Force will ensure humane management and administrative disposition of these people.

Drinking Habits

It's each person's responsibility to exercise judgment in the use of alcohol when not otherwise restricted by public law or military directive. The Air Force only investigates drinking habits that affect public behavior, duty performance, or physical and mental health.

Driving While Intoxicated

Intoxicated driving is incompatible with the maintenance of high standards of performance, discipline, safety, public image, personnel reliability, and readiness of military units and supporting activities. It's Air Force policy to significantly reduce the incidence of intoxicated driving and driving under the influence of alcohol within the Air Force through a coordinated program of education, identification, law enforcement, and treatment.

Officer's Role

Your role when handling substance abuse issues is entirely consistent with your other responsibilities as an officer and represents an affirmative step in your efforts to show genuine, personal concern for the welfare of the individual. As an officer, you're not tasked to be a diagnostician, yet you are charged to document and confront unacceptable performance or behavior, whatever the cause. On this basis, you need to take immediate and appropriate corrective actions.

Supervisor Responsibilities

As a supervisor there are steps you should take when a subordinate's duty performance reveals a possible substance abuse problem.

Documentation of Unacceptable Behavior. If a member has been identified as demonstrating any of the unacceptable behaviors mentioned on pp. 4D-6 and 4D-7, the next and most important step is documentation. Just as you must know your people, you should also maintain written records of meetings and actions related to them. A periodic review of this documentation will not only ensure the effective management of resources, it will also uncover any trends. Documentation should be specific and describe the type of behavior, how it violates standards, and how it differs from the individual's "normal behavior." Your records of performance discrepancies, unacceptable behaviors, interviews or counseling, and actions taken will serve as the basic elements of your confrontation with the problem member. Your documentation will also serve as a summary for higher supervision, problem consultants (MEO, medical, chaplain, etc.), or the commander.

Confrontation of Unacceptable Behavior. The next step is confrontation. Confrontation is the active process of face-to-face disclosures to the worker of the documented behavior discrepancies. This part of the recognition process is often the most difficult. Two questions might immediately come to mind--when and how do I confront someone, especially if that someone is a coworker and friend?

The confrontation should take place when changes occur that begin to impair the duty performance. Stick to the facts as they relate to work performance and seek to avoid emotional involvement. Maintain your objectivity. However unpleasant confrontation may be, it's important to confront as soon as you determine the presence of a negative trend. Here are some suggested steps:

Step 1. Actions

- You may know the cause of performance or behavioral changes and can take action to help correct it.

- The problem may be such that you wish to discuss it with your supervisor before seeing the worker. You may also wish to discuss the problem and your observations with a problem consultant, such as MEO or the Life Skills clinic.

Step 2. First Meeting

- Approach the worker on a friendly, questioning basis about unacceptable trends in performance or behavior.

- Show the worker your documented observations.

- Express your concern for problems that may exist and your willingness to help.

- Request an explanation of the trends.

- Advise the worker the situation must be corrected or action will be taken.

- Schedule another counseling session at a later date (for example, in 30 days) when the situation will again be reviewed for improvement or further actions.

Note: Anytime the person admits a substance abuse problem, make an appointment with the substance abuse office (Life Skills clinic) and reinforce the positive policy of the Air Force and unit. Help must be offered to every individual.

Step 3. Between Meetings

- Monitor and record the individual's progress.

- Keep your immediate supervisor advised of case status.

- If improvement is not noted or the situation deteriorates, consult with specialists and plan the proper approach for a second meeting.

Step 4. Second Meeting

- If the situation improves and seems to be returning to normal, reaffirm your faith in the worker, and remind him or her that you're always there to help when

needed. If the situation hasn't improved, confront the worker again and state that you haven't observed satisfactory improvement. Give the worker another chance to explain the lack of progress.

Things to keep in mind throughout the interview:

1. Stick to the facts.

2. Have all the documents available; don't rely on memory.

3. Explain any adverse actions (Article 15, separation, etc.) which may occur if the member fails to improve.

4. Be supportive, honest, consistent, and above all, firm.

5. When in doubt, refer.

Arrange any referral appointments (date, time, and contact name) and notify the worker. Ensure he or she keeps the appointment, and provide the referral agency with background case data as applicable.

The Referral. Referral is the process of directing the worker to the resource agency that is best suited to handle that individual's problem. Refer the individual when performance fails to improve, when your efforts fail, when an individual requests assistance, and before disciplinary action. The referral of a problem worker to a helping agency should be viewed not as a sign of failure, but as a positive decision based on mature judgment.

When personal problems are present which can't be resolved by the unit, make a referral to the appropriate agency; (for example, MEO, chapel, legal office, or medical clinic). There are many advantages to making timely referrals:

1. Counseling by people with special qualifications in problem areas is often successful.

2. The chaplain's privilege of confidentiality frequently provides a stimulus for uncovering trouble.

3. People often loosen up when away from the work center.

All referrals should include a history of suspected problems, your efforts to date, and actions you plan to take if the worker does not resolve his or her difficulties. Referrals to local base and community resource agencies are available and cover a wide range of services.

REFERRAL AGENCIES	PROBLEM
Chaplain Services Branch	Some areas they provide counseling in are religious, marital, academic, and personal problems.
Medical Services	The base hospital provides counseling in areas such as physical and mental health. They also offer assistance in the prevention and treatment of drug and alcohol abuse.
Air Force Aid Society	Can provide financial assistance for a wide range of emergencies and other needs.
Legal Office	This office can provide assistance by giving advice on legal matters.
MEO Office	This office offers assistance in resolving discrimination and harassment complaints.
American Red Cross (ARC) Office	Some of the services they provide include personal and family counseling, emergency financial assistance and assistance with communications between service members and their families.
Family Support Center	Some of the services provided by this agency include personal and family counseling crisis intervention, and financial counseling.

Identifying Substance Abusers

For the Air Force to have an effective substance abuse control program, we must have a means of identifying substance abusers. Although commanders play the major role in identifying drug users, you should be aware of how commanders must proceed in various circumstances. Due to the nature of the position you hold within your unit, you may also play an important part in the identification process. There are basically five identification methods:

(1) **Arrest, Apprehension, or Investigation**. An individual involved in intoxicated driving, under the influence, public intoxication, or an incident in which drug use or alcohol abuse is a contributing factor must be referred to Life Skills for evaluation.

(2) **Incident to Medical Care**. Medical personnel must notify the commander if a member receives treatment and are suspected, identified or observed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs or if a member is admitted as a patient for alcohol or drug detoxification. A patient under treatment for reason other than substance abuse may be found to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or the injury under treatment may be a result of substance abuse. Under these circumstances, medical personnel must notify the unit commander and the Life Skills Clinic so the patient can be evaluated.

(3) **Commander Referral**. A unit commander shall refer all service members for assessment when substance use is suspected to be a contributing factor in any incident, e.g., DUI, public intoxication, drunk and disorderly, spouse/child abuse and maltreatment, under-aged drinking, positive drug test, or when notified by medical

personnel. A referral may be completed by the commander or first sergeant simply by contacting the Life Skills Clinic and setting an appointment date and time. When there's no prior legal or medical basis, unit commanders can identify people for evaluation and treatment if necessary. As a supervisor, you should consider the behavioral signs of substance abuse we discussed earlier (deteriorating duty performance, frequent errors in judgment, excessive tardiness, or absenteeism, etc.). If you think a problem exists, see your immediate supervisor, or commander to begin necessary action.

(4) **Drug Testing**. The Air Force uses urine testing of personnel for detection of drug abuse according to AFI 44-120, Drug Abuse Testing Program. Urinalysis is most effective as a deterrent if it has the potential to reach each Air Force military member; thus, all military personnel are subject to testing. The method which best achieves this deterrent goal is inspection testing. Commanders must have the flexibility to select the most appropriate testing procedure, but inspection testing should be the primary method, with probable cause and a command-directed examination as supplements. Military members who fail to comply with an order to provide a urine sample are subject to punitive action under the UCMJ. Commanders must refer individuals identified positive as a result of urine testing for drug abuse to Life Skills personnel. Military members may receive an order or voluntarily consent to provide urine samples at any time. Methods to obtain urinalysis samples may include the following:

♦ Inspection Under Military Rule of Evidence, UCMJ. Commanders may conduct inspections in the form of unit sweeps or randomly on segments of a squadron, unit, duty section, or dormitory. Commanders must avoid singling out specific individuals or small groups, as these cases most often fall under command-directed testing provisions. Commanders should consult with their staff judge advocate (SJA), Life Skills, and the medical urine test program monitor before conducting inspection testing. Commanders may use the positive result of a urine sample to refer a member to Life Skills, as evidence to support disciplinary action under the UCMJ or administrative discharge action, and as a consideration on the issue of characterization of discharge in separation proceedings.

♦ Probable Cause Search and Seizure Under the UCMJ. Commanders can order a urine test when there's probable cause to believe that the military member has ingested drugs, is drug intoxicated, or has committed a drug-related offense. Commanders should consult with their SJA, as well as follow appropriate procedures, to establish probable cause. They may use the results to refer a member to Life Skills, to support and use as evidence in disciplinary action under the UCMJ or administrative discharge action, and as a consideration on the issue of characterization of discharge in separation proceedings.

♦ Command-Directed Examination. Commanders can refer a military member for urine testing when there's a reasonable suspicion of drug abuse. They can also order a test when it's conducted as an examination of a specified member in conjunction with the member's participation in a DoD drug treatment program. A command-directed examination may be conducted to determine a member's competency for duty and the need for counseling or other medical treatment.

Commanders usually direct urine testing in all circumstances of abnormal, bizarre, or unlawful behavior in which probable cause doesn't exist but there's a reasonable suspicion of drug abuse. Such circumstances may include unauthorized absences, violations of safety requirements, disobedience of direct orders, apprehension or investigation for drug offenses or intoxicated driving, involvement in violent crimes, or other incidents involving repeated or serious breaches of discipline. Commanders should refer individuals for a urine test as soon as possible after a behavioral incident. In addition, apathy, a defective attitude, or a personality change may, when examined in conjunction with other circumstances, lead to a reasonable suspicion of drug abuse and form the basis for command-directed urine testing.

Commanders may use results obtained from command-directed testing to refer a member for evaluation by Life Skills and in an administrative discharge action. Commanders may not use results against a member in any disciplinary action under the UCMJ or on the issue of characterization of discharge in separation proceedings.

♦ Medical Purposes. Results of any examination conducted for a valid medical purpose including emergency medical treatment, periodic physical examination, and other such examinations necessary for diagnostic or treatment purposes may be used to identify drug abusers. Results may be used to refer a member to Life Skills, as evidence to support disciplinary action under the UCMJ, or administrative discharge action; these results may also be considered on the issue of characterization of discharge in separation proceedings.

(5) **Self-identification**. The Air Force encourages personnel with substance abuse problems to seek assistance. Members may self-identify to the unit commander, first sergeant, substance abuse counselor or medical authority. In regards to alcohol, commanders must provide sufficient incentive to encourage members to seek help without fear of negative consequences. Self-identification is reserved for members who are not currently under investigation or pending action as a result of an incident. Regarding drugs, commanders grant limited protection to members who reveal this information with the intention of seeking treatment. Information disclosed voluntarily may not be used in UCMJ action or in weighing characterization of discharge. This limited protection is not applicable to members who have been apprehended for substance abuse involvement, are under investigation by Security Forces (SFS) or the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), or has been ordered to provide a urine sample. This protection also does not apply to those who are currently in a treatment program or have been advised of administrative discharge for substance abuse.

Note: In addition to the previously indicated methods, you, as an officer, should help ensure the identification of substance abusers by encouraging people known to have an existing or potential drug or alcohol problem to seek assistance. When abuse exists, you must notify your supervisor or commander at once so he or she can take proper action. Report all incidents of drug abuse to your immediate supervisor and unit commander, servicing security police agency, and the local office of the AFOSI.

Alcohol/Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (Adapt) Program

AFI 44-121, dated 22 Jan 99, completed the transfer of the ADAPT Program from the MEO Office to the Objective Medical Group. This instruction changes the focus of the program from substance abuse control, to substance abuse prevention. This is significant due to the redefined role of the commander's input into the treatment process.

The Air Force policy on substance abuse has not changed. It is the responsibility of all Air Force members to exercise good judgment in the use of alcohol. Personal drinking habits will not be investigated as long as performance, public behavior, physical health, or mental health are not affected. Drug use, on the other hand is illegal. You can still loose your career. With that said let's take a look at the changes the program has undergone. Most times people end up in the Life Skills office by violating some aspect of the policies we've just discussed.

Treatment Team Meeting (TTM) Composition – Minimum Requirements:

The purpose of the TTM is to determine the proper course of action for the member. This team will consist of the Commander, First Sergeant, Supervisor, Substance Abuse Counselor, Medical Consultant as needed, ADAPT Program Manager, Flight Surgeon (if the patient is on flying status), and the member. There are several factors that determine what level of treatment is necessary to help the patient. These will most often be discussed at length at the TTM. Treatment services available include the following:

1. Non-Clinical Services. Members who do not meet the diagnostic criteria for alcohol/drug abuse or dependence will be provided a minimum of six hours of education. Additional counseling to address issues identified in the biopsychosocial assessment may also be considered. The length of involvement in treatment will be determined by the members presenting problems and agreed upon.

2. Clinical Services. Members meeting the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) IV criteria for alcohol/drug abuse or dependence will be entered into treatment with the level and intensity determined by American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM) criteria. Variable lengths of stay/duration shall be provided within a variety of treatment settings tailored to meet the needs of the individual member. This may include inpatient care or intensive outpatient treatment. Detoxification may be necessary prior to treatment.

3. Program Requirements and Encouragement. Family involvement is highly encouraged. Abstinence is **required** during the treatment phase, and **encouraged** during the aftercare phase. Self-help group attendance is encouraged. PCS/TDY's are restricted for the first 6 months of aftercare and based upon the member's progress.

4. Transitional Counseling. Helps members make the transition to civilian life. Members may refuse assistance by signing a written statement.

5. Completing the Program. The member may complete the program once they meet DSM IV requirements for early remission. The TTM determines completion based on progress towards agreed upon goals stated in the treatment plan.

6. Failing the Program. Self identification members are held to the same standards as other members entering the program. If the member violates the program regimen, they will be considered a program failure. Members fail by not maintaining Air Force standards. Drinking, by itself, is not grounds for failure. Members who refuse to take part in or fail to satisfactorily complete the ADAPT program should be separated.

Administrative Issues Associated with the Adapt Program

1. Leave Authorization. Ordinary leave is not usually granted during the evaluation process or the treatment phase of the ADAPT program.

2. Line of Duty Determination. The purpose of a line-of-duty determination is to decide how much pay will be forfeited, if any, during absence from duty due to injury or disease resulting from substance abuse while a member is on active duty. A line of duty determination may also determine eligibility for physical, disability or retirement pay. The Air Force may require an individual to make good any lost time before separation. A line of duty determination must be made in cases of injury or death as a result of substance abuse while the member is on active duty.

3. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Decertification. Members who are diagnosed as alcohol abusers may be reconsidered for PRP duties 1 year after successful completion of the aftercare program. For those diagnosed as alcohol dependent, the decertification is permanent.

4. Promotion Eligibility. Promotions are solely the decision of the promotion authority.

5. Reassignment Eligibility. Members with an abuse/dependence diagnosis will be placed in a medical profile preventing PCS for 6 months.

6. Reenlistment Eligibility. Enlisted members whose terms of service expire during treatment and who are otherwise eligible to reenlist may extend their enlistment for the number of months required to complete treatment successfully. Individuals who self-identified to the Program, however, may not be denied reenlistment solely on that basis.

First-term airmen who successfully complete treatment and are selected for reenlistment by their unit commanders under the Selective Reenlistment Program and are otherwise eligible for promotion may acquire retainability to process and receive a response to an initial career job reservation application.

7. Security Clearance. A history of alcoholism in itself doesn't permanently disqualify a member from a security clearance, access to classified information, or unescorted entry into restricted areas. Members diagnosed as alcoholics aren't generally granted access

to classified information or unescorted entry into restricted areas while in treatment. Unit commanders must obtain a recommendation from other intervention committee members regarding security clearance or access authorization after the individual completes treatment. The committee uses such recommendations, with the member's demonstrated duty performance, to determine whether a security clearance or access authorization should be granted, denied, or revoked. AFI 31-501, USAF Personnel Security Program Management, provides guidance on people involved in substance abuse.

8. Temporary Duty (TDY). TTM decision based upon progress and current status.

9. Unfavorable Information File (UIF). UIF and control roster action should be based on a members unacceptable behavior and not solely on entry in the ADAPT Program.

10. Separation. Drug and Alcohol abuse affects military and social performance and individuals can be separated for inability to meet military performance standards.

(a) **Alcohol**. Commanders must base recommendations for separation on documentation that reflects failure to meet Air Force standards, not on the use of alcohol. (Failure to complete the ADAPT Program can't be based solely upon failure to maintain abstinence if abstinence has been established as a regiment goal or requirement.) Depending on the behavior in each case, the specific reason should be cited (unsuitability, misconduct, or substandard performance, etc.). Nothing prevents a commander from taking separation action for misconduct when required.

If a worker with an alcohol problem refuses to take part in the ADAPT Program or fails to complete treatment successfully, discharge is appropriate. Initial verbal refusals to cooperate in treatment or a hostile attitude on the part of an individual isn't unusual. You and Life Skills personnel must determine whether refusal to take part in treatment reflected a behavioral pattern or was an isolated instance.

(b) **Drugs**. Drug abuse isn't compatible with Air Force standards. The Air Force won't tolerate drug abuse among its members; therefore, it automatically jeopardizes their potential for continued service. Failure to meet standards of conduct and impaired duty performance are grounds for discharge. When immediate discharge is necessary, the ADAPT Program must not delay it. However, the commander must ensure the member either shows no sign of being drug dependent or denies drug dependency before discharge. If a member is drug dependent, the commander may postpone the execution of discharge to accommodate the requirement for detoxification and initial medical treatment.

Failure to complete the ADAPT Program successfully due to inability, refusal to participate, or unwillingness to cooperate as determined by the commander is also a basis for discharge. Individuals who previously participated in the ADAPT Program and are again substantiated as drug abusers should be processed for discharge.

Commanders, board members, and discharge authorities involved in drug abuse discharge actions must be familiar with the Air Force policy on drug abuse. Policies include limitations on identification methods, detoxification requirements, and referral

to the Veterans' Affairs if eligible. These considerations may affect the characterization of service that the discharge authorities recommend or approve.

11. Personal Considerations for the Member. Remember often members are embarrassed admitting to substance abuse problems. Be sensitive and respect the privacy of the member when dealing with family and co-workers.

Checklist of Physical and Psychological Symptoms

Identification of a pattern to any of the following warning signs should trigger increased monitoring of job performance by managers and supervisors:

--- Moodiness
--- Depression
--- Detached Attitude
--- Nervousness
--- Euphoria-increase energy
--- Inconsistent actions
--- Talkative
--- Large mood swings
--- Sleepiness
--- Unsteady gait
--- Tremors
--- Constant runny nose
--- Slurred speech
--- Trouble sitting still
--- Personal grooming deterioration
--- Frequent illness
--- Increased physical injuries
--- Bruises
--- Impaired short term memory
--- Impaired logical thinking
--- Poor muscle control
--- Bloodshot eyes
--- Dull eyes
--- Dilated pupils

Checklist of Work-Related Performance Indicators

Repeated or continuous patterns of performance deterioration (documentable job issues), in a number of the following areas probably indicates that intervention is needed. NOTE: Frequency and duration are two factors that should also be considered before assuming these behaviors are substance abuse related. As mentioned earlier, avoid attempting to diagnose--that is best left to the people who are trained to do so.

1. Absenteeism
   --- Unauthorized leave
   --- Monday absence/Friday absence
   --- Repeated absence of 2-3 days
   --- Repeated absence of 1-2 weeks
   --- Excessive tardiness
   --- Leaving work early
   --- Peculiar or increasingly improbable excuses for absences
   --- Higher rates of absenteeism than other employees for colds, flu, gastritis, etc.
   --- Frequent, unscheduled short-term absences

2. On-the-Job Absenteeism
   --- Away from job more than job requires
   --- Frequent trips to water fountain, bathroom, or for coffee
   --- Long coffee breaks
   --- Physical illness on the job

3. High Accident Rate
   --- Accidents on the job
   --- Frequent trips to medical facilities
   --- Accidents off the job, but affecting work performance
   --- Accidents to equipment

4. Lowered Job Efficiency
   --- Misses deadlines
   --- Makes mistakes or bad decisions due to inattention or impaired judgment
   --- Wastes materials
   -- Lowered output
   --- Overly dependent on others
   --- Carelessness
   --- Improbable excuses for poor job performance

5. Difficulties in Concentration/Confusion
   --- Work requires great effort
   --- Job takes more time
   --- Hand tremors when concentrating
   --- Frequent day dreaming
   --- Details often neglected
   --- Undependable
   --- Difficulty in recalling instructions clearly
   --- Increasing difficulty in handling complex assignments
   --- Difficulty in recalling own mistakes
   --- Forgetful
   --- Reduced awareness of what's going on
   --- Unable to keep current

6. Communication
   --- Less communicative than in the past
   --- Unclear or imprecise communication
   --- Argumentative with co-workers and supervisors

7. Sporadic Work Patterns
   --- Alternating periods of very high & very low productivity
   --- Work produced differs in quality from time-to-time

8. Initiative
   --- Unwillingness to change work responsibilities
   --- Unwillingness to change ways of doing job
   --- Needs constant supervision or extra help

9. Interpersonal Skills
   --- Overreacts to real or imagined criticism
   --- Wide swings in morale
   --- Borrows money from co-workers
   --- Avoids old friends or colleagues
   --- Constant complaints to associates and supervisors
   --- Avoids supervisor, especially after lunch and breaks
   --- Avoids making eye-contact with others
   --- Overly critical of others
   --- Makes unreliable or untrue statements

10. Abnormal Behavior
   --- Coming to or returning to work in an obviously abnormal condition
   --- Obviously bizarre or abnormal actions on the job

Conclusion

Through your awareness and concerted actions, you can recognize substance abuse problems and greatly reduce the scope of their impact. The Air Force substance abuse program is one of prevention and control, only achieved through commitment and action on the part of all Air Force personnel.

Bibliography:

1. AFP 36-2241, Vol 1, Promotion Fitness Examination, Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 1 Jul 99. (PA CAMs' office)
2. AFI 44-121, Alcohol/Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment Program, Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 22 Jan 99.

Security Education

Introduction

Each military member is required to receive security education training upon entry into the service. This lesson fulfills that requirement. It offers information about our operations security program (OPSEC), to include communications security (COMSEC), emission security (EMSEC), computer security (COMPUSEC), and protection of the President.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Know the importance of Air Force security.

Samples of Behavior:
1. Define OPSEC, COMSEC, EMSEC, and COMPUSEC.
2. State the types of security classifications under classified and unclassified information.
3. Identify your responsibilities under COMPUSEC.
4. State your responsibility regarding protection of the President.

Information

Operations Security (OPSEC)

Operations Security (OPSEC) is the process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions. This process is accomplished by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities. OPSEC applies at all levels of command. Individuals are responsible for complying with established security practices for protecting classified and unclassified information, which they've been exposed to.

Classified information is official information, which, in the interest of our national security, requires protection against unauthorized disclosure. Only those individuals, who possess the proper security clearance, have a need to know, and present proper identification can be granted access to classified information. Proper security clearance means the individual must have a clearance equal to the classification level of the information.

A person who doesn't meet these requirements can't have access to classified information. A security incident occurs if someone who doesn't meet all these requirements accidentally sees, or has access to classified information.

There are four types of security incidents: compromise, probable compromise, inadvertent access, and security deviation.

a. **COMPROMISE** - Compromise is defined as the known or suspected exposure of classified information or material to an unauthorized person. The compromise of classified information presents a threat to our national security. The seriousness of that threat must be determined, and appropriate measures must be taken to minimize the adverse effects of such a compromise. Action must be taken to regain custody of the material and to identify and correct the cause of the compromise.

b. **PROBABLE COMPROMISE** - An incident in which a reasonable presumption exists that an unauthorized person had or has access to classified information.

c. **INADVERTENT ACCESS** - An incident in which a person had or has access to classified information to which the individual was or isn't authorized, but was or is the subject of a favorable personnel security investigation permitting the granting of an interim or final security clearance to the level category of classified information involved.

d. **SECURITY DEVIATION** - An incident that involves the misuse or improper handling of classified material, but doesn't fall into the previous three categories.

The most critical part of the security system is the act of determining and assigning a security classification. The key in this determination is whether the national defense risks are grave enough to classify and withhold the information from unauthorized persons. There are three security classifications for classified information. They are:

a. **Top Secret.** National security information or material that requires the highest degree of protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause **exceptionally grave damage** to national security.

b. **Secret.** National security information or material that requires a substantial degree of protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause **serious damage** to national security.

c. **Confidential.** National security information or material that requires protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause **damage** to national security.

For example, if we reveal information about our emergency defense plans to someone who doesn't need to know, it could harm our nation's defense.

Unclassified information is also official information, but it doesn't need the same safeguards as classified information. However, it may have certain restrictions against its release to unauthorized persons.

Some unclassified information is controlled by marking it "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."

a. **FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).** This is information that hasn't been given a security classification, but which should be publicly withheld for one or more reasons. For example, although not required to be marked FOUO, your personnel records are considered to be FOUO.

b. **National Security-Related Information.** Some unclassified information concerning national defense or US foreign relations is of possible intelligence value. When added to other unclassified information, it gives an insight into classified plans, programs, operations, or activities and becomes of intelligence value. For example, the number of fighter aircraft on the flightline is unclassified, but that information could be of value to the enemy.

Historically, OPSEC emerged during the Vietnam conflict. In Southeast Asia, the enemy had advanced knowledge of our operations which greatly reduced our effectiveness against them. To correct this problem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a Secretarial Memorandum initiating an operations security program armed-forces wide. The Pacific Air Force's program was code-named "Purple Dragon." The Purple Dragon program denied the enemy vital information and had an immediate impact on the effectiveness of our combat operations.

Indeed, our adversaries are able to obtain a significant amount of intelligence through human sources. They befriend us, seeking information about our military forces as well as about scientific or technological advances. If any foreign nationals or others seek information or material from you, even if it may seem insignificant, report it immediately to your supervisor, security manager, commander, or OSI.

We have the privilege of living in a great nation. To preserve the privileges and freedoms we enjoy, we must be constantly aware of the forces around us who would like to deprive us of our freedoms to further their own political and individual goals. To keep abreast of current programs and threats, the DoD has directed commanders to implement active OPSEC education programs. You must realize it's not only the military member or the DoD civilian who's targeted for information, but it can also be the family, too. Remember, the bad guy doesn't run around in the black trench coat with the upturned collar!

c. **Critical Information.** Information about friendly (US, allied or coalition) activities, intentions, capabilities or limitations that an adversary needs in order to gain a military, political, diplomatic or technological advantage are known as critical information. These are things that are so familiar to the average military member that they don't think of them as being important. Some examples of critical information include but are not limited to exercise schedules, VIP visits, flight plans or increased working hours.

Communications Security (COMSEC)

COMSEC is the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value, which might be derived from analysis of telecommunications. It can be achieved only through effective defensive and preventive measures against thefts, espionage, observation, interception, traffic analysis, cryptoanalysis, deception, and other methods, which intelligence services employ.

The principle of COMSEC, defining the information which should be revealed, is simply this, "IF IT'S CLASSIFIED, OR DEALS WITH A CLASSIFIED PROJECT OR MISSION, OR CONTAINS INFORMATION ABOUT OUR CAPABILITIES, STRATEGY, PLANS, OR LIMITATIONS, GIVE IT ONLY TO THOSE WHO HAVE A DEFINITE NEED-TO-KNOW AND WHO HAVE THE PROPER SECURITY CLEARANCE BY A SECURE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA."

Emission Security (EMSEC)

The Air Force Emission Security Program defines Emission Security (EMSEC) as the protection resulting from all measures taken to deny unauthorized access to information of value, which may be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations. These emanations are usually electromagnetic or acoustic in nature. The term “TEMPEST” is used as a synonym for “compromising emanations.”

How do compromising emanations reach the enemy? They may travel through the air as radio waves (radiated signals) or through wires, pipes or other electrical conductors leaving an equipment area (conducted signals). The more power used in a device, the stronger its emanations, and the further they can travel long distances over wires. Telephones are particularly great emission security hazards since conducted signals near the telephone can be sent out as a signal on the line, and travel almost anywhere in the world. Proper grounding and distance from equipment that processes classified information are the most common means of preventing compromising emanations.

Remember, any knowledge about specific emission security hazards may alert enemy agents to possible sources of classified information. Don't tell anyone about a specific Emission Security hazard unless that person has a need-to-know and is cleared for the information.

Computer Security (COMPUSEC)

The broad, multi-disciplined area known as computer security encompasses all computers, from single-chip systems to large mainframes. It covers all applications including embedded computers, automated information systems, word processors, memory typewriters, and even memory calculators that have other than mathematical functions. It also includes hardware, software, operating systems, applications software, and firmware. The primary objective of the COMPUSEC program is to

protect the privacy, availability, and integrity of systems and the information they process. The hardware, software, and information are protected according to the degree of data, sensitivity, criticality to mission, threats and vulnerabilities of the system, and an economic assessment of protective measures. Threats can be either human (intentional or unintentional), structural (facility or system), or natural. Several security disciplines, including physical, information, personnel, EMSEC, communications, and operations security, are integral parts of COMPUSEC. Take proper care when using computers as most violations occur through user carelessness.

Here are some additional requirements and conditions you should consider as part of your COMPUSEC responsibility:

a. Use your computer resources for official business only. The commander may grant use of these resources for educational purposes if such use benefits the Air Force (i.e., professional military education).

b. Protect your USERID/password.

c. Protect operating and application system software in accordance with copyright laws. Obtain software only through Air Force channels, never from non-Air Force bulletin boards, public domain software, or shareware.

d. Protect the computer environment by keeping it clean, and don't permit smoking, eating, or drinking in the computer area.

Misuse of system resources violates public trust placed on military and civilian government employees. It may also cause additional costs by denying the resources to authorized users. Military members may be prosecuted for these types of misuse violations under the UCMJ, Article 92, Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation.

Protection of the President

In the relatively short history of the United States, we've lost presidents Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley, and Kennedy to assassins. We've also had assassination attempts on seven former presidents.

You and I could prevent another President from losing his/her life; others like us may have already done so. You've all read newspaper accounts of persons being arrested by the United States Secret Service for making threats on the life of the president. These arrests were made based on information from someone who heard an individual make such remarks as "I'm going to kill that so-and-so," or "He's responsible for our troubles and I'm going to fix his wagon."

AFI 71-101V2, Protection of the President, states you must report such threats to your commander, the Security Forces, or the AFOSI. Under AFI 71-101V2, "President" refers to those present and past, government heads of state, and others.

Bibliography:

1. AFI 75-105, Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program. Washington DC: Department of Air Force, 1 Apr 87. (Base Pubs Library)
2. AFI 31-401, Information Security Program Management, Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 1 Jan 99.
3. AFI 31-501, Personnel Security Program Management, Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 2 May 94.
4. AFI 10-1101, Operations Security, Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 1 May 97.

Air Force Complaint and Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (FWA) Programs

Introduction

The words "Complaint" and "Fraud, Waste, and Abuse" are sure to stir the strongest of negative feelings. This lesson is not designed to focus on the negative but to accentuate the positive. The positive is that you have an avenue to address what you consider to be "wrongs" against an individual or organization. But remember, there are ways to resolve your problems BEFORE filing complaints with the Inspector General or with Congress. Use your chain of command to resolve your problems. If you still feel your complaint is not resolved, then you have the right to file a formal complaint. Filing complaints aren't the only way you can change what you feel is not "right." Your flight training officer will also cover other ways to effect change. Although not all inclusive, one such way is by utilizing the Air Force Suggestion programs. This program allows you to have a direct voice in changing something for the better. By the end of this lesson, you should no longer equate the Air Force Complaint and Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Program with something bad. Rather, you should view them as "positives"--programs designed to give you a voice to correct wrongdoings. Remember, your immediate chain of command is the best place to begin.

Study Assignment

Read information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Know the Air Force Complaint Programs.

Samples of Behavior:
1. State the purpose of Air Force Complaint Programs.
2. State the importance of initially using the chain of command to resolve complaints.
3. Identify the goal of the Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (FWA) Program.
4. State an individual's responsibility concerning the FWA Program.
5. State other avenues available in the Air Force to effect change.

Information

The Inspector General Program

The Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978 directed that all services establish a function that would act as oversight for its programs and members. At every Air Force base, there is a senior member designated as an IG. The IG is usually the vice commander of the installation. IGs have numerous responsibilities that include

overseeing and inspecting mission capability, operational readiness, and unit effectiveness. IGs are also responsible for managing the complaint program.

Complaint Programs Policy

The Air Force Complaint programs are leadership tools that indicate where command involvement needs to correct systemic, programmatic, or procedural weaknesses. These programs ensure prompt and fair resolution to problems affecting the Air Force mission. They also measure the confidence our people have in Air Force leadership.

These programs provide feedback that is critical to the success of each individual in the supervisory chain. These programs help ensure:

- Air Force personnel are using resources effectively and efficiently in support of the mission.
- Issues are objectively and fairly resolved in an atmosphere of trust without retaliation or the fear of reprisal.
- Management reveals and corrects any false perceptions that Air Force members may hold about goals, plans, and projects.

Personal complaints and FWA disclosures help commanders to discover and correct problems affecting the productivity and satisfaction of assigned personnel. Resolving the underlying cause of a complaint may prevent more severe symptoms or costly effects, such as reduced performance, accidents, poor-quality work, poor morale, or loss of resources. Substantiated allegations may indicate isolated weaknesses or systemic problems that affect resources. Unsubstantiated allegations may indicate that commanders need to inform personnel about programs, projects, procedures, or policies.

AFI 90-301, Inspector General Complaints, formalizes the Air Force's commitment to prevent and eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse and outlines the complaint process. Air Force members have a duty to report mismanagement, FWA, a violation of any Air Force directive, an injustice, deficiency or like condition to a superior or commander in their chain of command, to an inspector or IG, or within any established grievance channel.

Presenting Complaints to Appropriate Officials

An Air Force member should present complaints to the appropriate officials responsible for the area of complaint. Don't use the IG complaint program for matters normally appealed through other channels unless there is evidence that those channels mishandled a complaint (for example, an individual is denied specific rights or there was a breach of established policy or procedure.)

An Air Force member may file an IG complaint at any level without notifying or following the chain of command. But remember, following the chain of command is the best avenue in trying to resolve complaints. Complainants normally do not travel at government expense to present a complaint.

Complainant Protections

The Air Force has a well-established complaint program. You can get help quickly and fairly when you need someone to answer a question. You can make your complaint at any level in the IG system. No one may act against you just because you complained. You have the right to file a protected disclosure without fear of reprisal. If you think someone has acted against you just because you complained, tell an inspector or an IG. IGs will advise you of the option to file a reprisal complaint with the DoD Inspector General according to established procedures.

You may go to an inspector or IG at any level, but experience has shown **commanders and supervisors are the people best equipped to resolve complaints.** Therefore, you are encouraged but not required to discuss your problem with your supervisor or your commander before coming to the IG.

IGs conduct inquiries and investigations at a command level that prevents self-investigation or the perception of the same. When there is any doubt that an impartial inquiry or investigation can be conducted, IGs refer the matter to the next level in the chain of command. The inquiry officer must be impartial, unbiased, and totally objective.

Complaints not Handled in Inspector General (IG) Channels

Matters covered under other directives are generally not handled through the IG channels.

If a policy directive provides specific appeal channels, you must exhaust those appeal procedures. You must be able to allege that there was a procedural problem with the process before using IG channels. Mere dissatisfaction with the outcome of an appeal is not sufficient basis for an IG review, inquiry, or investigation.

Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (FWA)

Every year the Air Force loses millions of dollars in moneys and resources due to individuals abusing the system, wasting precious resources and committing acts of fraud. For example, a captain goes on a temporary tour of duty (TDY) for 2 weeks. The captain finishes the job in 4 days and for the remainder of the time goes to the beach. The vacation the captain took was at government expense. Did the captain commit fraud? Did the captain abuse the system? The captain clearly abused the system by using government time and funds for personal benefit. A good example of fraud is when a contractor knowingly sells the Air Force parts which don't meet the specifications of the contract. You certainly wouldn't want to be in a plane in which the propeller was a substandard part from a contractor. Waste of resources can be anything from throwing away usable items to ordering a $1,000 part when a $50 part

does the job. Misuse of grade is normally considered abuse. Consider this example. A senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) in transportation ordered two junior airmen to fix his personal vehicle during duty hours; the airmen follow orders because the senior NCO is the boss. There is no doubt that the senior NCO used his leadership position for personal gain.

Preventing FWA is the primary focus of the program. Detection and prosecution serve to deter fraudulent, wasteful, or abusive practices; however, the key element of the program is preventing the loss of resources. The Inspector General (SAF/IG) is the focal point for preventing FWA in the Air Force. Within the Office of the Inspector General, the Inquiries Division directs, administers, and oversees the Air Force FWA Prevention and Detection Program.

Anyone may report fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA) complaints to the Air Force Audit Agency, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), security forces, or other proper authority. You should try resolving FWA issues in command channels before elevating them to a higher level as with personal complaints.

Promptly advise the AFOSI of suspected criminal misconduct or fraud. The AFOSI investigates criminal allegations. You may submit FWA disclosures on an AF Form 635, **USAF Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Disclosure**, by letter, in person, or by FWA hotlines.

You may request to remain confidential or submit the complaint anonymously. The identity of individuals granted confidentiality may be revealed only to Air Force or DoD officials who establish an official need for the information with the express approval of the appointing authority or SAF/IG. In making a disclosure, the individual is responsible for providing factual, unbiased, and specific information. Information contained in a disclosure or complaint is privileged. The release of records relating to FWA and complaint inquiries and investigations outside the Air Force or to a person who does not have an official need to know is prohibited without the approval of SAF/IG or the designated representative.

Individuals making a disclosure may request a summary of the results from the office to which the disclosure is made. This request must be made at the same time the disclosure is submitted. The nature of the allegation, findings, and corrective actions will determine what information is releasable. All information released must be according to the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Freedom of Information Act. Anonymous disclosures are investigated and processed in the same manner as all other complaints and disclosures. However, feedback information will not be provided to inquiring individuals, including any individual claiming to be the disclosure source.

Any complaint or disclosure received that belongs in another channel is forwarded appropriately. IGs notify complainants, except anonymous complainants, when a different agency is the primary office of responsibility (OPR) for their complaint.

Remember, the success of the program lies with each individual within the Air Force. Support by both military and civilian personnel is crucial in preventing and eliminating FWA. Without full support from both military and civilian personnel, the

Air Force can't succeed in the fight against FWA. Any individual who is aware of ineffective controls that could lead to resources being wasted or diverted should report the situation to the proper officials.

Other Avenues To Effect Change

Although many avenues exist for Air Force personnel to effect change, one such avenues is the Air Force Innovative Development through Employee Awareness (IDEA) Program.

Air Force IDEA Program

An IDEA is a constructive idea that proposes a method of doing a task better, faster, cheaper, or safer. An individual or a group can submit an IDEA. IDEAs usually come from the individual's own work area, but is not a requirement. An IDEA must show a specific need for improvement and workable solution.

Types of **Eligible** IDEAs:

- Improves service to the Air Force
- Increase output and enhance productivity
- Conserve energy, manpower, materials, time, and space
- Improve product quality
- Safety
- Reduce costs without loss of quality or efficiency
- Confirmatory (After the fact)

Types of **Ineligible** IDEAs:

- Is a complaint
- Not the submitter's own idea
- Posters, slogans, contests
- Duplicates another IDEA
- Base beautification
- Improves Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) activities
- Parking, shorter work hours, gyms, theater, non smoking areas

- Related only to the personal comfort, convenience or desires of the submitter with no benefit to other personnel

- Is vague, incomplete, deals with generalities or opinions, or is nonfactual (is not based on a specific achievement or universally acknowledge fact; has no firm basis in actuality; and represents only conjecture, speculation, supposition, or theory)

- Proposes a study or review be made without offering the necessary, personally researched guideline data

- Proposes a change in housekeeping practices or routine work orders for the maintenance of buildings (including but not limited to such ideas as replacing burned-out light bulbs, washing windows, or painting), ground (including but not limited to trimming hedges, spraying, fertilizing, landscaping, maintaining or installing sidewalks, repainting curbs and crosswalks)

If you have an IDEA for improvement, see your unit IDEA Monitor and complete an AF Form 1000.

Bibliography:

1. AFI 90-301, Inspector General Complaints, Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, May 94. (Base Pubs Library)
2. AFPAM 36-2241, Vol 1, Promotion Fitness Examination Study Guide, Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, Jul 99.
3. Inquiries, Complaints, and FWA Handbook, Randolph AFB TX: HQ AETC/IGQ, Sep 94. (PK CAMs Office)
4. AFI 38-401, The Air Force Innovative Development through Employee Awareness (IDEA) Program, Washington DC, Department of the Air Force, 1 Oct 97.

Officer Professional Development

Introduction

Officer professional development is essential to support the Air Force mission and to provide for your professional growth as an officer. The officer who is most effective at carrying out the mission is one who's professionally prepared to assume the responsibilities that go with a particular grade. Professional development of officers is not new in the Air Force. It occurs at every echelon and activity. Ideally, the individual's aspirations and long-term professional development are most likely to be realized when they are in harmony with long-term Air Force requirements.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Know how an officer manages professional development.

Samples of Behavior:
1. Know the objective of the Officer Professional Development (OPD) Program.
2. List the three elements of OPD.
3. Know the objective of each level of Professional Military Education.
4. Know the criteria boards use to select officers for promotion.
5. Describe the items contained in the officer selection folder.

Information

Objective of Officer Professional Development

Professional development includes those actions and experiences that enhance an officer's ability to perform his or her job and thereby contribute to the mission of the Air Force as the level of responsibility increases. It begins with concentration on primary job expertise, broadens through the career, at different rates for different officers, and culminates in a generalist with both depth and breadth of experience. This growth pattern is produced by a well-balanced combination of career area professional expertise, leadership, and management skills. The relative emphasis on these areas will vary since officer roles in support of the mission also vary with both grade and level of responsibility.

The Air Force needs career-oriented officers concerned with their own growth. Therefore, the objective of a professional development program is to emphasize individual duty performance and motivate officers to develop skills that continue to contribute to the Air Force and the defense establishment as job responsibility increases. To accomplish this objective, the Air Force offers its officers numerous means and methods to enhance their professional credentials.

An officer's professional development involves three basic elements: assignments that provide depth and breadth, training and education that support a specific career path, and counseling that provides feedback on performance, training and future assignments. Commander and key supervisor involvement and interaction with the officer is the cornerstone of an officer's professional development. The Air Force provides officers numerous means and methods to enhance their professional credentials.

Role of Professional Military Education (PME) and Advanced Academic Degrees (AAD)

Professional military education (PME) and academic education should parallel and support the requirements of appropriate jobs. PME should build upon a solid foundation of officership laid during precommissioning. The uniqueness of the profession and the particular values and culture of the military officer corps are the bedrock on which all future professional development is based.

Aerospace Basic Course (ABC) is the first level of PME instruction for commissioned officers. Second Lieutenants within one year of commissioning are eligible and are selected to attend ABC by the Air Force Personnel Center. The focus of ABC is to inspire new officers to comprehend their roles as Airmen who understand and live by USAF core values, articulate and demonstrate USAF core competencies, and who dedicate themselves as warriors in the world's most respected Aerospace Force.

The focus for company grade officers should be on developing the skills needed to enhance their career specific competence to include officer leadership. Therefore, leadership and communication skills are paramount and are a primary focus of the Squadron Officer School (SOS), the Air Force's company grade PME. SOS also provides Air Force captains the leadership tools they need to build military teams and lays foundation for critical thinking in air and space power through education on air power history and doctrine.

While building on earlier instruction, the focus for the field grades and, therefore, of Air Command and Staff College (the Air Force's Intermediate Service School) is to learn to develop, advance and apply air and space power in peace and war. This is done through the use of problem-solving technologies of the theater campaign, which emphasizes the analytical and practical tools officers will need as future military leaders.

Senior officers must understand not only the skills taught in earlier PME, but also how to lead in the strategic environment, to include joint and combined operations, and to employ air and space power in support of national security. This is the role of the highest level of PME, Air War College (the Air Force's Senior Service School).

Completion of professional military education (PME) has long been considered crucial to professional development and greater responsibility. Don't wait to be selected for PME in residence. Start by correspondence or seminar as soon as you're

eligible. Statistics show that there's no difference in how you obtain your PME, just as long as you get it. Remember, it's another key to your future!

In the final analysis, the appropriate role of PME in officer professional development is to expand and refine the skills an officer will need to operate effectively and assume increasingly higher levels of responsibility. Officers must recognize that failure to complete the appropriate level of PME by the time of consideration for the next higher grade will have some impact on promotion potential.

Advanced academic degrees are important to officer professional development to the extent that they enhance the degree holder's job and officer qualifications. A degree which is directly related to the primary utilization area (such as an Engineering degree for a Developmental Engineer, AFSC 62E4) would be appropriate at any level since this degree adds to depth of experience. An advanced degree in management or more general studies would tend to enhance job performance for officers reaching the field grade ranks where breadth development begins to take place.

Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)

In accordance with its mission of providing defense-focused graduate and continuing education research and consultation to improve Air Force and DoD operational capability, AFIT offers programs at the undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral levels at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio, and in civilian institutions across the country. AFIT has three programs:

1. AFIT at Wright Patterson AFB. Confers degrees engineering, logistics and acquisition management..

2. AFIT in civilian universities. Confers degrees in almost any subject. (However, the Air Force must have a projected need in the subject area before an officer may attend.)

3. AFIT in civilian industries. Officers are placed in jobs at various industrial concerns in order to gain a better understanding of industrial operations in support of the national defense effort.

Contact the base education office for assistance. You can receive full tuition assistance for all three programs.

Operation Bootstrap

Operation Bootstrap is a more readily available means of obtaining undergraduate and graduate degrees than AFIT, particularly in the nontechnical areas (e.g., Business Administration, Education, etc.) Through Operation Bootstrap, Air Force members may attend colleges or universities of their choice to further their education. Operation Bootstrap provides for permissive temporary duty (terminal or nonterminal TDY) for resident study based on AFI 36-2306. In all cases, permission to study full-time is contingent upon the ability of the organization to release the

individual for the requested period of absence. (The individual is not replaced for the period of full time.)

The student is not eligible for tuition assistance during the permissive TDY. Normal pay and allowances continue. The student's active duty service commitment upon return from the full-time study will be three times the length of study.

Terminal TDY. Terminal TDY is for qualified and eligible personnel who have progressed far enough in their college programs that the remaining course requirements for a baccalaureate or higher degree can be completed by resident study within a period ranging from a Summer Session to a year (30 semester hours or less). One may be authorized temporary duty on permissive orders for this purpose.

Nonterminal TDY. Required courses which are not available to students during normal off-duty study may be completed during short periods (up to 16 weeks) of release from usual military duties. The period of study could be increased up to 19 weeks by combining the TDY with annual leave. The three-for-one active duty commitment also applies.

Airman Education and Commissioning Program (AECP)

The Airman Education and Commissioning Program is a means by which airmen who've served in the Air Force a minimum of 1 year may gain a commission. This program, operated by AFROTC, allows airmen who have more than 30 hours of college credits to apply for a program which would send them back to college for up to 36 months to gain a degree. After graduating from college, these individuals are sent to OTS to receive their commissions. Those airmen who already have their degree and have served on active duty for a year or more are also eligible for this program. The only other limiting factor besides stiff competition for slots, is the applicant must be able to obtain both the degree and commission before their 35th birthday.

Obviously, you as an officer aren't eligible for this program, but you may have subordinates who may be interested in AECP. You can have a lot of influence on these people by encouraging qualified enlisted personnel to use the educational benefits they're entitled to and possibly get commissioned.

Tuition Assistance

Tuition Assistance is available to active duty service members. The program is designed to encourage personnel to pursue voluntary, off duty educational opportunities. Tuition assistance is approved for courses offered by post-secondary institutions accredited by a national or regional accrediting body recognized by the Council on Post-secondary Accreditation and the Department of Education. The Air Force will pay 75 percent (rounded down to the nearest dollar) of the tuition cost at a cap of $250.00 per semester hour or $166.00 per quarter hour; the individual pays the remaining 25 percent plus fees and books.

New GI Bill Educational Benefits (MONTGOMERY GI BILL)

The Montgomery GI Bill is the current Veterans Administration Program providing 36 months of educational benefits for individuals initially entering active duty after 30 June 1985. These service members must have a pay reduction of $1200 ($100 per month for the first full 12 months of active duty), serve 3 years on active duty or 2 years active duty plus 4 years in the Selected Reserves, a high school diploma or equivalent, and an honorable discharge. Effective 1 Apr 93, post service benefits are $400 per month for 36 months of full-time study for a maximum of $14,400. Benefits end 10 years from date of separation of retirement.

Those who received commissions from a U.S. military academy or who completed an ROTC Scholarship Program are not eligible for the Montgomery GI Bill.

The counselors at the base education office can assist you in meeting your educational goals.

Finally, as part of officer professional development, one also needs to consider the integral roles of the Officer Evaluation System (OES), promotion system, and assignment system.

Role of the OES

The OES is an integral part of the Air Force Professional Development program and strongly supports the program's goals and philosophy. The OES has three purposes. The first provides meaningful feedback to officers on performance expectations and advice on how well they improve. The second provides a reliable, long-term, cumulative record of performance and potential based on that performance. The third provides central selection boards with sound information to assist them in selecting the best qualified officers. To accomplish these purposes, the OES focuses on performance. This reflects the fact that how well an officer does his or her job, and qualities the officer brings to the job, are of paramount importance to the Air Force. Performance is most important for successful mission accomplishment. Performance is also important for the immediate development of an officer's skills and abilities, for the long-term development of an officer's leadership ability, and in determining who should be selected for promotion. The OES emphasizes performance in several ways. First, every supervisor is required to provide performance feedback to their officers to help them improve their duty performance. Second, performance reports are based solely on performance and the impact an officer has on the unit's mission. Finally, promotion recommendations are based on performance and potential. The OES is a tool that officers can use in their own professional development and in the development of those officers they supervise. More information is available in AFI 36-2402, Officer Evaluation System, and in AFPAM 36-2404, USAF Officer's Guide to the Officer Evaluation System.

Role of the Promotion System

The objective of the officer promotion system is to select officers for advancement who have clearly demonstrated the potential to serve in more demanding leadership positions in the Air Force hierarchy.

Promotion boards are told that demonstrated leadership abilities and performance of primary duties are of overriding importance far outweighing all other considerations. It is this reason that officers need to concentrate on duty performance in their current grade and not on "square-filling" exercises.

Facts and specifics. Promotion programs are designed to ensure that there are enough officers of the desired quality, in the proper grades, to carry out the mission.

- Promotions occur at spaced intervals to maintain a selective flow of officers through the grades in visible advancement patterns that avoid promotion stagnation.

- The selection process must ensure that the best qualified officers are promoted to positions of increased authority and responsibility based on past performance and future potential.

a. Promotion opportunity is the percentage of each year group that will be promoted after competing for promotion to the next grade.

- The Air Force strives to provide equal promotion opportunity to each year group. The number that can be promoted each year is largely determined by Air Force requirements.

b. A specific percentage of the promotion quota may be used to select officers BPZ. Officers selected BPZ must, in the judgment of the selection board, be better qualified and possess greater potential than all nonselects in IPZ and APZ. The maximum BPZ selection quota is 10 percent to lieutenant colonel, and 15 percent to colonel.

c. While officers previously considered but not selected IPZ and APZ do not generate a quota, they continue to be considered on a fair and equitable basis, and those considered to be "best qualified" are selected for promotion.

d. Promotion phase points represent the number of years and months of active commissioned service a "due course" officer--that is, an officer never promoted early or late--can expect to pin on the next higher grade. Average phase points represent the average of the 12 monthly phase points during the fiscal year.

e. Second lieutenants are promoted to first lieutenant on a "fully qualified" basis after serving 2 years in their current grade, while first lieutenants and above must be selected for promotion to the next higher grade by a central selection board

on a "best qualified" basis. Selection board schedules are published as far in advance as practical.

f. What criteria do boards use to select officers for promotion? Those officers who are the strongest performers are selected for promotion based on their demonstrated potential to serve in a higher grade in positions of greater responsibility. Promotion boards evaluate records using the "whole person" concept and are briefed that performance of primary duties and demonstrated leadership abilities are more important than other considerations. Factors included in the whole person assessment are:

- **Job Performance**--as documented in PRFs, OPRs, training reports, and letters of evaluation. The PRF, unlike the other documents, is based on the officer's duty performance throughout his or her career. The PRF sends a strong message from the officer's senior rater to the promotion board based on demonstrated performance in his or her current position and in past jobs or positions.

- **Leadership**--in staff, operations, and command positions.

- **Professional Competence**--expertise as a specialist, supervisor, operator, etc.

- **Breadth and Depth of Experience**--where assigned, and at what level, when, variety of jobs and tasks, etc. What the individual has done, where he or she has been, both in and out of his or her particular specialty is considered. However, the "where," "level," "when," etc., are less important than how well the officer performed wherever he or she was assigned.

Lieutenants and captains should concentrate on depth of experience in their career area. Breadth of experience is more appropriate for field grade officers. Somewhere around the mid-major point, an officer's career may broaden.

A lieutenant colonel looking for promotion to colonel should place more emphasis on broader considerations--that is, breadth of duty experiences that include command, career broadening assignments, PME, advanced education, and headquarters assignments.

- **Job Responsibility**--scope of responsibility, exposure, opportunity to make decisions, resources managed, etc.

- **Academic and Professional Military Education**--appropriate level, relationship to career field, and how it improves duty and performance, etc.

- **Specific Achievements**--awards, decorations, special recognition, such as squadron "top gun," maintenance officer of the quarter, etc.

Selection Boards

a. Selection boards are comprised of highly qualified senior officers representing the broadest practical scope of Air Force activities. In order to provide a balanced perspective with regard to the skills of the Air Force, board members mirror, insofar as practical, the officers eligible for consideration with respect to aeronautical rating, career field, and command of assignment. Boards will also have female and minority members and, if considering Reserve officers, one or more board members will be a Reserve officer.

b. The basic eligibility criteria are established approximately 150 days prior to the convening date of a board. Your current grade and date of rank determine eligibility. In most cases (includes all Line officers) officers who have not served on extended active duty for 6 months before their board convenes are not eligible for consideration.

c. About 60 to 90 days before a board convenes, eligible officers receive officer preselection briefs (OPB) through their servicing Military Personnel Flight (MPF). The OPB contains the same information as the officer selection brief (OSB) that is a part of the selection folder evaluated by board members. Officers are responsible for reviewing their OPB and having any errors or omissions corrected by their servicing MPF.

d. Boards are in session from 1 to 2 weeks, depending on the number of officers to be considered and the number of board members to score records.

e. After the board adjourns, the board report is sent through channels in turn to: Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel; Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force; Chief of Staff of the Air Force; Secretary of the Air Force; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the President for nomination to the Senate.

f. The results of selection boards are released after the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) approves the report. Usually, promotion board results are released 4 to 6 weeks after a board adjourns, with notification of selection made by the local MPF promotions unit through the respective commander.

Remember, you don't meet the board, your records do! Board members are tasked to carefully review each officer selection folder, giving appropriate weight to the "whole person" concept used to evaluate the records and considering such factors as: job performance, leadership, job responsibility, professional competence, specific achievements, and education.

Your selection folder may contain the following items (those preceded by an asterisk are mandatory):

* Officer Performance Reports (OPRs) and Training Reports (TRs)

* Officer Selection Brief (OSB)

* Citations for U.S. Decorations

* Specialty Board Certification

* Courts-Martial orders containing or reflecting approved findings of guilt

Letters to the board from eligible officers

Letters pertaining to non-attendance, or ineligibility for Professional Military Education (PME) schools

Letter of Not Qualified for Promotion Action from the commander

Oral 368 Nonjudicial Punishment (AF Form 368)

Nonjudicial Punishment Administration (AF Form 307x Series)

Notice Form 366 of Intent to Vacate or Suspend Nonjudicial Punishment (AF Form 366)

Some of the major parts of the selection folder are now explained in more detail:

OPR. Your OPRs meet the board, not you. Therefore, these "descriptions of your performance" become very significant. Through these reports, the promotion board sees your potential or lack thereof. These evaluations are the only way that the board can evaluate your day-to-day performance which, by the way, is the most important function you can do for the Air Force. As stated in the USAF OFFICERS' NEWSLETTER, Oct 87, "The essence of career planning lies not so much in the selection of your next assignment as it does in the manner in which you carry out your present one. As far as you're concerned, the best professional development job is the one you have right now."

Officer Selection Brief. As stated previously, it's YOUR responsibility to ensure the correctness of your Officer Selection Brief (OSB).

Citations For U.S. Decorations. These should include all U.S. decorations only. Awards or foreign decorations aren't included.

Specialty Board Certification. Any specialty board certification letters or certificates for members of the Medical, Dental, Nurse and Medical Services Corps.

Letters to the Board From Eligible Officers. Officers eligible for consideration In/Above-the-Promotion Zone (IPZ-APZ) may send a letter to the president of the board calling attention to any matter of record concerning themselves that they believe important to their consideration. Correspondence other than letters (i.e., messages, telegrams) will not be accepted. The letter may not contain any attachments, criticize any officer, or reflect upon the character, conduct, or motives of any officer. Comments in the letter will be restricted to matters pertaining to consideration for promotion. Comments regarding regular appointment or selection to service schools are not authorized. Selection boards are not authorized to consider

correspondence from anyone else on behalf of any eligible officer. Any such correspondence will be returned to the sender. After the board adjourns, letters will be destroyed unless the officer provides a stamped, self-addressed envelope and requests that the letter be returned.

Letters Pertaining to Nonattendance or Ineligibility for Professional Military Education (PME) Schools. The bottom line is: If selected to attend PME in residence, go, unless there are extenuating circumstances beyond your control.

Active Duty Service Commitments

Active Duty Service Commitments (ADSCs) fulfill two very important functions. First, they communicate to Air Force members the periods of obligated service they must complete before becoming eligible to separate or retire from active duty. They subsequently assure the Air Force and the taxpayers receive an appropriate return for their investment in training/education, relocation, or promotion. Law establishes some ADSCs; policy establishes others. The complete list of ADSC incurring events and the associated commitments is found in AFI 36-2107 Active Duty Service Commitments (ADSC). Air Force members will be advised in writing of an ADSC incurring event, but lack of advance counseling does not negate an ADSC.

Role of the Assignment System

The purpose of the officer assignment system is to assign the right officer to the right position at the right time to meet AF mission requirements. Officers should not concern themselves with mapping out their career, but instead concentrate on their current duty, ensuring the proper level of depth-breadth development depending on grade. The only assignment with which an officer should be concerned is the one in which he or she is currently serving and, when available for a new assignment, the assignment that immediately follows. The officer's qualifications and professional development phase are the primary factors in making assignments.

Commander involvement is also a key element in this process. Nine months prior to becoming eligible for an assignment officers will receive a notice to inform them of their impending eligibility. This is a perfect time to seek counseling from your supervisor and commander. The new assignment system for officers requires that all officers complete an assignment preference worksheet. Once the officer has completed the worksheet it must then be forwarded to the commander for review and approval before being sent to Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) for consideration for assignment. AFPC will return any assignment preference worksheet that has not been reviewed and approved by the officers commander.

Additional Self Development

As officers, it is our responsibility to continue to strive for excellence and self-development. We must enhance our understanding of the history of air and space power, Air Force doctrine, military strategy, and leadership. In learning the role of air

and space power as it applies to military operations, we'll break down the "stovepipes" in our service that hamper our full realization of its potential and significance.

To help facilitate this learning and understanding, former Air Force Chief of Staff, General (Ret) Ronald Fogleman, created a professional reading list based on inputs from Air University, the Air Force Academy, Air Force History Office, and a few other agencies and historians. The list is divided into three levels: a basic list for captains, an intermediate list for majors and lieutenant colonels, and an advanced list for colonels and generals. The list for captains is as follows:

Winged Shield, Winged Sword by Natly
10 Propositions Regarding Air Power by Phillip Meilinger
Heart of the Storm by Richard Reynolds
Lincoln on Leadership by Donald Phillips
The Right Stuff by Tom Wolfe
Hostile Skies by James Hudson
A Few Great Captains by DeWitt Copp
Winged Victory by Geoffrey Perret
Officers in Flight Suits by John Sherwood
This Kind of War by T.R. Fehrenbach
Thud Ridge by Jack Broughton

Throughout your years as a junior officer, take the time to read these books as part of your personal and professional self-development.

Mentoring

A mentor is defined as a "trusted counselor or guide." Mentoring, therefore, is a relationship in which a person with greater experience and wisdom guides another person to develop both personally and professionally. Mentoring is a professional development program designed to help each individual reach his or her maximum potential. Mentoring is a professional relationship because it fosters free communication by subordinates with superiors concerning their careers, performance, duties and missions. It enhances morale and discipline and improves the operational environment while maintaining respect for authority.

Air Force mentoring covers a wide range of areas, such as career guidance, technical and professional development, leadership, Air Force history and heritage, air and space power doctrine, strategic vision, and contribution to joint warfighting. It also includes knowledge of the ethics of our military profession and understanding of the Air Force's core values of integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do. Commanders and supervisors will encourage subordinates to read and comprehend warfighting publication and the books in the CSAF Professional Reading Program. This list follows on the next page.

Mentoring is a fundamental responsibility of all Air Force officers and civilian employees supervising officers. They must know their people, accept personal responsibility for them, and be accountable for their professional development. Mentors help the mentoree to distinguish between individual goals, career

aspirations, and realistic expectation. First and foremost, officers must stay focused on developing people who are skilled in the employment and support of air and space power and how it meets the security needs of the nation.

To help the subordinate focus on professional development there are many organizations, programs, and associations dedicated to the advancement and education of military professionals. Some of these are listed in the mentoring tool box diagram.

Usually the immediate supervisor or rater is designated as the primary mentor for each of his or her subordinates. However, this does not limit the subordinate from seeking additional counseling or advice from other sources or mentors. The mentor is responsible for ensuring the officer doesn't view a successful career solely in terms of promotion success. Look for and seek out mentors to help your professional development as an officer and realize that you will one day find yourself in the role of the mentor.

THE MENTORING TOOLBOX

Company Grade Officer Council (CGOC). This organization is active in helping the base and local community. It is normally active at each base.

Air Force Intern Program (AFIP). HQ USAF/DPPE, 1040 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1040. Gives future leaders early Pentagon experience.

Lieutenant's Professional Development Program (LPDP). This program fills the professional development gap between commissioning and Squadron Officer School along with the Air and Space Basic Course.

The Order of the Daedalians and the Airlift/Tanker Association. Professional associations of military pilots.

The Air Force Association (AFA), 1501 Lee Highway, Arlington, VA 22209. Founded in 1946 to support air power and a strong national defense. Lobbies on all Air Force-related issues.

The Association of Military Surgeons of the US, 9320 Old Georgetown Rd., Bethesda, MD 20814. Founded in 1891 to represent physicians and other health care workers of commissioned rank. Mainly a professional development group.

Military Chaplains Association of the USA, P.O. Box 42660, Washington DC 20015. Founded in 1925 for Army chaplains. Chartered by Congress in 1950 to represent the interests of all military chaplains. Lobbies Congress on pay, benefits, and preservation of the chaplain corps.

The National Association of Uniformed Services (NAUS), 5535 Hempstead Way, Springfield, VA 22151. Founded in 1968 to represent anyone who wears (or has worn) a uniform. Lobbies for an array of pay and benefits.

The Retired Officers Associations (TROA), 201 N. Washington St., Alexandria, VA 22314. Founded in 1919 to represent retired officers. Focuses on pay and benefit issues.

Air Force Cadet/Officer Mentor Action Program, Inc. (AFCOMAP), P.O. Box 47015, Washington, DC 20050. A private organization founded in 1982. Chartered by SAF and CSAF. Committed to supporting the Air Force in the recruitment, professional development, and retention of cadets and junior officers. Originally founded for minority officers, but open to all.

Air University Library, 600 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6424. Houses well-balanced collections especially strong in the fields of war fighting, aeronautics, Air Force and DoD operations, military sciences, education, leadership, and management.

Civil Air Patrol (CAP), 105 South Hansell St., Bldg 714, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6332. The volunteer civilian auxiliary of the Air Force. CAP performs emergency service missions to include air and ground search and rescue, disaster relief, and drug interdiction. It promotes citizenship, leadership, physical fitness, and aerospace education through its cadet programs.

Bibliography:

1. AFPAM 36-2611, Officer Professional Development Guide, Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 1 Apr 96.
2. AFPAM 36-2506, You and Your Promotions-The Air Force Officer Promotion Program, Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 1 Sep 97.
3. AFI 36-3401, Air Force Mentoring, 1 Jul 97.



STAFF SERGEANT HENRY EUGENE ERWIN

was radio operator of a B-29 leading a group to attack Koriyama, Japan, 12 April 1945. He was also charged with dropping phosphorescent smoke bombs to aid in assembling the group on the bomb run. A faulty bomb exploded, striking him in the face, obliterating his nose and completely blinding him. Smoke filled the plane, totally obscuring the pilot's vision. Ignoring personal safety and indescribable pain, he picked up the white-hot bomb, crawled to a window, threw the bomb out and then collapsed, completely aflame. The smoke cleared and the pilot pulled the plane out of its dive, only 300 feet from the ground. Sergeant Erwin had saved the lives of all of his comrades.

Code of Conduct

Introduction

"In 1955, a special advisory committee, appointed by the President of the United States, drew up a set of standards designed to provide guidelines for the professional conduct of U.S. fighting men. As a result, on 17 August of the same year the President, by Executive Order 10631, proclaimed an official Code of Conduct for members of the U.S. Armed forces.

The primary objective of the Code is to increase unit fighting strength and to strengthen the individual's will to resist. The Code applies to all fighting men of the Armed Forces, whether in combat, captivity, or any other circumstance.

Like any soldier, every leader must adhere to the moral obligations prescribed by the Code. In addition, he is responsible for training his men to do likewise. He manages and inspires his subordinates in a manner that maximizes their opportunity to abide by the Code. Therefore, a leader must understand fully the details of the Code, its purposes, and underlying principles." (Colonel Samuel Hays, ed, Taking Command)

Study Assignment

Read the Information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Comprehend the principles of the Code of Conduct.

Sample of Behavior: Distinguish correct courses of action in accordance with the Code of Conduct.

Information

Code of the US Fighting Force

As a member of the United States Armed Forces, you're protecting your nation. It's your duty to oppose all enemies of the United States in combat or, if a captive, in a prisoner of war compound. Your behavior is guided by the Code of Conduct, which has evolved from the heroic lives, experiences, and deeds of Americans from the Revolutionary War to Desert Storm.

Your obligations as a U.S. citizen and a member of the Armed Forces result from the traditional values that underlie the American experience as a nation. These values are best expressed in the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, which you've sworn to uphold and defend. You would have these obligations--to your country, your service and unit, and your fellow Americans--even if the Code of Conduct had never been formulated as a high standard of general behavior.

Just as you have a responsibility to your country under the Code of Conduct, the United States Government has an equal responsibility--always to keep faith with you and stand by you as you fight for your country. If you're unfortunate enough to become a prisoner of war, you may rest assured that your Government will care for your dependents and will never forget you. Furthermore, the Government will use every practical means to contact, support, and gain release for you and for all other prisoners of war.

To live up to the Code, you must know not only its words but also the ideas and principles behind those words. This is an extract from Department of the Army (DA) Pam 360-512, 1986, which contains the code, and explanation of its principles and a statement of the standards expected of you.

The Code of Conduct is an ethical guide. Its six articles deal with your chief concerns as an American in combat; these concerns become critical when you must evade capture, resist while a prisoner, or escape from the enemy.

Experiences of captured Americans reveal that to survive captivity honorably would demand from you great courage, deep dedication and high motivation. To sustain these personal values throughout captivity requires that you understand and believe strongly in our free and democratic institutions, love your country, trust in the justice of our cause, keep faithful and loyal to your fellow prisoners, and hold firmly to your religious and moral beliefs in time of trial. Your courage, dedication, and motivation supported by understanding, trust, and fidelity will help you endure the terrors of captivity, and return to your family, home, and nation with honor and pride.

Article I

I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

All men and women in the Armed Forces have the duty at all times and under all circumstances to oppose the enemies of the United States and support its national interests. In training or in combat, alone or with others, while evading capture or enduring captivity, this duty belongs to each American defending our nation regardless of circumstances.

Article II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.

As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may never voluntarily surrender. When isolated and no longer able to inflict casualties on the enemy, the American soldier has an obligation to evade capture and rejoin friendly forces.

Only when evasion by an individual is impossible and further fighting would lead only to death with no significant loss to the enemy should one consider surrender. With all reasonable means of resistance exhausted and with certain death the only alternative, capture doesn't imply dishonor.

The responsibility and authority of a commander never extends to the surrender of a command to the enemy while the command has the power to fight and evade. When isolated, cut off, or surrounded, a unit must continue to fight until relieved or able to rejoin friendly forces through continued efforts to break out or evade the enemy.

Article III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

The duty of a member of the Armed Forces to use all means available to resist the enemy isn't lessened by the misfortune of captivity. A POW is still legally bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice and ethically guided by the Code of Conduct. Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention, a prisoner of war is also subject to certain rules imposed by the captor nation. When repatriated, a prisoner of war won't be condemned for having obeyed reasonable captor rules, such as sanitation regulations. The duty of a member of the Armed Forces to continue to resist doesn't mean a prisoner should engage in unreasonable harassment as a form of resistance. Retaliation by captors to the detriment of that prisoner and other prisoners is frequently the primary result of such harassment.

The Geneva Convention recognizes that a POW may have the duty to attempt escape. In fact, the Geneva Convention prohibits a captor nation from executing a POW simply for attempting escape. Under the authority of the senior official (often called the senior ranking officer, or "SRO") a POW must be prepared to escape whenever the opportunity presents itself. In a POW compound, the senior POW must consider the welfare of those remaining behind after an escape. However, as a matter of conscious determination, a POW must plan to escape, try to escape, and assist others to escape.

Contrary to the spirit of the Geneva Convention, enemies engaged by US forces since 1950 have regarded the POW compound as an extension of the battlefield. In doing so, they've used a variety of tactics and pressures, including physical and mental mistreatment, torture and medical neglect to exploit POWs for propaganda purposes, to obtain military information, or to undermine POW organization, communication and resistance.

Such enemies have attempted to lure American POWs into accepting special favors or privileges in exchange for statements, acts, or information. Unless it is essential to the life or welfare of that person or another prisoner of war or to the

success of efforts to resist or escape, a POW must neither seek nor accept special favors or privileges.

One such privilege is called parole. Parole is a promise by a prisoner of war to a captor to fulfill certain conditions--such as agreeing not to escape nor to fight again once released--in return for such favors as relief from physical bondage, improved food and living conditions, or repatriation ahead of the sick, injured, or longer-held prisoners. The United States does not authorize any service member to sign or enter into any such parole agreement.

Article IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

Informing, or any other action to the detriment of a fellow prisoner, is despicable and is expressly forbidden. Prisoners of war must avoid helping the enemy identify fellow prisoners who may have knowledge of particular value to the enemy and who may, therefore, be made to suffer coercive interrogation.

Strong leadership and communication are essential to discipline. Discipline is the key to camp organization, resistance, and even survival. Personal hygiene, camp sanitation, and care of sick and wounded are imperative. Officers and noncommissioned officers of the United States must continue to carry out their responsibilities and exercise their authority in captivity. The senior, regardless of Service, must accept command. This responsibility, and accountability, may not be evaded.

If the senior is incapacitated or is otherwise unable to act, the next senior person will assume command. Camp leaders should make every effort to inform all POWs of the chain of command and try to represent them in dealing with enemy authorities. The responsibility of subordinates to obey the lawful orders of ranking American military personnel remains unchanged in captivity.

The Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War provides for election of a "prisoners' representative" in POW camps containing enlisted personnel, but no commissioned officers. American POWs should understand that such a representative is only a spokesman for the actual senior ranking person. Should the enemy appoint a POW chain of command for its own purposes, American POWs should make all efforts to adhere to the principles of Article IV.

As with other provisions of this Code, common sense and the conditions of captivity will affect the way in which the senior person and the other POWs organize to carry out their responsibilities. What is important is that everyone support and work within the POW organization.

Article V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva Convention and this Code to give name, rank, service number (social security number) and date of birth. The prisoner should make every effort to avoid giving the captor any additional information. The prisoner may communicate with captors on matters of health and welfare and additionally may write letters home and fill out a Geneva Convention "capture card."

It's a violation of the Geneva Convention to place a prisoner under physical or mental duress, torture, or any other form of coercion in an effort to secure information. If under such intense coercion, a POW discloses unauthorized information, makes an unauthorized statement, or performs an unauthorized act, that prisoner's peace of mind and survival require a quick recovery of courage, dedication, and motivation to resist anew each subsequent coercion.

Actions every POW should resist include making oral or written confessions and apologies, answering questionnaires, providing personal histories, creating propaganda recordings, broadcasting appeals to other prisoners of war, providing any other material readily usable for propaganda purposes, appealing for surrender or parole, furnishing self-criticisms, communicating on behalf of the enemy to the detriment of the United States, its allies, its Armed Forces, or other POWs.

Every POW should also recognize that any confession signed or any statement made may be used by the enemy as false evidence that the person is a "war criminal" rather than a POW. Several countries have made reservations to the Geneva Convention in which they assert that a "war criminal" conviction deprives the convicted individual of prisoner of war status, removes that person from protection under the Geneva Convention, and revokes all rights to repatriation until a prison sentence is served.

Recent experiences of American prisoners of war have proved that, although enemy interrogation sessions may be harsh and cruel, one can resist brutal mistreatment when the will to resist remains intact. The best way for a prisoner to keep faith with country, fellow prisoners and self is to provide the enemy with as little information as possible.

Article VI

I will never forget that I am an American, fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

A member of the Armed Forces remains responsible for personal actions at all times. A member of the Armed Forces who is captured has a continuing obligation to resist and to remain loyal to country, Service, unit and fellow prisoners.

Upon repatriation, POWs can expect their actions to be reviewed, both as to circumstances of capture and conduct during detention. The purpose of such review is to recognize meritorious performance as well as to investigate possible misconduct. Each review will be conducted with due regard for the right of the individual and consideration for the conditions of captivity; for captivity of itself isn't a condition of deserving blame.

Members of the Armed Forces should remember that they and their dependents will be taken care of by the appropriate service and that pay and allowances, eligibility and procedures for promotion, and benefits for dependents continue while the Service member is detained. Service members should assure that their personal affairs and family matters (such as pay, powers of attorney, current will, and provisions for family maintenance and education) are properly and currently arranged. Failure to arrange matters can create a serious sense of guilt for a POW and place unnecessary hardship on family members.

The life of a prisoner of war is hard. Each person in this stressful situation must always sustain hope, must resist enemy indoctrination. Prisoners of war standing firm and united against the enemy will support and inspire one another in surviving their ordeal and in prevailing over misfortune with honor. (Reprinted from DOD GEN-11A/DA Pam 360-512, 1979 reprinted 1986)

Special Allowances for Medical Personnel and Chaplains

Article I

If the captors allow medical personnel and chaplains to perform their professional duties, these personnel may exercise a degree of flexibility concerning some of the specific provisions of the Code of Conduct to perform their professional duties.

The degree of flexibility can only be employed if it's in the best interests of the medical and spiritual needs of their fellow Military Service members and their country. Like all members of the Armed Forces, medical personnel and chaplains are accountable for all of their actions.

Article III

Under the Geneva Conventions, medical personnel and chaplains who fall into the hands of the enemy are entitled to be considered "**retained personnel**" and are not to be considered prisoners of war. **The enemy is required by the Conventions to allow such persons to continue to perform their medical or religious duties, preferably for POWs of their own country**. When the services of these "retained personnel" are no longer needed for these duties, the enemy is obligated to return them to their own forces.

1. The medical personnel and chaplains of the U.S. Armed Forces who fall into the hands of the enemy must assert their rights as "retained personnel" to perform their medical and religious duties for the benefit of the POWs and must take every opportunity to do so.

2. If the captor permits medical personnel and chaplains to perform their professional functions for the welfare of the POW community, special latitude is authorized these personnel under the Code of Conduct as it applies to escape.

3. Medical personnel and chaplains don't, as individuals, have a duty to escape or to actively aid others in escaping as long as they are treated as "retained personnel" by the enemy. However, U.S. experience since 1949, when the Geneva Conventions were written, reflects no compliance by captors of U.S. personnel with these provisions of the Conventions. U.S. medical and chaplain personnel must be prepared to be subjected to the same treatment as other US POWs.

4. In the event the captor doesn't permit medical personnel and chaplains to perform their professional functions, they're considered identical to all other POWs with respect to their responsibilities under the Code of Conduct. Under no circumstances will the latitude granted medical personnel and chaplains be interpreted to authorize any actions or conduct detrimental to the POWs or the interest of the United States.

Article IV

Medical personnel are generally prohibited from assuming command over nonmedical personnel and chaplains are generally prohibited from assuming command over military personnel of any branch. Military Service regulations which restrict eligibility of these personnel for command will be explained to personnel of all Services at an appropriate level of understanding to preclude later confusion in a POW camp.

Article V

This Article and its explanation also apply to medical personnel and chaplains ("retained personnel"). They're required to communicate with the captor in connection with their professional responsibilities, subject to the restraints discussed in Article I and VI.

Articles of the Geneva Convention as They Pertain to the Code of Conduct

The following articles are quoted from Section VI, "Relations Between Prisoners of War and the Authorities," of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

Article 78

Prisoners of war shall have the right to make known to the military authorities in whose power they are, their requests regarding the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected.

They shall also have the unrestricted right to apply to the representatives of the Protecting Powers either through their prisoners' representative or, if they consider it necessary, direct, in order to draw their attention to any points on which they may have complaints to make regarding their conditions of captivity.

These requests and complaints shall not be limited nor considered to be part of the correspondence quota referred to in Article 71. They must be transmitted immediately. Even if they are recognized to be unfounded, they may not give rise to any punishment.

Prisoners' representatives may send periodic reports on the situation in the camps and the needs of the prisoners of war to the representatives of the Protecting Powers.

Article 79

In all places where there are prisoners of war, except in those where there are officers, the prisoners shall freely elect by secret ballot, every six months, and also in case of vacancies, prisoners' representatives entrusted with representing them before the military authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and any other organization which may assist them. These prisoners' representatives shall be eligible for reelection.

In camps for officers and persons of equivalent status or in mixed camps, the senior officer among the prisoners of war shall be recognized as the camp prisoners' representative. In camps for officers, he/she shall be assisted by one or more advisors chosen by the officers; in mixed camps, his/her assistants shall be chosen from among the prisoners of war who are not officers and shall be elected by them.

Officer prisoners of war of the same nationality shall be stationed in labor camps for prisoners of war, for the purpose of carrying out the camp administration duties for which the prisoners of war are responsible. These officers may be elected as prisoners' representatives under the first paragraph of this Article. In such a case,

the assistants to the prisoners' representatives shall be chosen from among those prisoners of war who are not officers.

Every representative elected must be approved by the Detaining Power before he has the right to commence his duties. Where the Detaining Power refuses to approve a prisoner of war elected by his fellow prisoners of war, it must inform the Protecting Power of the reason for such refusal.

In all cases the prisoners' representative must have the same nationality, language, and customs as the prisoners of war whom he represents. Thus, prisoners of war distributed in different sections of a camp, according to their nationality, language or customs, shall have for each section their own prisoners' representative, in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs.

Article 80

Prisoners' representatives shall further the physical, spiritual, and intellectual well-being of prisoners of war.

In particular, where the prisoners decide to organize amongst themselves a system of mutual assistance, this organization will be within the province of the prisoners' representative, in addition to the special duties entrusted to him by other provisions of the present Convention.

Prisoners' representatives shall not be held responsible simply by reason of their duties, for any offenses committed by prisoners of war.

Article 81

Prisoners' representatives shall not be required to perform any other work, if the accomplishment of their duties is thereby made more difficult.

Prisoners' representatives may appoint from amongst the prisoners such assistants as they may require. All material facilities shall be granted them, particularly a certain freedom of movement necessary for the accomplishment of their duties (inspection of labor detachments, receipt of supplies, etc.)

Prisoners' representatives shall be permitted to visit premises where prisoners of war are detained, and every prisoner of war shall have the right to consult freely his prisoners' representative.

All facilities shall likewise be accorded to the prisoner's representatives for communication by post and telegraph with the detaining authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and their delegates, the Mixed Medical Commissions, and the bodies which give assistance to prisoners of war. Prisoners' representatives of labor detachments shall enjoy the same facilities for communication with the prisoners' representatives of the principal camp. Such

communications shall not be restricted, nor considered as forming a part of the quota mentioned in Article 71.

Prisoners' representatives who are transferred shall be allowed a reasonable time to acquaint their successors with current affairs.

In case of dismissal, the reasons therefore shall be communicated to the Protecting Power.

Article 82

A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power; the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offense committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations, or orders. However, no proceedings or punishments contrary to the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed.

If any law, regulation, or order of the Detaining Power shall declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to be punishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishable if committed by a member of the forces of the Detaining Power, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only.

Article 83

In deciding whether proceedings in respect of an offense alleged to have been committed by a prisoner of war shall be judicial or disciplinary, the Detaining Power shall ensure that the competent authorities exercise the greatest leniency and adopt, wherever possible, disciplinary rather than judicial measures.

Article 85

Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.

Article 89

The disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of war are the following:

(1) A fine which shall not exceed 50 percent of the advances of pay and working pay which the prisoner of war would otherwise receive under the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a period of not more than 30 days.

(2) Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the present Convention.

(3) Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily. *

(4) Confinement.

* The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be applied to officers.

In no case shall disciplinary punishments be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health of prisoners of war.

Article 93

Escape or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offense, shall not be deemed an aggravating circumstance if the prisoner of war is subjected to trial by judicial proceedings in respect of an offense committed during his escape or attempt to escape.

In conformity with the principle stated in Article 83, offenses committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of facilitating their escape and which do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as offenses against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary punishment only.

Prisoners of war who aid or abet an escape or an attempt to escape shall be liable on this count to disciplinary punishment only.

Guidance for Peacetime Captivity

The Code of Conduct is a moral guide designed to assist military personnel in combat or being held prisoners of war to live up to the ideals contained in the DOD policy. This guidance shall assist U.S. military personnel who find themselves isolated from U.S. control in peacetime, or in a situation not related specifically in the Code of Conduct.

U.S. military personnel, because of their wide range of activities, are subject to peacetime detention by unfriendly governments or captivity by terrorist groups. This guidance seeks to help U.S. military personnel survive these situations with honor and doesn't constitute a means for judgment or replace the UCMJ as a vehicle for enforcement of proper conduct. This guidance, although exactly the same as the Code of Conduct in some areas, applies only during peacetime. The term "peacetime" means that armed conflict doesn't exist or where armed conflict does exist but the United States isn't involved directly.

U.S. military personnel, whether detainees or captives, can be assured that the U.S. Government will make every good faith effort to obtain their earliest release. Faith in one's country and its way of life, faith in fellow detainees or captives, and faith in one's self are critical to surviving with honor and resisting exploitation. Resisting exploitation and having faith in these areas are the responsibility of all

Americans. On the other hand, the destruction of such faith must be the assumed goal of all captors determined to maximize their gains from a detention or captive situation.

Regardless of the type of detention or captivity, or harshness of treatment, U.S. military personnel will maintain their military bearing. They should make every effort to remain calm, courteous, and project personal dignity. Discourteous, unmilitary behavior seldom serves the long term interest of the detainee, captive, or hostage. Such behavior, in some situations, can jeopardize survival and severely complicate efforts to gain release of the detained, captured, or hostage-held military member.

Capture by terrorists is generally the least predictable and structured form of peacetime captivity. The captor qualifies as an international criminal. The possible forms of captivity vary from spontaneous hijacking to a carefully planned kidnapping. In such captivities, hostages play a greater role in determining their own fate since the terrorists in many instances expect or receive no rewards for providing good treatment or releasing victims unharmed.

If assigned in or traveling through areas of known terrorist activity, U.S. military personnel shall exercise prudent antiterrorism measures to reduce their vulnerability to capture. During the process of capture and initial internment, they should remain calm and courteous, since most casualties among hostages occur during this phase.
For peacetime detention:

1. **YOU ARE** subject to laws of country

2. **AVOID** aggressive, combative, or illegal behavior

3. **REQUEST** Embassy, Allied, or Neutral representatives

4. **YOU ARE NOT** protected under Geneva Accords

Article III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. **I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.**

1. Escape attempts will be made only after careful consideration of the risk of violence, chance of success, and detrimental effects on detainees remaining behind. Jailbreak in most countries is a crime; escape attempts provide the detainer with further justification to prolong detention by charging additional violations of its criminal or civil law and result in bodily harm or even death to the detainee.

2. U.S. military personnel must keep faith with their fellow hostages and conduct themselves according to the guidelines of this enclosure. Hostages and kidnap victims who consider escape to be their only hope are authorized to make

such attempts. Each situation will be different and the hostage must weigh carefully every aspect of the decision before he/she attempts to escape.

3. Accept release unless doing so compromises individual honor or causes damage to the United States or its allies. Persons in charge of U.S. military detained personnel will authorize release under almost all circumstances.

Article V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. **I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability**. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their causes.

1. Provide name, rank, social security number, date of birth and innocent circumstances leading to detention. Discussions should be limited to and revolve around health and welfare matters, conditions of fellow detainees, and going home.

2. Surviving in some terrorist detentions may depend on hostages conveying a personal dignity and apparent sincerity to the captors. Hostages, therefore, may discuss nonsubstantive topics such as sports, family, and clothing, to convey to the terrorists the captive's personal dignity and human qualities.

3. The hostage will make every effort to avoid embarrassing the United States and the host government. The purpose of this dialogue is for the hostage to become a "person" in the captor's eyes, rather than a mere symbol of his or her ideological hatred. Such a dialogue should also strengthen the hostage's determination to survive and resist. A hostage may also listen actively to the terrorist's feeling about his or her cause to support the hostage's desire to be a "person" to the terrorist; however, he or she should never pander, praise, participate, or debate the terrorist's cause with him or her.

SUMMARY

> *"The responsibilities of a leader during combat are no different from his responsibilities in any other situation, i.e., he must effectively lead his unit in the accomplishment of its mission.*
>
> *The Code of Conduct is a formalization of the unwritten creed that American fighting men have dedicated themselves to since the birth of our nation. It is a professional code of moral conduct based upon human freedoms and dignity. It establishes standards of performance for the soldier to live up to and provides guidelines to help him meet these expectations. ... The Code of Conduct fits the very nature of a free man who holds firm convictions. As well as the soldier lives by the Code, it will serve him in turn." (Colonel Samuel Hays, ed, Taking Command)*

We cannot predict the situations we'll be thrust into during our service in the military. Living by the Code and making your followers aware of it, provides a bond that military members have turned to for strength in every combat situation. Think about what you'd do in the face of a POW situation.

Bibliography:

1. DA Pam 360-512, Code of the US Fighting Force; American Forces Information Service; Washington DC; Department of Defense, 1979. Reprint 1986
2. Hays, Colonel Samuel H. ed., Taking Command, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA, 1967.